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This study was confined to Kenya where the discourse of politicized Islam 
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views have given rise among intellectuals in the country. Clearly demonstrat-
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of religious institutions in civil society and politics, and also that Muslims, de-
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ciational activity in the country. Interviews were indispensable in the writing 
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nine- month postdoctoral position (September 2010– May 2011) to contin-
ue researching and writing the manuscript. Both institutions provided good 
working environments and high expectations, which challenged me to deliv-
er results.
I would like to make a special mention of the people upon whom the suc-
cess of this book depended. I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Muhammad 
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genial leadership and scholarly guidance. He provided much practical help 
and crucial professional guidance during the writing of this book. His sug-
gestions were thoughtful and went a long way in improving the manuscript. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Benjamin Soares of 
the African Studies Centre at Leiden University for being the first person to 
guide me in the ways of writing a manuscript. I wish to thank most sincerely 
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Kenya’s established tradition of separation of church and state has not suc-
cessfully severed the relationship between religion and politics. This book 
investigates the interweaving of religion and politics and, in particular, the 
changing relationship between Muslims and various political developments 
in Kenya from precolonial times to the present. It traces the role of Muslim 
individuals and associations under different political regimes, and explores 
the ways in which Muslims have politically mobilized in a context of polit-
ical authoritarianism and limited space for protest in Kenya. This has led to 
increasing politicization of Islam in Kenya, with the formation of the Islamic 
Party of Kenya (IPK) in 1992 crystallizing the growing process of radicaliza-
tion of sections of Kenyan Muslims. Bassam Tibi asserts that religion is today 
becoming increasingly politicized as an ideology of mobilization.1 He holds 
that “the politicization of religion signifies the articulation of a concept of 
order designed and articulated in divine terms.”2 Based on this argument, the 
politicization of Islam results in the belief that “Islam is a political system in 
as much as it is a religious one.”3
Politicization of Islam in Kenya is intrinsically connected to Muslims’ 
sense of their own marginalization, which shapes their understanding of Ken-
yan politics and governmental policies. Since the 1990s, an antigovernment 
stance has manifested among Muslims in Kenya, and there is much specula-
tion about why. This book examines Muslim discontent and traces it to a myr-
iad of factors, the most significant being perceived discrimination and mar-
ginalization, as well as divisions within Muslim communities. If one engages 
a Muslim in a discussion about the condition of Muslims, the conversation 
will likely include the following points: educationally, there is low enrollment 
of Muslim children in schools; economically, the majority of Muslims are 
jobless or low- income earners and generally poor; and politically, Muslims 
do not have sufficient clout to influence policy making. As a result, Muslims 
have come to perceive their situation as “collective discrimination, punish-
ment and marginalization of the community.”4 To illustrate their oppressed 
condition, this is how they interpret certain events confronting Muslims: The 
internal security permanent secretary ordered an audit of properties in the 
Eastleigh Estate in Nairobi. These properties have witnessed enormous in-
vestments by both Kenyan and non- Kenyan Somalis. There is concern that 
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some of the wealth that the Kenyan Somalis hold is associated with illegal 
activities, such as piracy, and that wealthy Somalis who benefit from the pro-
ceeds of piracy are escalating the property prices in Kenya’s towns beyond 
the reach of most Kenyans. The audit would ascertain the income sources 
of Somali investors, but Muslims want to know why the government is only 
targeting the Somalis.
From time to time, the government has been freezing the issuance of iden-
tity cards (IDs) to Northeastern Province residents, who are predominantly 
Somali, on the pretext that foreigners were also being issued the IDs. This 
government policy has led Muslims to ask why an entire region should be 
punished because of a few corrupt immigration officers. Another government 
ministry that raised suspicions for Muslims is Environment and Natural Re-
sources, which proposed a law seeking to regulate noise and excessive vibra-
tion. Though the statement published by the ministry did not directly identify 
the Muslim call to prayer (adhaan) as one of the sources of noise pollution, 
Muslims are concerned that such a law will impede the call to prayer be-
cause it employs loudspeakers. Muslims view the noise- reduction proposal as 
a strategy to curtail their freedom of worship, and claim that the government 
declared the adhaan to be noise. There is also the Catholic Church’s refusal 
to allow Muslim children wearing head scarves (hijab) to continue attending 
schools that are run by the church but whose teachers are paid by the gov-
ernment. Muslims feel that the head scarf is being used as a pretext to deny 
Muslim children education. These are only some of the frustrations building 
up in the Muslim community and waiting to erupt.
Obviously, the Kenyan government alone cannot be held responsible for 
this situation; a share of the blame must be placed on local and national 
Muslim political leaders as well. This book explores the myriad problems 
confronting Muslims, including failures of leadership. Besides providing lack-
luster service to their constituents, most Muslim politicians have done little 
to inspire political awareness in their communities or to initiate projects that 
would socially elevate their electorates, particularly Muslims. However, the 
overwhelming perception of marginalization and discrimination is beginning 
to mobilize Muslim politicians (extremists included) to demand justice and 
fair treatment. Poor education, economic impoverishment, and political pow-
erlessness are some of the many reasons why frustrated Muslims have resorted 
to politicizing Islam to agitate for their rights. Consequently, the non- Muslim 
Kenyan community is concerned about the aggressive political activism by 
some Muslim leaders demanding justice and equality for Muslims. By exam-
ining the dynamics of Muslim politics in Kenya, this book hopes to illuminate 
possibilities and the potential for a positive future.
The discourse of religion and politics is often confused with what is com-
monly referred to as the church- state relationship. While the problem of 
church and state involves institutions that are independent of each other and 
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thereby separable, the question of religion and politics revolves around a dif-
ferent set of issues involving the same people. Citizens who belong to reli-
gious groups are also members of political parties, and this dual association 
generates complications.
Religion influences the social, cultural, and political lives of communities 
in different ways. From time immemorial, religion and politics have been in-
separable. Islam and Christianity, in order of seniority, are the two dominant 
religions in Kenya. Historically, both Islam and Christianity have been state 
religions in different places of the world; they have even survived as such in 
modern times.5 In Kenya, the concept of state religion has not been incor-
porated into national politics based on the separation of church and state. 
However, while separation of church and state has been established, religion 
and politics continue to interact, and the personal involvement of politicians 
in religion is quite common. For example, President Daniel arap Moi takes 
members of his cabinet and senior government officials to participate in a 
Christian crusade organized by the renowned televangelist Reinhard Bonnke. 
The president “informed the crusade team that he had ordered the Ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting to broadcast the final two crusade meetings 
LIVE across the nation on television and radio.”6 Such media coverage is usu-
ally restricted to “official state occasions”; hence, Bonnke sees it as “a mighty 
miracle in the declaration of the Gospel.”7 Clearly, public participation by the 
political leadership in religious events enhances the bond between church 
and state, further integrating religion with politics.
Hassan Mwakimako dismisses the legitimacy of church and state separa-
tion in Kenya, arguing that it is only employed to suppress Muslims’ politi-
cal aspirations and to favor Christians.8 This view is misleading; if Christians 
were indeed favored, then church leaders would not have been critical of the 
Kenyan government and strongly opposed to the one- party system that dom-
inated national politics for more than two decades. The church challenged 
authoritarianism, human rights abuses, and the rigging of elections that were 
characteristic of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime.9 Presi-
dent Moi’s regime was extremely unpopular, and the church pulpit provided 
a forum from where popular disenchantment could be raised.10 The religious 
sector is one of many that publicly express dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment. Here, the term religious sector is used to refer to a vast community 
comprised of religious leaders, respected jurists, and teachers of the various 
religious groups in Kenya. In this sense, the meaning is not restricted to bish-
ops, priests, imams, sheikhs, ulama, and Kadhis, but to a more general group 
of people who may be referred as “holy men.” Since the late 1990s, religious 
leaders have been in the forefront, advocating for people- driven constitution-
al reforms as opposed to government- sponsored reforms. Together with other 
civil bodies, religious societies have played significant roles in promoting mul-
tiparty democracy, civic education, and good governance.
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However, the power of the religious sector could not match that of the 
state. With its loyal security forces, the government was capable of controlling 
any religious opposition it viewed as a political threat. President Moi’s regime 
perfected state control over the lives of citizens, and any criticism of the state’s 
excess was perceived as dissent. David Throup asserts that when Moi assumed 
power, he embarked on creating a political hegemony that included advanc-
ing people from his Kalenjin community into positions of influence. This 
process coincided with the ascension of a populist generation of politicians 
in the ruling party, KANU, who attacked any individual criticizing Moi’s pol-
icies.11 Despite this development, a section of leaders in the religious sector 
continued criticizing Moi’s government without fear, providing a surrogate 
opposition to his regime.
Vocal religious personalities like Bishop Alexander Muge of the Anglican 
Church, Muslim preacher Khalid Balala, and Father John Antony Kaiser 
of the Catholic Church suffered the consequences of opposing the regime. 
Muge died in a suspicious road accident in 1990,12 Balala was stripped of his 
Kenyan citizenship while he was visiting Germany in 1995,13 and Kaiser was 
mysteriously murdered in 2000.14 Many Kenyans believe that these incidents 
were politically motivated and suspect state involvement because these three 
religious figures were strong critics of Moi’s administration. The incumbent 
regime viewed criticism by religious bodies as encroachment into its political 
domain and insisted that religious leaders should not indulge themselves in 
politics, since it is an arena exclusively for politicians.15 As an autonomous 
force, Steve Bruce argues, religion is capable of creating order and stability 
by binding people together under a shared belief, a common cosmology, and 
morality. But despite promoting social cohesion, religion can also present 
“a potential threat to any political order” because of its ability to challenge 
political authority.16 It is this posed threat that led the political leadership in 
Kenya to call for a separation of religion and politics, which is meant to re-
strict the political engagement of religious leaders rather than to undermine 
a particular faith.
Religion took a prominent role in the public domain as a result of political 
liberalization that allowed multiparty politics in Kenya, leading Rene Otayek 
and Benjamin F. Soares to comment that “Islam, Christianity, and even Afri-
can traditional religions have all in varying degrees ‘gone public’ and entered 
into politics.”17 Muslims in Kenya capitalized on this emerging development 
by increasing their political activities, with Muslim activists and preachers 
joining the seasoned politicians. Kenya’s political history amply illustrates the 
salient role of Muslims in national politics. Donal B. Cruise’s position that 
Kenyan Muslims “seemed to find little to say of their present situation” due 
to their own incompetence at engaging in national politics is not true.18 This 
book explores abundant evidence that Muslims have engaged in national pol-
itics in both the colonial and postcolonial period.
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Muslims in Kenya predominantly inhabit the Northeastern Province and 
the coastal region. Islam has remained the dominant religion in these areas, 
along with traditional tribal institutions and values. Pockets of Muslim popu-
lations are concentrated in the interior of the country in various urban centers 
like Nairobi, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu, and Mumias. The most striking fea-
ture of the Kenyan Muslims, like their Christian compatriots, is a sociocul-
tural heterogeneity that cuts across the various racial and ethnic groups in the 
country. Due to this heterogeneity, Muslims’ political participation has often 
been influenced by ethnic, racial, and sometimes religious considerations. In 
some cases, such racial and ethnic heterogeneity does not support a mono-
lithic political voice. Instead, in a widely varied and plural community, the 
political control of certain personalities is bound to be eroded when racial 
and ethnic considerations constitute the main factors of political mobiliza-
tion. This, in combination with other factors, has made the Muslim commu-
nity in Kenya and their political direction vulnerable to external penetration 
and manipulation. These cleavages are traced to the British colonial policy of 
racially differentiating Muslims based on their Arab and African ancestries.19 
This study examines the contemporary consequences of that colonial policy.
After independence, Muslims groups discarded their differences under the 
unifying umbrella of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) 
and also became integrated into the regimes of presidents Jomo Kenyatta 
(1963– 78), Daniel arap Moi (1978– 2002), and Mwai Kibaki (2002– 13). In a 
study by Francois Constantin, he argues that the creation of a national Mus-
lim association in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania was “part of a general policy 
of social control initiated by post- colonial governments.”20 It is this desire that 
influenced the creation of organizations such as SUPKEM, Baraza Kuu la 
Waislamu wa Tanzania (BAKWATA), and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Muslims in Uganda (NAAM). According to Constantin, all 
of these national associations are expected to be loyal to their respective gov-
ernments and to abstain from political involvement. It is this position that 
compelled me to ascertain why SUPKEM, within the Kenyan context, has 
been reluctant to participate in partisan politics.
It is important to realize that ethnicity has remained prevalent in Kenyan 
politics because of its composition as a multiethnic nation- state, with subna-
tional identities based on language, common ancestry, and religion. Some-
times, religion and ethnicity combine to provide individuals with distinct 
identities. There is a tendency in Kenya to associate one’s ethnicity with a 
particular religion; this is why Islam, for example, is associated with “Arab,” 
Digo, and Swahili ethnic groups living at the coast or the Somalis of north-
eastern Kenya, while ethnic groups from the hinterland, such as the Luo and 
the Kikuyu, are viewed as Christians. Due to this affiliation of different ethnic 
communities with particular faiths, independent Kenya has experienced eth-
nic and sometimes religious tension that often arises from Muslims’ claims 
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of marginalization by the regimes of three presidents who are all ethnically 
associated with Christianity.
As a minority religious group vis- à- vis Christians, it can hardly be expect-
ed that Muslims would constitute a dominating force in Kenyan politics. 
However, they have less political influence than their proportion suggests. 
Despite the integration of some Muslims into the British administration of 
indirect rule, Muslims did not manage to capitalize on their privileged posi-
tion, particularly in the coastal region. Muslims not only failed to seize the 
educational opportunities offered by the colonial regime; in some cases they 
deliberately ignored them. This has heightened the Muslim perception of 
marginalization and discrimination. My study establishes that Kenyan Mus-
lims actively give voice to the issue of political neglect, arguing that since 
independence the upcountry Christian ruling class has regarded them as po-
litically insignificant and, therefore, allocated them paltry positions in govern-
ment. As an emerging young nation— between 1963 and 1979— there were 
no Muslim cabinet members in government, demonstrating the lack of polit-
ical influence of Kenyan Muslims in the country. This heightened Muslims 
feeling alienated and discriminated against with the advent of the upcountry 
Christian hegemony. This book discusses the chief manifestations of such 
Kenyan Muslim discrimination.
Despite this shared experience, the Muslim community in Kenya is not 
monolithic. The large majority of Kenyan Muslims belong to the various 
Sufi orders— such as the Qadiriyya and the Alawiyya— that are prominent in 
the rural areas.21 This diversity within the community is further reflected in 
the presence of the two major Sunni and Shi’a sects, both of which contain 
internal differences, such as the Ithna’ashari, Ismailis, and Bohora among 
the Shi’a, and the different schools of law among the Sunni Muslims. Fur-
thermore, Kenyan Muslims come from culturally diverse ethnic and racial 
groups, who practice distinct versions of the Muslim way of life. These ex-
amples of diversity illustrate that Muslims in Kenya do not present a single 
cohesive community.
There are conflicting reports regarding the number of Muslims in Kenya. 
Statistics vary depending on the source of information. Non- Muslim 
sources usually estimate the Muslim population to be between 5 and 8 per-
cent, whereas Muslim sources propose higher figures of between 25 and 35 
percent.22 External sources give similarly different figures. For instance, a 
2007 report by the U.S. State Department notes that “approximately 80 per-
cent of the country practices Christianity; Protestants represents 58 percent 
of the Christian majority, Roman Catholics represent 42 percent. Ten per-
cent of the population practice Islam, less than 1 percent practice Hinduism, 
Sikhism, and Baha’i, and the remainder follow various traditional indigenous 
religions. There are very few atheists.”23 Another external report ranks the pop-
ulation of Muslims in Kenya at 24 percent,24 while Arye Oded points out that 
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the 1998 census estimated the population at 20 percent. The 2009 census has 
been rejected by Muslim leaders; it put the community’s population at 10 
percent, which they allege is underestimated.25 On average, Muslims claim 
to represent at least 30 percent of the population.26
Muslims alleged that certain government officials in the department deal-
ing with census had deliberately manipulated the 2009 census data to adjust 
the figures of Kenyan Somalis— and to a large extent Muslims. This demon-
strates keen awareness, and even apprehension, of the numbers of Kenyan 
Somalis (read also Muslims) by the central government that did not exist be-
fore. Clearly, the numerical strength of the various religious groups in Kenya 
is a volatile issue. Muslims claim that they have received fewer resources and 
insignificant appointments into positions of power despite their sizeable num-
bers. In fact, the government does make decisions based on ethnic demogra-
phy, allocating national resources according to the ratio of an ethnic group 
to the total population. The smaller the population, the fewer resources it 
receives.
My examination of majority- minority relations draws from the works of 
Norman R. Yetman, Joseph B. Gittler, and Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr. 
Yetman traces the political origins of majority- minority consciousness to the 
emergence of nationalism and nation- states in Europe during the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the term minority “was used to 
characterize national or ethnic groups that had become subordinate to the 
peoples of another national group through imposition of, or shifts in, politi-
cal boundaries.”27 However, by emphasizing the differences in power as the 
distinctive feature of majority- minority relations, Gittler defines minority as a 
group “whose members experience a wide range of discriminatory treatment 
and frequently are relegated to positions relatively low in the status structure 
of a society.”28 In the Kenyan context, where religious difference instigates the 
dominance of the Christian majority over the Muslim minority, conflict is ev-
ident if not always overt. In their analysis of several developments in conflict 
since 1800, Bartos and Wehr argue that ethnic identity and racial superiori-
ty were encouraged by European governments as they established colonial 
empires in Africa. Bartos and Wehr claim that European powers carved up 
colonial territories with little regard for the prior political arrangements, thus 
ensuring that civil conflict would occur in these new states. The colonial 
boundaries split “ethnic groups into two, creating vulnerable minorities.”29 
The authors contend that intergroup resentments were bound to contribute 
to postcolonial conflict in such arrangements. Following Bartos and Wehr, I 
examine Muslim- Christian relations in Kenya in terms of conflict between a 
majority and a minority that have incompatible goals and feel hostility toward 
each other.
Muslims in Kenya are drawn from minority ethnic groups, thus doubling 
their sense of marginalization as ethnic and religious minorities. This per-
10 introduction 
ceived marginalization led to the formation of various Muslim organizations 
for improving Muslims’ welfare. Of all these organizations, the most signifi-
cant politically is the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), which was 
founded in January 1992. The formation of the IPK coincided with the gener-
al political activism in the country that inspired Kenyan Muslims to become 
more forceful in their struggle for equality. This study examines the increased 
political activism among Muslims that took the form of campaigns for politi-
cal reforms throughout the country.
This study also explores the incidents of terrorism in Nairobi (1980 and 
1988) and Mombasa (2002 and 2003), which posed daunting challenges to 
the Kenyan government’s attempts to prevent militant Muslims from commit-
ting more acts of terrorism in the country without antagonizing its Muslim 
population. This study delineates the legislative steps taken by the Kenyan 
government to curb international terrorism and Muslims’ rejection of the 
Suppression of Terrorism Bill in light of the history of Muslims’ opposition 
to the controversial legislation. This study illuminates how these legislative 
contests reveal three major recurrent themes: Muslims’ perceived margin-
alization, their political involvement, and their minority status. I argue that 
despite persistent racial and ethnic cleavages, Muslims’ involvement in Ken-
ya’s national politics is linked to their constant sense of marginalization as a 
minority.
In addition to defining the ideology of mobilization, Islamic symbols are 
also used to define Muslims as a political community. Ilter Turan defines “po-
litical community” as meaning “a collectivity whose members feel they should 
be under the same government.”30 Turan adds that the criteria of membership 
in a political community vary over time and across political systems. Applied 
to the Kenyan situation, Turan’s analysis sheds light on how Muslims have 
thought of themselves as a collective or as discrete groups of different tribes 
and races. This realization of a distinct political identity explains sections of 
Muslims’ secession campaigns during the early 1960s. Central to Muslim 
political identity and sense of community is sharia, or Islamic law, which is 
often used to define Muslims in local and national contexts. For example, 
the application of sharia is enshrined in the constitutions of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, but in Nigeria it is confined to local jurisdiction over Muslims of the 
northern regions of the country. In Kenya, Muslims’ sense of community and 
political identity in relationship to sharia has focused on both the demand to 
retain aspects of sharia in the Kenyan constitution and the application of sha-
ria to Muslims only. Writing about sharia and Sudan, Rex S. O’Fahey argues 
that the subject of sharia was central to the political and military conflicts in 
that country.31 The Islamist government continued enforcement of sharia in 
Sudan, and its refusal to compromise over the issue has been the source of a 
protracted civil war in Sudan. In Kenya, tensions between Muslims and the 
state have sometimes been heightened by governmental policies that are re-
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garded as contradictory to certain aspects of Muslims’ personal law. Through 
excessive lobbying, Muslims have been able to influence governmental deci-
sions and gain exclusion from certain laws of the country.
Since this study is concerned with the relationship between religion and 
politics in Kenya, it brings forward two important concepts: secularism and the 
secular state. The term secularism has been interpreted differently by scholars, 
but despite variant meanings, secularism as an ideology refers to the separa-
tion between religion and politics. However, the nature of secularism tends 
to differ from one state to another, culminating in several types of secular 
states. In some states, the concept of a secular state implies antireligious pro-
paganda, while in others the religious institution is recognized and respected. 
When the idea of separation of religion and politics is contextualized within 
Muslim society, Muslims express divergent views. There are those who hold 
that religion and politics must be integrated, while other Muslims believe that 
the two are separable. In their insightful analysis of Muslim politics, Dale F. 
Eickelman and James Piscatori concluded that “Muslims hold a variety of 
opinions on the relationship between religion and politics” but despite “the 
intellectual diversity, the indivisibility of the two realms persists in the study of 
Islam.”32 The view that there is no distinction between religion and politics in 
Islam is widespread among Islamists scholars.
Islamist scholars reject secularism, arguing the commonly held percep-
tion that it is an externally imposed ideology that reflects European imperial 
interests and, therefore, is irrelevant in Muslim societies.33 This position is 
found in the writings of Khurshid Ahmad, Muhammad Asad, Muhammad 
Husayn al- Mawdudi, and Hasan al- Turabi, among others. Proponents of this 
view argue that religion and politics have never been separate entities since 
the beginning of the history of Islam.34 As evidence, they draw from the life of 
Prophet Muhammad as both a messenger of God and a political leader of the 
state of Medina. A leading Islamist, Ayatollah Khomeini, has supported this 
view in his numerous writings, arguing that those “who consider Islam sepa-
rate from government and politics, it must be said to those ignoramuses that 
the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet contain more rules regarding 
government and politics than in other matters.”35 The ultimate goal of this in-
teraction is the creation of an Islamic state that is subordinate to sharia, which 
is then regarded as the code that outlines the general norms and functions of 
the state. Once such a state is formed, an Islamic religious authority is estab-
lished that directs people’s “lives in accordance with an interpretation of what 
the holders of such authority claim to be divine authority, which overrides 
authority established by ‘secular powers.’ ”36 This has led to “constant tension 
in the Muslim world between the realities of secular power and the idealism 
of those who claim religious authority,” John Hunwick observed.37
The contending view is that there is a separation between religion and pol-
itics in Islam. Among the scholars in this camp is Norma Salem, who claims:
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In the first place, the Arabic language does distinguish between the 
concept of din (religion) and siyasa (politics), dawla (state) and sul-
tan (power). The fact that many Muslim thinkers argue in favour of 
subjecting politics to the exigencies of religion indicates that such 
an ideal situation did not always exist either historically or even ideo-
logically.38
In support of this separation is Nazih Ayubi, who argues that the original Is-
lamic sources, the Quran and the hadith, have not adequately addressed the 
issue of a state. Ayubi took up the discussion by arguing
Islam is indeed a religion of collective morals, but there is very little 
in it that is specifically political i.e. there is very little in the original 
Islamic sources on how to form state, run governments and manage 
organizations. If the rulers of the historical Islamic state were also 
spiritual leaders of their community, this was not because Islam re-
quired the religious leaders (Imams) to be also a political ruler.39
Muhammad Said al- Ashmawi agrees with Ayubi and comments as follows on 
the question of an Islamic state:
There is no passage in the Quran about such a state and form of gov-
ernment, because the essence of religion, including Islam, is man, 
without regard to his terrestrial location, racial division or variety. 
Until the death of the prophet, there was no state in Islam; Medina 
approximated a city state. There was only a Muslim community led 
by the prophet. The basis of loyalty was religious belief, not any terri-
torial state or nation. The Quran and sharia always addressed them-
selves to the faithful, not the citizens. In fact the idea of citizenship 
was alien and unknown to Islam.40
This line of argument is repeated by another critic of the Islamic state, Hu-
sain Fawzi al- Najjar. He argues that there is no authentic text in the classical 
sources of Islam that supports the unity of religion and state where the sover-
eignty of God is the source of governance.41 The arguments of oppositional 
scholars form a consensus that the Quran and the hadith have not tackled 
the question of the form of government, thereby encouraging secularism and 
opposing “any institutionalized control by religion over human life, arguing 
that such a dominance fosters absolutist tendencies, destroys the existing in-
tellectual life, and promotes less tolerant and anti- democratic forms of social 
and political control.”42
According to the views of oppositional scholars, secularism has been 
adopted by some Muslim societies because it affords people protection 
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from tyranny, domination, and intolerance. There are abundant examples 
of secular- minded Muslim leaders who have ruled by emphasizing a separa-
tion between religion and politics, thereby disarming a potentially threaten-
ing religious authority. In determining the tension between secular powers 
and religious authorities, Hunwick thoughtfully observes variant forms of the 
strained relationship in Muslim societies.43 While some embraced aggressive 
secularization methods and programs (e.g., Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Mohammed Reza Shah of Iran), “others 
manipulated Islamic symbols and pursued a more subtle and circumspect ap-
proach to secularization (Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, 
and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan).”44 In addition to these two categories, 
most Muslims living as minorities have adapted to secular societies and po-
litical systems. This book examines the participation of Kenyan Muslims in 
national politics against this background of creating a secular state.
There is no recipe for a secular state, since the ingredients differ from one 
state to the other. Indeed, there are a variety of interpretations of the concept 
of secularism, which secular states are expected to incorporate into their con-
stitution as a policy. From the outset, there is no consensus on whether secu-
larism is essentially antireligious or nonreligious. For instance, England has 
a constitutionally established state religion but is inclusive of other faiths,45 
while Indonesia’s constitution does not declare Islam to be the official reli-
gion of the state, despite being a predominantly Muslim country. Though 
the various political groups “do not espouse an Islamic state or a literal inter-
pretation of shari’ah,” they nevertheless “tend to pursue agendas and policies 
guided by the principles of shari’ah.”46 In the former USSR, secularization 
implied the right to conduct antireligious propaganda, which was regarded 
as more important than the right to freedom of religion,47 whereas Turkey’s 
constitution does not allow the interference of religion in state affairs and 
politics.48 Despite this declaration, the state pays wages for the Sunni imams, 
provides Sunni religious education in public schools, and controls the con-
tent of the Friday sermons given in the mosques.49
This approach to secularism, where the state controls religious affairs, is 
different from the U.S. model, whose objective is “to give equal freedom to 
its citizens, in religious, political, economic and other aspects” and “not to 
promote one religion at the cost of other religions.”50 In this form of a secular 
state, the religious institution is respected, but no one religion is regarded as 
superior to another. It is left to citizens to decide whether or not they wish to 
adhere to a certain religion.
The constitution of Kenya is based on the principle of a nation constituted 
by all citizens, irrespective of religion or other identities. The Kenyan consti-
tution does not show preference to any one religion, but it does give special 
protection to minority cultural interests. This is why Muslims have enjoyed 
substantial autonomy in spheres that they consider important for preserving 
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their identity: those closely bound up with Muslim personal law. During 
both the colonial and postcolonial periods, Muslims have been allowed to 
apply their personal law in accordance with sharia via the entrenchment of 
the Kadhi courts in the country’s constitution. Therefore, this book examines 
Kenya’s form of a secular state vis- à- vis the Muslim minority in order to de-
termine how it impacted Muslims’ political involvement in both the colonial 
and postcolonial periods.
I assert in this book that there have been factors within Kenya’s political 
scene that create both division and unity among politically engaged Muslims. 
Specifically, I argue that Muslim politics are grounded in ethnicity and race 
in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. The racial and ethnic antag-
onism among Muslims contributed to the emergence of different Muslim 
political associations, in different political periods, with great ramifications 
for Muslims. More significantly, this book records recent political discourses 
involving Muslims in Kenya, in hopes that they will serve as a background for 
future research on current developments in the Muslim political arena.
This book attempts to answer many questions. How do religion and pol-
itics interact in Kenya? Is it possible for religion and politics to coexist in 
the country? How did the perceived marginalization of Muslims affect their 
participation in national politics both during the liberation struggle (1950– 
63) and after independence? To what extent did Muslim organizations be-
come involved in Kenyan politics before and after independence? How do 
Muslims cope with their minority status in the context of Kenyan politics? 
For instance, how do they express their rejection of legislation introduced by 
the government that they see as detrimental to Muslims? What role did the 
Islamic factor play at certain critical junctures? These questions and their 
answers demonstrate that religion and politics are intricately linked, and that 
they interact in important and complex ways.
The major recurring themes in this book are the perceived marginaliza-
tion and intra- Muslims divisions that continue to shape Muslim politics in 
postcolonial Kenya. Although the predicament of Muslims can be traced to 
the colonial period, postcolonial Kenyan regimes have been accused of ex-
cluding Muslims from political power. As the rest of Kenya was struggling to 
attain independence from the British, some Muslims were preoccupied with 
the idea of secession, remaining committed to the idea even after indepen-
dence rather than seeking their place in the emerging multiethnic and mul-
tireligious Kenya. These Muslims were confronted with marginalization that 
continues to shape Muslim politics in Kenya today, with internal divisions 
along racial and ethnic lines weakening their political strength even more. 
A recurrent paradox in Muslim politics is that repressive state measures that 
affect multiple disparate subgroups of Kenyan Muslims tend to bind them 
together through a shared increase in sense of marginalization and com-
mon misfortune. However, when it comes to pursuing objectives that are not 
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related to their perceived marginalization, Muslims tend to abandon their 
“tribal” (read: Islamic) identity and appear divided along racial and ethnic 
lines. This shows a dialectic play of some factors creating unity and others 
creating division.
Separation of church and state and integration of religion and politics are 
two important themes that function differently for Muslims and Christians. 
Muslim courts are enshrined in the Kenyan constitution, and Muslims strug-
gle very hard to keep it that way, while Christians demand the removal of the 
courts from the constitution on the basis of separation of church and state. Si-
multaneously, Muslims are concerned about the close relationship between 
churches and state officials, which reached its peak during the presidency 
of Moi. Muslims are now eager to have their religious symbols recognized 
within the Kenyan state, leading to competing politics between Muslims and 
Christians for recognition of their respective religious symbols. This book will 
demonstrate how the use of Islamic symbols to articulate a “mobilisatory ide-
ology” provides a better understanding of Muslim politics in Kenya.
This book also uses the theme of minority participation in politics to trace 
the various ways Muslims have engaged in Kenya’s political process. By ac-
tively engaging in both the democratic and nondemocratic aspects of nation-
al politics, Muslims earned political recognition within the Kenyan system. 
They have represented various political parties during parliamentary elec-
tions, which have been conducted in the country since its emergence as a 
sovereign state in 1963. Like other Kenyans, Muslims’ political engagement 
in the country underwent great transformation since the rekindling of the 
democratic process in the 1990s, with the role of Muslim activists becoming 
more visible. Due to this development, this book examines how a religious 
minority has challenged the uniformity of a nation- state, exploring structural 
power relations between the Kenyan state and a segment of its Muslim pop-
ulation. My narrative will follow Kenyan periodization, presenting Muslims’ 
political engagement from the precolonial era, through British colonial rule, 
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Religio- Political Relations in Precolonial and Colonial Times
Before examining Muslims’ political involvement in the contemporary peri-
od, this chapter puts the independence decades in proper perspective with 
an analysis of the precolonial and colonial eras. In the chapter, I explore the 
historical evolution of Muslim politics before independence. During the pre-
colonial period, the Kenyan coast was under the rule of a political model 
inspired by Islam. This was the Omani, Al- Busaid, dynasty that was a form of 
an Islamic sultanate. In 1749, the Omani Yarubi dynasty was overthrown by 
their adversary, the Al- Busaid family, which endured dynastic conflicts that 
incapacitated their domestic powers forcing them to relocate their capital to 
Zanzibar in 1830s. Said bin Sultan al- Busaid (1806– 56), is recognized as the 
founder and “first seyyid (prince or ruler) of the Al- Busaid Sultanate of Zan-
zibar.”1 The dominion covered the capital Zanzibar and the coastal strip of 
Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, apart from Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu, 
the Zanzibari hegemony also covered parts of the Sabaki north bank, Chonyi, 
Kauma, the Bajun area south of Kiunga, and parts of Digo.2 Under Seyyid 
Said’s rule in Zanzibar, the domain extended its realm of influence, and by 
the end of the nineteenth century the sultanate emerged as a dynastic king-
dom with Arabs (read also Muslims) at the top.3 Although Seyyid Said exer-
cised little direct control, his agents, the Omani governors, were established 
along what is now the Kenya coastline.4 This implies that coastal Kenya had 
a long tradition of sultanate rule prior becoming a British protectorate. The 
appointed governors secured their political control over the assigned regions 
by compelling indigenous leaders to submission through the lenses of Arabo-
centrism.5 Clearly, this illustrates that the power of the sultanate was derived 
from the notion of belonging to a purportedly superior racial class.
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Before Seyyid Said shifted the capital to Zanzibar, the sultanate was based 
in Oman, where it had grown out of the original Ibadi imamate.6 The Ibadi 
imamate ensured that the religious community was politically established, 
providing for an intimate interaction between religion and politics. Randall 
Lee Pouwels describes this interaction as follows:
The Ibadi Imamate saw itself . . . as an umma, a community of the 
“righteous ones” which maintained its special relationship to God by 
walking the path of righteousness. Also . . . it saw itself as pursuing the 
“right path” through adherence to the laws of God as interpreted by a 
body of educated jurisconsults. In addition they were led by an elect-
ed leader . . . the Imam . . . who was head of state and who ultimately 
was responsible for the administration of the Sharia.7
However, in the eleventh century, some changes were brought to the Oman 
dominion that included transition in the highest political office from imam 
to sultan. With the changes the sultan’s office assumed a purely political po-
sition and delegated the religious duties to another office.8 Although a clear 
separation of mosque and state evolved in Oman, the sultan retained most of 
the prerogatives that had formerly been the privilege of the imams. For that 
reason, when the Oman sultanate ultimately established its base in Zanzibar, 
efforts were made to maintain the same political system. The Liwali (plural, 
Maliwali) and Kadhi (plural, Makadhi) system of administration was intro-
duced in the Zanzibar dominion to represent the sultan in various capacities.
Until 1895, if an individual was to participate in the political affairs of 
the dominion such as holding an administrative office, one had to be a Mus-
lim. This was because all the upper ranks in the sultan’s administration were 
held by Omani Arabs who were by religious affiliation Muslims.9 The non- 
Muslims in the sultanate were free to practice their religion without inter-
ference, in return for recognizing and obeying the political authority of the 
sultan. It was not possible for non- Muslims to have the opportunity to rule 
the dominion because they were not members of the dominion’s political 
community. It is evident that during this era religion gave legitimacy to the 
polity. The religion of the political elites of the sultanate was Ibadi (a subsect 
of Kharijite) Islam, and accordingly, the political leadership was reserved for 
Arab Muslims, especially of the Ibadi affiliation.10 This religious affiliation 
assisted in distinguishing the Omanis as a distinct class and caste in the Al- 
Busaid dominion of Zanzibar.
Although the Arabs were a minority in the region, they managed to up-
hold the hegemony through force from the mid- nineteenth century to the 
early twentieth century. As in all forms of colonialism, the Arab hegemony 
served the interests of their own kind. Only Arab Muslims were appointed 
in various parts of the dominion to represent the sultan as either Kadhi, or 
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Liwali, or Mudir.11 By 1886 most of the governors (Maliwali) were Arabs of 
Omani descent, who during their service were transferred to different posts 
along the coast depending on their performance, a policy that thwarted them 
from creating an independent “local power base.”12 Beneath the Liwali were 
the Wajumbe who served as mediators between the Liwali office and the in-
digenous people. While executing their duties these administrative mediators 
also assisted in resolving cases using the local law of the people in their areas, 
but citizens could petition to the Liwali, or the Kadhi, when dissatisfied with 
the Wajumbe ruling.13 However, in places that the Arab representative was 
a Mudir, he was assisted in his duties by the African Masheha, who acted as 
messengers for the Muslim official.14 Gradually, the Omani Arabs construct-
ed a “racial state” crafted on a “political culture of Arabocentrism,” which for 
many years “accorded status and prestige to those who claimed connections 
to the Islamic Middle East.”15
This trend of appointing officials of the state confirms that the dominion 
was firmly meant to be an Arab Muslim affair. Carl F. Hallencreutz and Da-
vid Westerlund have referred to such a system of governance, like the one 
witnessed in the sultanate, as the state’s modified confessional policy of re-
ligion.16 In the Zanzibar sultanate, Islam was regarded as the religion of the 
state and privileged in various ways. Ilter Turan has argued that “in an Islamic 
state there may be non- Muslims” who are privileged with the “protected sta-
tus (Dhimmi) but they do not have equal rights and duties with members of 
the umma” because they are regarded as “subjects but not members of the 
political community.”17 Theoretically, in Islamic political thought the politi-
cal community is regarded to be synonymous with the religious community, 
thereby renouncing the need for autonomous politics. In such a system, non- 
Muslims do not have equal rights and duties with the members of the umma 
because they are considered subjects of the state, but not members of the 
political community. This argument by Turan confirms why the sultanate was 
dominated by Arab Muslims.
The end of the nineteenth century, during the rule of Sultan Barghash 
bin Said (1870– 88), brought the transition from precolonial Arab Muslim 
hegemony to Arab Muslim dominance under colonial overlordship. As the 
European countries were dividing Africa in the 1880s, Barghash succeeded 
in safeguarding the sultanate’s sovereignty by arranging for British “protec-
tion,” which recognized Zanzibar as a “protected Arab state.”18 The roots of 
the contemporary relationship between Muslims and the Kenyan state can 
be traced back to the period of British imperialism, which lasted from about 
1895 to 1963. The historical coastal strip (mwambao) that was part of the Zan-
zibar sultanate— 2,116 square miles that extended from Kipini in the north 
to Vanga in the south, and stretching inland from the coast for ten nautical 
miles— was granted a British protectorate status by the 1895 treaty. In oppo-
sition to the colonial rule forced upon what became Kenya, the 1895 treaty 
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between the British government and the Zanzibar hegemony recognized the 
sultan’s autonomy over the mwambao. This saw the colonial administration 
that governed the area as a protectorate being sympathetic to the religious 
and cultural heritage of the Muslims in the region. The Arabs and the colo-
nial administration maintained a working relationship throughout the period 
of British rule over the Kenyan coast, incorporating the Liwalis (governor), 
Mudirs (lieutenant), and Kadhis (court judge) into the nascent colonial ad-
ministration. Initially, Muslims— especially Arabs— were appointed as co-
lonial administrative officials to assist the British officers, but their number 
dwindled over time.
During this period, the British policy of indirect rule used the native in-
stitutions of government as a means to exert colonial control. The colonial 
administration was reluctant to tamper with local native institutions that 
had recognized their authority, preferring to use those institutions instead of 
inventing new ones.19 After the sultan accepted that the colonial authority 
would operate at the coast as overlords, the British acknowledged the sultan 
as a former master of the coast, thereby incorporating the institutions to im-
pose direct rule. This recognition implied that only the welfare of “a narrow 
stratum at the top of coastal society” was guaranteed, excluding other coastal 
groups who did not share “in the benefits of Omani rule.”20
Following this arrangement, freedom of religion was guaranteed, though 
no extra effort was made to encourage Islam. Supposedly, at least, the British 
colonial power respected Muslim sensitivities insofar as religious practices 
were concerned. This was evident with the recognition of the sultan’s ad-
ministrative (Liwali and Mudir) and legal (Kadhi courts) institutions. A clear 
illustration of this recognition is evident in James W. Robertson’s report:
Within the administration there is a special cadre of Arab adminis-
trative officers [read also Arab Muslims] headed by the Liwali for 
the Coast (who is also Adviser on Arab affairs to the Governor) and 
consisting, apart from him, of four Liwalis and ten Mudirs. These of-
ficers also had subordinate Courts of the second and third class with 
jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. There are, in addition, 
Kadhis who are magistrates specialising in questions of Islamic law 
in relation to inheritance, marriage and divorce, and other personal 
matters. Jurisdiction is limited to Arabs, Somalis and Africans [Mus-
lims]. These posts were in existence before British administration 
and to the Muslim peoples of the Coast they are, on nationalist, reli-
gious and historical grounds, of very great importance.21
However, Donal B. Cruise O’Brien calls the arrangement between the sultan 
of Zanzibar and the British authority over the Kenyan coast a “fictitious au-
tonomy” under colonial rule that provided consolation to the Muslim rulers 
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of the mwambao. He regards this arrangement to have soothed some Mus-
lims, which in the long run isolated coastal Muslims from development in 
the interior of the country.22 It is this isolation, I argue, that Muslims in the 
postcolonial era are striving to correct. Despite the recognition of various Mus-
lim institutions, colonial administrators had the exclusive capacity to appoint, 
monitor, regulate, and sanction the authority of Muslim officers. The sultan 
was not anymore consulted in the appointment of the three Arab officials: 
Liwalis, Mudirs, and Kadhis.23 This Arab cadre of officers was now on the 
payroll of the colonial administration. Since, for instance, in the precolonial 
period the Kadhis were expected to interpret the Islamic law as judges on be-
half of the sultan, such an institution was retained for continuity and smooth 
transition. Nevertheless, cooperation between Arab Muslim elites and the co-
lonial rule did not imply complete absence of criticism of the British admin-
istration. The latter part of the colonial period saw the emergence of Muslim 
groups that were not satisfied with the imposed political arrangements.
Another example that elucidates British concessions to Muslim interests, 
thereby demonstrating that the dominion was Islamic oriented, is the ban of 
alcohol in the protectorate. A notice given by Arthur H. Hardinge, consul 
general, in July 1897 states,
Whereas it is provided in the ordinance for restriction of importation 
of alcoholic liquors into Zanzibar, dated June 15th and published in 
the Zanzibar Gazette of the 30th . . . no distilled or alcoholic liquor 
shall be imported whether by land or sea into any of the territories 
administered by or for His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar otherwise 
than in accordance with this ordinance, which is thus rendered ap-
plicable to the mainland dominions of His Highness as well as to the 
Island of Zanzibar and Pemba.24
Hardinge’s letter to the colonial administrators shows the extent the British 
authority respected the Islamic law governing foods and drinks. The ban of al-
cohol in the sultan’s dominion is an indication of how Islam was an important 
factor in the administration of the sultanate, to the extent that it was granted 
the status of a Muslim polity.
The clear distinction between Muslims and non- Muslims in the Zanzibar 
sultanate should, however, not lead to the conclusion that the former were a 
unified political community. Racial and sectarian differences that divide the 
Muslim community were also evident in the sultanate. For example, there 
were certain Ibadi sultans who displayed intolerance to other sects of Islam. 
It was during the reign of Sultan Barghash that this religious intolerance oc-
curred. Upon his accession, Barghash came under the influence of a reform-
ist party of the Ibadi ulama called the Mutawwiun. This party influenced his 
personal religious conviction as well as the affairs of the state. One result of 
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this influence was the banning of the separate Friday prayer for the Sunni sub-
jects.25 The move angered the Sunni Muslims who constituted the majority 
in the dominion, thereby undermining the popularity of the sultanate.
Apart from sectarian differences, there were also racial divisions. African 
Muslim inhabitants of the dominion were not integrated into the political 
community.26 Hassan A. Mwakimako has illustrated this view by saying:
Immediately the Omani established their rule, they embarked on 
imposing their own governors over the indigenous communities. In 
appointing his representatives (liwalis, mudirs and kadhis), the sultan 
hardly considered the Mijikenda or the Swahili Muslims. This per-
haps was a bad precedent set by the Omani which later the British 
built on.27
It is a historical reality that the Arab settlers on the coast “used images of Arab 
descent to bolster their authority.”28 To justify the exclusion of the indige-
nous coastal Africans from the dominion leadership, the Arab elite regarded 
Africans as wajinga or washenzi, denoting ignoramuses. Such metaphors fit-
ted absolutely with the prejudices of the colonial rule. It was the practice of 
British administration “to conflate race and culture” where any “Muslim of 
aristocratic bearing was considered an Arab, not an African, and the Arab ele-
ment of coastal society was assumed to control the rest.”29 In the colonial view, 
“any upper- class Muslim might be called an ‘Arab,’ ” even if “he was born in 
Africa and spoke little or no Arabic.”30 This rejection of the native Africans 
from the political community elucidates why with the advent of nationalism, 
African Muslims supported the agenda for a unitary Kenya. The nationalists’ 
efforts inculcated a sense of Kenyan nationality with equal treatment to all 
citizens. The Arab Muslims, on the other hand, found it difficult to accept an 
ideology that challenged their monopoly in politics and their superior social 
status. The spread of nationalist ideas prompted resentment toward integra-
tion among Arab Muslims. As it became clear that Arabs would now lose their 
political monopoly, Islam was turned to as a means of securing and preserving 
their privileges, but to no avail. This was important as the spirit of Kenyan 
nationalism had become dominant.
The Fate of Muslims After the British Occupation at the Coast
The colonial power exhibited a reserved if not suspicious attitude toward Is-
lam in Kenya. However, within this framework, British policies were varied. 
During the formative years of the installation of the British rule, the colonial 
administration did not have a clear policy regarding the Islamic faith. Atti-
tudes toward Islam and Muslims varied among colonial officials who were 
influenced by their individual background. From 1895 to about 1912, the 
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British did not officially support or discourage the spread of Islam, but as a 
result of particular policies, the religion made significant gains. Sometimes 
consciously, but frequently not, the colonial government adopted policies that 
led to the unprecedented growth of the Muslim community. However, at the 
same time there were colonial policies that favored Christianity to the disad-
vantage of Islam. During the period of colonial occupation, there was a solid 
expansion of missionary evangelization and education. Many Kenyans in this 
period were exposed to Christian missionary activities such that by around 
1920s, the influence of Christianity was outstripping that of Islam especially 
in the rural interior areas.31 This led to increase of the number of Christians, 
while the spatial boundaries of Islam became static.
For a long time Islam in precolonial Kenya was confined to the coastal 
region (pwani) where it was associated with foreigners— Arabs, Persians, In-
dians, and some Muslim merchants who were culturally oriented toward the 
Middle East.32 Some of the earliest colonial officials indirectly promoted the 
spread of Islam in Kenya by adopting the policy of using Muslims, mostly Ar-
abs, in low- level administrative positions within the protectorate. The policy 
of appointing Arabs as state officials was based on the assumption that Arabs 
were superior to Africans. This was confirmed by Sir Arthur H. Hardinge, who 
as the high commissioner of British East Africa observed:
The Arabs  .  .  . are the only natives  .  .  . who can read, or have any 
comprehension of politics, justice or government. Community of 
religion, language and intermarriage gives them an influence over 
negro coast populations, which the European stranger cannot as a 
rule possess in the same degree, and even in the interior they are as 
Africans more at home than he can be. Once they have thoroughly 
learnt the lesson that he is the predominant partner, and must be 
obeyed as such, their influence applied under his control may be . . . 
very useful; and it is, I think, very important for the future of East 
Africa that a native administrative element should, if possible, be 
formed and trained up out of the Arabs.33
This colonial view of Arabs’ superiority was endorsed by the provincial com-
missioner of the coast, C. W. Hobley, who stated:
The Arab has several characteristics that made him of value particu-
larly to the coastal areas. He possesses greater intelligence than the 
ordinary native of the country. He possesses a hereditary gift of man-
aging natives.34
Clearly, the colonial administration considered the Arabs as enlightened and 
their urban centers located along the coastline as oases of “civilization.”35 The 
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Europeans’ view was grounded in racial bias that regarded native Africans 
as incapable of organizing themselves politically without the control and 
manipulation of the Arabs. It was out of such convictions that a system that 
reserved a special place for Arab Muslims within the colonial administration 
was initially recognized. In this system of administration, Arabs were incor-
porated in the nascent colonial administration as clerks and administrators. 
When the need for establishing a British African troop was mooted, Muslims 
of Arab, Nubi, Somali, and Swahili background were conscripted to the force. 
Many of these soldiers took it to be their duty to convert their non- Muslim 
colleagues to Islam. Also, the choice of the location of colonial administrative 
posts in the interior to some extent abetted the progress of Islam in the area. 
Most of the administrative posts were established in existing trading posts that 
had in the beginning been set up by Muslims before the British occupation 
of Kenya.36 It is through these and other policies that the earliest colonial rule 
served to reinforce Islam indirectly.
The Arab Factor in Muslim Collaboration with the Colonial 
Administration
Though Arabs formed a tiny minority among the mass of indigenous Af-
rican Muslims, they dominated the politics of Kenya’s coast in the pre- 
independence era.37 It is after independence that the participation of the wid-
er Muslim society is evident in Kenya’s politics. In this period, Arab influence 
was confined to the established coastal settlements and had no substantial 
impact inland. This limitation was partly from choice given that the Arab 
settlements had primarily a trading purpose. Apart from the period in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which the Portuguese held a tenuous 
disputed authority, Arab control of the coastal centers continued until the 
nineteenth century. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Arab 
control was reinforced and consolidated by Seyyid Said, who in 1832 moved 
his capital to Zanzibar.38
Following the death of Seyyid Said, an inheritance dispute emerged be-
tween his two sons. To resolve the matter, it was referred to the governor gen-
eral of India, Lord Canning, for arbitration; he decided that the sons should 
share their father’s possessions. According to the arbitration, Seyyid Thuwain 
became the sultan of Muscat and Oman, while on Seyyid Majid was bestowed 
the sultan of Zanzibar as an independent state from Oman. The recognition 
of Zanzibar’s independence was confirmed by Britain, France, and Germany 
in the 1862 declaration. In a 1886 agreement, Britain and Germany further 
recognized the sultan’s sovereignty in Zanzibar. The 1886 agreement stipulat-
ed that the sultan’s mainland dominions were defined as
The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and the smaller islands, as well 
as the islands within a radius of twelve nautical miles round those two 
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islands, as well as the islands of Lamu and Mafia . . . a continuous 
line of coast from the Minegani River at the head of Tungi Bay to Ki-
pini. . . . The line has an internal depth of ten nautical miles from the 
coast, measured direct into the interior from high water mark. The 
northern limit includes Kau, and to the north of Kipini the stations 
of Kismayu, Brava, Meurka, Mogadisho with a radius of ten nautical 
miles, and of Washeikh with a radius of five nautical miles.39
In May 1887, the British East Africa Association received from Sultan Bar-
ghash of Zanzibar a concession for fifty years over all his mainland territories 
and dependencies from Vanga to Kipini. The franchise granted the associa-
tion the administration of these areas to be conducted on behalf of the sultan, 
under his flag and subject to his sovereign rights. After acquiring the con-
cession, the association petitioned to the queen to be granted a charter. This 
petition was granted in 1888, and a royal charter was vested in the association 
under the name of Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC).40
For several reasons, the IBEAC found it difficult to continue overseeing 
the sultan dominion in the mainland and began negotiation with the British 
government to take over. Eventually, in 1895, the British government agreed 
to take over the property rights and assets of the company. The formal transfer 
of authority was conducted at Mombasa, Lamu, and Kismayu in July 1895. In 
the Mombasa meeting, Sir Lloyd Mathews, the wazir of the sultan, made the 
following remarks in relation to the transfer of authority:
I have come here today by the order of our Lord, Seyyid Hamid bin 
Thuwain, to inform you that the Company has retired from the ad-
ministration of this territory, and that the great English Government 
will succeed it, and Mr. Hardinge, the Consul- General at Zanzibar, 
will be the head of the new administration.41
On the December 14, 1895, a formal agreement was signed between the Brit-
ish authority and the sultan, where the IBEAC surrendered its management 
of the sultan’s dominions, paving the way for the British government. With 
the collapse of IBEAC, Sultan Hamid bin Thuwain (1893– 96) was prevailed 
upon to accept an agreement that formally entrusted the coast of Kenya to the 
protection of the British authority.42 The agreement signed between Sultan 
Thuwain and Hardinge, on behalf of the British authority, stated:
His Highness Seyyid Hamid bin Thuwain,43 Sultan of Zanzibar, 
agrees for himself, his heirs and successors, that as regards his pos-
sessions on the mainland and adjacent islands, exclusive of Zanzibar 
and Pemba, the administration shall be entrusted to officers appoint-
ed direct by Her Majesty’s Government, to whom alone they shall be 
responsible. . . . Her Britannic Majesty’s Government shall have the 
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power of terminating this Agreement on giving six months’ previous 
notice to the Sultan of Zanzibar of their intention to do so.44
This agreement ushered in the era of colonial rule over the sultan’s sub-
jects on the Kenyan coast, and the net effect was the gradual destruction of 
the authority of the Arab elite. Under British rule, the sultan became only 
a symbol of Muslim political sovereignty without any authority to make 
a decision. This development saw the course of Arab Muslims changing 
from one colonial governor to the other. However, the British rule over 
the sultan’s subjects was not as devastating as that of the Portuguese in the 
sixteenth century.45
During the formative years of colonial rule, Arabs on the coast were ini-
tially opposed to British administration before they learned to live with it and 
benefit when they could. Along the Kenyan coast, the Mazrui and Nabahani 
“were among the earliest Omani families” to settle in the region, and highly 
privileged “within the political framework of the Zanzibar sultanate.”46 The 
arrival of colonial rule ushered a new era that saw some “noble” Arab families 
at the coast losing their authority, forcing them to rebel against the British 
leadership. The revolts by these Arab elites were not efforts to defend the 
Omani state, but to safeguard their own sphere of influence, as they feared 
under British overlordship they would lose their local predominance. Among 
the notable rebellions by the Arab elites against the British were those led 
by the sultan of Witu and the Mazrui family around 1895.47 Both uprisings 
demonstrated dissatisfaction with colonial rule, but were successfully put 
down by British troops due to lack of unity among Muslims living along the 
coast. After these initial hostilities, the British administration found ways to 
establish working relations with Arab elites of the coastal region based on 
mutual benefit. This working relationship came in the form of the British 
acknowledging Arab Muslims as the local leaders of the communities living 
along the coast. The following extract from a report by the chief native com-
missioner on coast administration illustrates this clearly:
It is an axiom that the best way to govern any race is through its 
own acknowledged leaders and the organizations to which it is ac-
customed. The Arabs were masters of the Coast for centuries and are 
still its aristocracy.48
These views were also reinforced by J. H. Fazan, resident commissioner, who 
in a report on the administrative relations between Arab officers and native 
headmen at the coast, said:
The Arab officers are a legacy of the treaty with Zanzibar. It is pos-
sible for us to use them simply in the administration of Arabs  .  .  . 
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or again we may give them a recognized position in the scheme of 
direct administration of the coast people as a whole.49
What can be deduced from the foregoing extracts is that when the colonial 
government established its rule in Kenya, it assumed that Arabs were the 
overlords of the coastal region. As a result of the biased perception, British 
administrators felt it was necessary to create conducive working relationships 
with local Arab Muslim leaders. This working relationship excluded leaders 
of other communities in the region, for example, the Mijikenda and the Swa-
hili.50 In this arrangement, Arab leaders were to administer their areas of in-
fluence, which included the land of the Mijikenda and the Swahili, in return 
for both financial rewards and a range of political and religious privileges. In 
the accepted political arrangement, Arabs leaders agreed to support the new 
administration in exchange for being recognized as notables within the new 
political structure. Some of the notable Arab families who were elevated to 
“royal” positions by the British administration were the Nabahani, Mazrui, 
and Busaidi families.51
Therefore, after visualizing the Arabs as a special ruling class, the process 
of training Arab cadets started in earnest as they were viewed to be an asset 
to the protectorate.52 The imperialists decided to establish an administration 
of young Muslims who came from upper- class Arab families based on the as-
sumption that Arabs at that time were the only group at the coast who had any 
comprehension of politics and government.53 With only a small European 
staff and little prospect of the British treasury providing resources to recruit 
more, it was inevitable that the earliest administration depended on an Arab 
Muslim workforce and experience. Though no longer rulers of the coast, Ar-
abs were able to retain some of their previous privileges under the colonial 
authorities, whose notion of racial stratification served Arabs’ interests. In the 
colonial hierarchy of prestige, Europeans were ranked at the top, followed by 
Indians, then Arabs, and lastly Africans. Through their preferential policies, 
the colonial administration, like the earlier Al- Busaid leadership, contributed 
to strengthening racial groupings in coastal politics, “though by no means can 
it be said to have invented them.”54
As soon as Hardinge took over the governorship of the protectorate, he 
initiated a number of changes that had far- reaching implications. This started 
with the promulgation of the East Africa Order in Council of 1897, which 
entrenched British rule as it legally established institutions of state, power, 
and authority. The Order in Council established the Legislative Council, 
which in turn enacted the Native Court Regulation that empowered colonial 
officials to make rules and regulations for the administration of natives. The 
Native Courts Authority (1897) established the Native Courts Ordinances 
that contained statutes like the Liwali, Mudir, and Kadhi courts ordinances.55 
After its establishment, the Legislative Council enacted the Mohammedan 
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Marriage Divorce and Succession Ordinance of 1897, which institution-
alized selected aspects of Muslim personal law like marriage, divorce, and 
succession. The unfolding events indicate Hardinge’s eagerness to fulfill the 
agreement that had been made between Zanzibar and Britain. In the agree-
ment, the British had promised to continue recognizing the authority of the 
religious institutions in the protectorate. It was the sultan’s wish that “all affairs 
connected with the faith of Islam will be conducted to the honour and benefit 
of religion, and all ancient customs will be allowed to continue.”56 This ex-
plains why British officers gave due regard to sharia in dealing with Muslims 
living along the coast. To cite Hardinge: “The Mohammedan religion will 
remain the public and established creed in the Sultan’s territories and all 
cases and law suits between natives will continue to be decided according 
to the sharia.”57 One may wonder why Hardinge exhibited kind and tolerant 
gestures to Muslims. The answer could be that, apart from implementing the 
agreement, it is possible that his work experience and background influenced 
some of his decisions. Having worked in other Muslim societies (Egypt and 
the Ottoman Empire), Hardinge was willing to respect some local Islamic 
institutions thereby according Islam a special position in the administration. 
Steadily, a dual form of administration emerged on the coast: the Muslim and 
the colonial. In return for that recognized position, local Arab leaders were 
now expected to acknowledge the British administration and not the sultan.58
All along, the affairs of the new administration were managed from Mom-
basa.59 The growth and endowment of Mombasa with the necessary infra-
structures during this period made it an ideal choice for an administrative 
capital. With the choice of Mombasa and the recognition of local Arab lead-
ers, the Arab community began to associate itself with the colonial admin-
istration. However, the decision by Sir Charles Eliot in 1907 to transfer the 
capital of the colonial administration from Mombasa to Nairobi was viewed 
with skepticism by some Muslims. The action was interpreted as a deliberate 
intention to marginalize coastal Muslims and push them to political irrele-
vance.60 While this could be true, the transfer of the administrative capital to 
Nairobi had as much to do with Nairobi’s proximity to the emerging White 
Highlands.61 With the creation of the European settler class of the White 
Highlands, Nairobi was geographically close and a strategic location for the 
colonial administration. Therefore, the growth of Nairobi in size and politics 
was part and parcel of the history of white settlers in Kenya.
Under colonial rule, the Maliwali and the Makadhi were the most import-
ant Muslim officials to be incorporated into the native administration initiat-
ed by Hardinge. At the beginning, the two (Liwali and Kadhi) officials worked 
from the same office, and sometimes their duties overlapped because the du-
ties had not been clearly defined. In order to distinguish between the two, and 
to define the duties of the Kadhi office, Hardinge borrowed from the Egyptian 
and the Ottoman systems to draft the Mohammedan Marriage Divorce and 
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Succession Ordinance. It was now clear that the Kadhi’s jurisdiction would 
extend to all cases affecting the personal status of Muslims. In addition, the 
Makadhi were also made legal advisers to the Liwali and the district officers 
(DOs), whom they assisted in interpreting Islamic law.62
On the other hand, British administrators were supposed to work with 
Muslim officials known as Liwali, who had offices at Vanga, Gasi, Mombasa, 
Takaungu, Malindi, Mambrui, Mkunumbi, Kiwayu, and Lamu, and one who 
administered the region between Kiwayu and Tula.63 The scope and terms of 
reference for the Liwali were set out in a report by the chief native commis-
sioner for the coast region as follows:
The liwalis. . . [are] required to perform the same sort of administra-
tive duties as Assistant District Commissioners, viz— the collection 
of tax, the counting of houses, the taking of census for tax and other 
purposes, to supervise the work of village headmen, and generally to 
assist the District Commissioner in all the multifarious duties which 
he has to undertake.64
Through these changes, a special cadre of officials known as the Arab admin-
istration emerged. Though answerable to the colonial provincial administra-
tion, the head of the entire Arab administration was a senior Liwali who re-
sided in Mombasa.65 The Arab administrative officials acted as intermediaries 
between British authorities and the Muslim population at the coast. The Brit-
ish officials trusted and depended on them as they were the ones who were 
more familiar with the laws and customs of their people. There was no doubt 
that the British solution to governing the protectorate lay in the application 
of indirect rule, where they co- opted some of the Arab elites into the colonial 
bureaucracy though in subordinate positions.66 Such arrangements served to 
establish a belief among the Arab elites that they were the masters, a special 
class, over the native inhabitants.
Nevertheless, the early stages of implementing the indirect rule points to 
uncomfortable relations between colonial officials and the Muslim admin-
istrators they had appointed. In resolving the tension, British officials only 
retained Muslim individuals who were useful to the administration of the lo-
cals. When colonial officers noticed that some Muslim officials posed a threat 
to their authority, they did not hesitate to curb their influence. The following 
excerpt from the chief native commissioner on coast administration illustrates 
the efforts exerted by the colonial administrators to subdue Muslims officials:
The Liwalis, Mudirs, Kathis [Kadhis], and Akidas are now, as always 
have been, Arabs or Swahili, but it would appear that in some cas-
es they have been permitted to regard themselves as a class apart, 
instead of an ordinary integral portion of the general administrative 
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machinery of the protectorate. This is a condition which calls for 
correction. These officers must be either in the civil service or out of 
it. If they are in the service, they must conform to regulations, obey 
orders and carry out whatever is required of them as every European 
officer must.67
If any Muslim officials thought that they were a distinct class of officers not 
linked to the colonial state bureaucracy, they were mistaken. Subsequent gov-
ernors like Sir Charles Eliot and Sir Donald Stewart quickly corrected such 
misconceptions.68 During their tenures, they made it clear to the coastal Mus-
lim officials that they were civil servants and should not presume to have inde-
pendent authority outside the orbit of colonial administration. This implied 
that the position of the Muslim officials depended on the colonial adminis-
trators who monitored, regulated, and sanctioned their authority. Like other 
civil servants, Muslim officials also received monthly remunerations together 
with other benefits that accompanied their respective positions.69 The deci-
sion to pay the Muslims officials salaries and allowances can be interpreted as 
the colonial government’s effort to get maximum loyalty from the prospective 
appointee and by extension from the Muslim masses.
During this period of colonial rule, there was also close affinity between 
the various Christian missionaries and British administrators. Though at 
times some church missionaries were against certain aspects of colonial pol-
icy, such as taking peoples’ land in the White Highlands, there were more 
areas of agreement than disagreement between them. Not only did they share 
the same race and religion, but as Jeff Haynes has argued, colonialists and 
missionaries also shared the goal of bringing their “superior” European civili-
zation, which included their Christian faith, to as many Africans as possible.70 
Until the protectorate government began to consider its educational responsi-
bilities, the missionaries were the primary providers of Western education. It 
is this colonial educational system influenced by Christian missionaries that 
structured the social order. The educational system privileged ethnic groups 
that had connections with Christian missionaries, thereby excluding Muslims 
who ignored the missionaries. For religious reasons, some Muslims avoided 
missionary schools since during these early years it was intimately bound up 
with Christian teachings.71 To some extent proselytizing was an ulterior mo-
tive of these mission schools, making some Muslims (both African and Arabs) 
reluctant to send their children to school. However, there were cases where 
some Muslim individuals went through these mission schools and upon com-
pletion of their education became powerful Liwali in Mombasa. This was the 
case of Salim bin Muhammad Muhashami, Mbarak bin Ali Hinawi, and Sir 
Ali bin Salim.72
This Muslim boycott of the missionary school had an adverse effect on the 
Muslim community. Lack of education severely narrowed the scope for the 
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participation of Muslims and the opportunities for improvement in their po-
sition in the protectorate administration.73 Chances of improving their condi-
tions were very low given that government- sponsored schools were inadequate 
on the Muslim coast. The government felt reluctant to establish secular edu-
cation for a community that did not seem to appreciate it. Whether Muslims 
appreciated it or not was a different question. The fact was that the British ad-
ministration was not willing to support education in the protectorate, and this 
applied to Muslims as well. Every time the administration was approached, 
they gave the same response that “there was no money.” This prompted the di-
rector of education, in his letter of October 1918, to make the following retort:
It is time that this ceased. I have informed the Education Commis-
sion that in the proportion of expenditure on Education to public 
expenditure generally, the East Africa Protectorate ranks the lowest 
of— if not all— very nearly all the colonies and Protectorate of the 
Empire. Where Basutoland spends 10.2% and Southern Rhodesia 
9.7%, Zanzibar spends 1.4% and East Africa 0.69%.74
This situation put the Muslim community at an educational disadvantage. 
As a result, they were rendered incapable of coping with their economic 
problems and of retaining positions in various departments in the colonial 
government. According to Robert Hamilton’s report of 1919 to the Educa-
tion Commission, it was estimated that only around one hundred Muslims 
were employed by the government. This figure was too low given that four 
thousand clerks were employed by the colonial administration.75 At this point, 
Muslims came to consider education as the remedy to their pathetic condi-
tion, but not the low standard of education provided in the scarce government 
schools. Far from being adequate, they regarded the education presented in 
those schools as insufficient, producing semi- educated Muslim youths unable 
to compete for employment.76
Although some Muslims along the coast interpreted colonial policies as 
unjust and biased against them, their frustration did not lead to a religious 
conflict with the British. This was evident in the unquestioned loyalty of most 
Muslim officials and troops under the colonial administration. Different seg-
ments of the Muslim population (i.e., Arabs, Swahilis, Somalis, and Suda-
nese) had been used several times to put down one another’s mutinies and 
rebellions under British order without religious sentiments.77 Such incidents 
illustrate that the Islamic factor was not strong enough to unify Muslims in 
sabotaging British rule as demonstrated by the sultan of Witu and the Mazrui 
revolts. Their call for jihad failed to inspire the coastal Muslims against the 
colonial administration. Even when there were indications that their fortune 
was changing, Arabs did not resort to religious fanaticism as a means to restore 
their eroding privileges. Around 1925, there were efforts to curb the influence 
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of Arab officials in the districts of Malindi- Kilifi and Digo because the Brit-
ish observed that increased Arab influence amounted to encouraging Islam, 
which was not desired.78 Despite this change of attitude of British officials 
toward their earlier collaborators, there is no evidence that Arab Muslims 
resorted to Islam to rally their coreligionists against British authority.
Muslims’ Response to Representation in the Legislative Council
Due to the position Arabs found themselves in, they felt that they had genuine 
reasons to complain. A need arose for an independent voice to articulate their 
grievances. The only Arabs within the government were the Liwalis, Kadhis, 
and Mudirs. All of them were civil servants unable to question the authority 
they served. Consequently, an independent voice had to emerge. This voice 
turned out to be the Coast Arab Association (CAA), which appeared on the 
political scene in 1921. The association believed that Arabs’ support for the 
colonial administration had been taken for granted, due to the inadequate 
representation in the Legislative Council.79 For that reason, the CAA demand-
ed elected representation inspired by the growing political consciousness of 
the 1920s. This appeal was an attempt by Arabs to raise their status through 
independent representation.80 Although the CAA showed a lack of confidence 
in government appointees representing the community, it was not an Islamist 
body in its outlook. Rather, it could be described as a party that was secular in 
orientation. The actions of this Muslim body amounted to a revolt against the 
authority that the colonial government had worked hard to perpetuate.
In January 1922, a public meeting was held at Mombasa under the auspic-
es of the CAA. The meeting agreed to request that the government grant Arab 
Muslims two seats in the Executive Council and four seats in the Legislative 
Council.81 It was also resolved during the meeting that these seats should ex-
clusively be the preserve of Arab Muslims. This request demonstrated Arabs’ 
determination not to be left behind in the struggle for communal interests 
that had dominated the politics of the time. Ultimately, the British authority 
agreed to offer the community only two seats in the Legislative Council in 
1923. However, the election of Arabs to the Legislative Council caused a 
serious split in the Arab- Swahili camp that had for a long time been regarded 
as a composite body. Informing this perception was that some of the earliest 
Omani families living on the Kenyan coast like the Mazrui and Nabahani had 
long become assimilated to Swahili culture, explaining why some of their de-
scendants could no longer be regarded as “white Arabs,” but rather as people 
of a “mixed blood,” whom their European acquaintances referred as “black 
Arabs.”82 It is possible that in their efforts to distinguish between the “white 
Arab” and “black Arab” the local natives used the terms mwarabu in reference 
to “a Swahili speaking ‘Arab’ born at the coast,” and mmanga indicating “an 
Arabic speaker born in Oman.”83
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Etymologically, the word Swahili is derived from “an Arabic root meaning 
‘of the coast,’ ” that “was used as a euphemism by which slaves and others of 
low status could eschew their upcountry origins and identify with the Muslim 
culture of the coastal town.”84 Gradually, the word took a broader meaning 
to imply “a term of self- identification by those engaged in popular struggles 
for [coastal] citizenship.”85 Considering themselves as the aristocrats of the 
coast, the Arab elites were reluctant to be clustered with the Waswahili as 
one homogenous group, taking into account the category of people the word 
Swahili incorporated, the low class in society. This schism was witnessed in 
1927 when Arabs refused to allow the Swahili to vote for the Arab Legislative 
Council member. Clearly, the Arab elites’ attitude toward their Swahili allies 
was ambivalent. Arabocentrism ensured that the Swahili were classified as na-
tive Africans despite the former’s opposition to such perception.86 The Arabs 
considered the Swahili as Africans and therefore not legally eligible to vote 
for an Arab franchise seat. This argument was frequently used when it came 
to deciding on who had the right to vote for the Arab Legislative Council 
member. According to the Arabs, the Swahili were more Africans than Arabs, 
and that is why they refused to be treated equally with them. The Arab elites 
uncompromisingly disapproved the notion of being equated with the “un-
civilized African” (washenzi). The Swahili blamed their exclusion on some 
influential Arabs who had embraced the government’s classification of the 
Muslim community as two distinct groups that received different treatment.87 
Although the two groups shared the same faith, racial identity was stronger 
than Islamic solidarity.
The major historical cleavage in the Muslim world, other than that be-
tween Muslims and non- Muslims, was that between Arabs and non- Arab 
Muslims. Frequently, non- Arab Muslims were assigned second- class status 
by Arabs even though this was inconsistent with the egalitarian principles of 
Islam.88 This attitude of some Arabs was reflected in the politics of colonial 
Kenya where they were reluctant to concede equality to African Muslims. 
In a religion that advocates that no ethnic group was superior to any other, 
African Muslims were not accepted as equals by the influential Arabs. Despite 
sharing the same faith, the basis for the African- Arab cleavage was centered 
on the issue of race. This explains the antipathy many African Muslims de-
veloped for Arabs. Some African Muslims reacted with an underlying resent-
ment toward Arab Muslims. This was reflected in later nationalistic politics.
Faced with Arab rejection, the Swahili community felt the need to estab-
lish their own party. It was against this background that in 1927 Swahili Mus-
lims formed their own organization, the Afro- Asian Association (AAA). The 
choice of the name for the association suggests the Swahili’s willingness to 
be associated with the Arabs even if in a confused way. In this contradiction, 
it is clear that the Swahili identified themselves as both Arabs and Africans 
with individual racial identity changing depending on the prevailing circum-
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stances. The formation of the AAA meant that two rival Muslim bodies were 
now in existence. The AAA was in opposition to the CAA, which a section of 
coastal Muslims considered to be a racist association. In the next few years, 
intense rivalry between the two groups was evident.89 However, some mem-
bers of the Swahili community like the Tisa (Nine Tribes) and Thelatha Taifa 
(Three Tribes) struggled to have access to the voters’ roll as Arabs, while Ar-
abs continued to resist any amendments.90 In their campaign, the members 
of the Twelve Tribes tirelessly strove to justify their claim to recognition as 
Arabs based on (a) alleged genealogical proof of Arab origin and (b) and the 
possession of various letters, treaties, and proclamations from the sultans of 
Zanzibar granting them the status of Arabs.91 Clearly, the Twelve Tribes were 
playing at being Arabs so as to accrue the benefits of being aristocrats, but 
the Arab elites did not share their aspirations and denounced their claim to 
Arab status. In the ongoing conflict, the Swahili community sought full rec-
ognition in the urban community, while the Arab elites steadily ensured that 
the Waswahili were excluded and relegated to an inferior position. These 
struggles for recognition and supremacy in the urban community formed the 
core of the ambivalent relationship between Arabs and Swahili as evident 
in the later years. The struggles were essential in shaping the politics of the 
mwambao (coastal strip) that I will discuss in the next section.
For their part, the colonial authorities were adamant that they would not 
change the policy of appointing Arabs to both religious and political posi-
tions. This attitude later created a lasting impression that Arabs participated 
as collaborators within the colonial policy of indirect rule. Unless the law 
was changed, there was no hope of bringing the two factions together. And 
because division in the Muslim community was serving the colonialist polit-
ical interests, they were not inclined to change the law very soon. However, 
in 1952 as a result of emerging new political developments, the Swahili were 
granted franchise as Arabs. After this recognition, the Swahili were finally able 
to register as Arabs for both the 1957 and 1961 national elections.92
As the Swahili were eventually granted access to the voter’s roll as Arabs, 
still the indigenous African (black) Muslims did not feature in the scheme 
of the colonial administration. When both administrative and elective posts 
were being distributed to Arabs (and belatedly to Swahilis), African Muslims 
were not considered. This prompted their officials in 1958, under the banner 
of the African Muslim Society (AMS), to send a petition to the governor, 
Evelyn Baring, concerning African Muslim representation in the Kenya Leg-
islative Council. In part the letter stated:
All races in Kenya are represented in Legislative Council either on a 
religious or tribal basis except the African Muslims. The European 
and Arab communities have their representatives, whereas the Asians 
are catered for on a religious basis. Although African representation 
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is composed on a tribal basis, all these representatives are of Chris-
tian denomination. . . . It may well be said that the Arab and Asian 
Muslims can well serve the religious interests of our community in 
all vital problems affecting our faith, but experience has shown that 
neither of these two communities are prepared to assist us particular-
ly when it involves a clash with their own immediate interests.93
The above letter by the president of AMS, A. A. Omar, was an attempt to 
champion the rights of African Muslims on the coast to representation in 
the Legislative Council. In response, F. R. Wilson, private secretary to the 
governor argued:
Representation in Legislative Council is accorded to various sections 
of the population on a racial and not on a religious basis. The only 
exception to this rule is the separate representation of Asian Muslim 
and non- Muslim communities which is based on a long tradition of 
separation that has culminated in the partition of their country of 
origin and creation of two separate states: India and Pakistan. The 
religious divisions among the European and African communities 
and inside the Asian non- Muslim community have never been rec-
ognized as a proper basis for affording representation in Legislative 
Council and it would be wrong to recognize them as such at this 
stage. African representation is on a geographical and not on tribal 
or religious basis, but it is open to African Muslims to contest any 
constituency where they think they can obtain a majority . . . In se-
lecting candidates for appointment to the government backbenches, 
the Governor has always deliberately refrained from considering a 
person’s religion since if the government attempted to base its major-
ity on the support of denominational groups, it would probably serve 
to encourage religious differences.94
This letter downplayed a genuine concern that had been raised by African 
Muslims. What emerges from the letter is that the colonial administration did 
not have a coherent policy on how to deal with the religious factor. Its actions 
suggest that it was keen to emphasize racial differences, but the religious fac-
tor indirectly influenced some of its policies. By allowing Asian Muslims and 
Asian non- Muslims to have separate representation in the Legislative Coun-
cil, the religious factor that formed the basis of the formation of India and 
Pakistan was in play in colonial Kenya.
While the Islamic factor was acknowledged through the recognition of 
Arabs and Asian Muslims, the same privilege was denied to African Muslims. 
The latter group did not figure in the mental map of the colonial adminis-
trators, and they did not know how to deal with them. Since Africans were 
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rated low in the racial hierarchy, it is possible that the British authorities did 
not find them worthy enough to endorse their request. As far as the adminis-
tration was concerned, the solution to the issue lay in discouraging the idea 
of separate representation in the Legislative Council on the basis of religious 
affiliation. Though European, Asian, and Arab representation was influenced 
by religion, it was not a sufficient reason to extend the religious privilege to 
African Muslims. This colonial policy demonstrates the British government’s 
role in reinforcing racial segregation between the native African and the Arab 
elite. As a result of these policies of communal representation, politics were 
extremely polarized both racially and ethnically. During the colonial era, the 
politics of Kenya were racially oriented to the extent that certain groups strug-
gled to rid themselves of the inferiority status, while striving for the benefit 
enjoyed by the privileged class. The colonial policy dictated that the more 
native a group was, the fewer privileges it enjoyed.95
According to a colonial official, A. C. Hollis, a native was “any native of 
Africa, not of European or American origin. It includes any person not of Eu-
ropean or American origin, who, within the dominion of the sultan of Zanzi-
bar, would be subject to His Highness’ jurisdiction even though such a person 
should not have been born in Africa.”96 This explains why certain groups re-
jected their “identity because belonging to the ‘wrong identity’ carried with it 
the irresolvable consequences of loss of privileges,” A. P. Thornton observed.97 
To be a native implied one being denied human rights and important priv-
ileges that were reserved for the “civilized groups.” Due to lack of foresight, 
Arabs, Swahili, Bajuni, and Shirazi (all Muslims) who had no other home but 
the coast demanded to be accorded equal status with immigrant groups (Indi-
ans and Europeans) by denouncing their native status.98 This move by some 
coastal Muslim groups implied that they were not indigenous to the coast, 
but immigrant groups. This step was a miscalculation by these Muslim groups 
because they could have agitated for equality under their native status. It was 
this demand by certain Muslim groups that later led to the development of an 
ambiguous relation between them and African nationalists. Their demand for 
nonnative status was a dangerous move that resulted in a growing animosity 
toward them among indigenous black Africans. Such was the political front 
that a section of the Muslim community presented as Kenya was approaching 
independence.
Coastal Muslims’ Secession Agenda and the Politics of a  
Unitary Kenya
As a result of having acquired a Western formal education from the various 
missionary schools, upcountry Christian politicians were better prepared and 
equipped to take over leadership of the country from colonial authorities, rais-
ing concerns among Muslims that they would be marginalized by upcoun-
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try ethnic groups. This fear of political marginalization explains the Muslim 
secession campaigns in the early 1960s. In postcolonial Kenya, Arabs and 
Somalis were destined to be under African majority rule, dominated by Chris-
tians. As a result of their lower status, both ethnically and religiously, Arabs 
and Somalis were concerned that their interests would not be considered in 
postcolonial Kenya. This prompted them to seek secession. The entire seces-
sion agenda revealed tensions among minorities, who feared domination by a 
majority who would subject them to an “inferior social position” where their 
interests would not be represented.99
During the years of agitating for Kenyan independence, a protracted 
debate took place regarding the political status of the mwambao and the 
Northern Frontier District (NFD) largely inhabited by Somalis. Incidental-
ly, both regions— principally occupied by Muslims— advocated separately 
for secession to avoid being integrated into the new Kenya. The debate on 
secessionism highlights, on the one hand, the conflict between Arabs and Af-
rican nationalists (read: other coastal and upcountry politicians), and, on the 
other hand, the conflict between Somalis and the African nationalists (read: 
upcountry Christian politicians). This demand led to an ambivalent relation-
ship between pro- secessionists and the nationalist leaders in the country. The 
debate supports Bartos and Wehr’s argument that conflict is bound to erupt 
when there are opposing camps with different goals.100 It is evident that the 
goal of the Arabs and the Somalis was to secede to join Zanzibar and Somalia, 
respectively, while that of the African nationalists was a united Kenya. With 
the loss of being administered from Zanzibar and the Republic of Somalia, 
Kenyan Muslims became a minority group.
These sections of Muslim population— Arabs and Somalis— were suspi-
cious and nervous about the power of the upcountry Christian politicians, 
which explains the emergence of a strong separatist tendency among them. 
The political agenda of the Kenyan Somalis who advocated joining Soma-
lia was both ethnically and religiously influenced.101 Although Somalis per-
ceived their struggle in ethnic terms, religious differences with the majority of 
Kenyans prejudiced their political cause. On the other hand, the coastal Ar-
abs were agitating for reunification with the Busaidi sultanate in Zanzibar.102 
Their political agenda was among other factors guided by religious principles. 
Arguably, the pro- secessionists had a nostalgic feeling of an Islamic era under 
the Zanzibar sultanate, which they wanted to reestablish.
The decade of the 1950s was one of the crucial phases in the political his-
tory of Kenya. This phase was momentous as it saw the rise of African nation-
alism, which by 1963 succeeded in removing the colonial regime. Another 
crucial political development in this period was the campaign for secession 
that was being fronted by some of the coastal Muslims. As early as 1956, once 
it was established that the colonial administration was on the verge of ending 
and as countrywide demand for independence deepened, a section of Mus-
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lims on the coast began campaigning to be either rejoined with their former 
compatriots in Zanzibar or granted some autonomy relative to the emerging 
nation. Underlying the petition was the fear of being subjugated by the largely 
non- Muslim upcountry ethnic groups. The history of the position of mwambao 
as part of the dominion of Zanzibar became a mobilizing factor and the legal 
rationale for demanding special consideration from the colonial authority.
According to the Arab Muslims, it was a historical blunder that led the 
coast to be incorporated into the colony. For them, the coastal region should 
have been allowed to be administered with Zanzibar because the latter had 
more in common with the coast culturally, religiously, and even ethnically.103 
They viewed their culture to be similar to that of the Arab aristocrats in Zan-
zibar, which was reinforced by professing the same Islamic faith. Therefore, 
as the prospects for independence became real, the Arab Muslims feared the 
possibility of being denied certain privileges by the upcountry Christian ad-
ministration in the impending postcolonial Kenya. African politicians from 
the region, however, had different views about the status of the coast. They 
perceived themselves to have greater cultural affinity with the other Africans 
in the colony than with Zanzibar. In the emotional debate that was prompted 
by racial politics, Arab Muslims sought refuge in separation.104 This view was 
not shared by African coastal politicians such as Ronald Ngala, Msanifu Kom-
bo, and Francis Khamisi. The confrontation between the two sides gradually 
manifested itself as a competition between Africans and Arabs.
Both non- Muslim and Muslim African politicians on the coast were re-
luctant to embrace the idea of secession. They feared that unification with 
Zanzibar would imply being under Arab rule, and would mean continued 
subordination. Their preference was union with the rest of Kenya. On the oth-
er hand, the advocates of coastal autonomy viewed the upcountry Christian 
nationalist politicians who were collaborating with African coastal politicians 
as “foreigners.” Accordingly, the secessionists vowed that they would not al-
low again another leadership of “outsiders.”105 According to them, a foreign 
administration in the form of British- Christian government was preparing to 
pass governance of the country to another “foreigner ” in the form of upcoun-
try Christian leaders.
The attitude of the secessionists could be attributed to both social pride 
and the Islamic factor. One reason why the secessionists supported union 
with Zanzibar was their expectation that previous Arab privileges and status 
would be protected. Moreover, as Muslims they were unwilling to be ruled by 
non- Muslims. It was not until November 1958 that Governor Baring clarified 
the British position on the issue. The governor declared that the 1895 treaty 
between Britain and Zanzibar had not been abrogated and was still the ba-
sis of administration of the protectorate.106 Following this revelation, Africans 
were disappointed as they could not endorse the notion of an Arab- dominated 
coast. As far as they were concerned, the coast belonged to the Mijikenda 
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tribes, and the 1895 treaty did not alter that fact. The Africans argued that they 
were not consulted when the agreement was signed. In fact, there is no men-
tion in the British official report of indigenous coastal Africans’ participation 
in the meetings that culminated in the treaty.107
In late 1958, during the debate on secession, the two Arab elected mem-
bers, Sharif Abdallah and Sheikh Mahfudh Mackawi, presented a memo-
randum to the British authority, which they claimed had the support of the 
Afro- Asian Association and the Bajunis.108 Confronted with the possibilities 
of losing their privileges in postcolonial Kenya, the Arab elites appealed for 
the support of the Swahili community, only to realize that the latter had 
their own vision of the form of coastal politics. In the memorandum, Arab 
elites requested the colonial authority not to relinquish the protectorate to 
a government of independent Kenya.109 When the AAA was informed about 
this development, they decided to send a telegram to London dissociating 
themselves from the claims made by the two leaders. The response was 
prompted by the fact that for a long time Arabs had considered the members 
of the AAA as inferior. Therefore, they seized the opportunity to express 
their dissatisfaction with the way they had been perceived. And there was 
no better way than denying Arabs the support that they desperately needed 
at that crucial moment. Clearly, as the debate raged about secession of the 
coastal strip, Muslim and non- Muslim sections of Swahili communities and 
other African indigenous groups supported the amalgamation of the Kenyan 
colony and protectorate. Supporters of a united Kenya abandoned the idea 
of seceding, fearing continued domination by the Arab elites. Their appre-
hension was intensified by the colonial authority’s promise that the 1895 
treaty would be respected and would form the basis of considering the future 
of the mwambao.
Consequently, in addition to the telegram, the AAA presented a memoran-
dum to the British administration stating that it was inaccurate to insinuate 
that the coast belonged to Arabs only. According to the AAA, there were other 
communities like Baluchi, Digo, Giriama, and Swahili among others who 
also had a stake in the affairs of the region. In their view, it would be necessary 
to involve the other sections of the population in any discussion regarding 
the future of the coast. This action of the AAA was interpreted by Arabs as 
sabotage to a united front in London. In response, some Arabs decided to 
send telegrams expressing their support for Mackawi and Abdallah. To calm 
matters, the colonial secretary, Iain Macleod, in his address to a conference in 
February 1960, stated that so far there were no changes being contemplated 
in the agreement with the sultan.110
Arab Muslims’ attempts to form a coastal union association to protect the 
interests of the coast were frustrated by African politicians from the region 
who refused to join. In fact, the Mombasa African District Union (MADU) 
called upon all Africans organizations in the region not to be part of a union 
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that was being sponsored by Arabs. The Africans felt that since their objec-
tives were different from those of Arabs there was no need for collaboration. 
It was regarded as futile to support such a union. This response supports the 
claim by Bartos and Wehr that conflict is likely to arise between groups with 
incompatible goals. Having been disappointed by the coastal Africans, the 
Arabs solicited support elsewhere. In May 1960, a delegation of Arabs and 
Swahili Muslims went to Zanzibar and sought an audience with the sultan. 
In the meeting with the sultan, they expressed the concern about the sultan 
renouncing his sovereignty over the protectorate. They requested the sultan 
not to make any decision on the issue without consulting them, fearing that 
Britain might leave them under an upcountry government, which according 
to them would be unsympathetic to their culture and religion. Rather than 
being forced into that sort of arrangement, they visualized for themselves and 
other residents an autonomous status of the protectorate.
It was inevitable that the Arab claim to the coast as a separate entity would 
meet strong African opposition. Coastal Africans under their leader Ronald 
Ngala were not willing to compromise. In fact, Ngala said, in a November 
1960 Mombasa Times interview responding to one of the parties advocat-
ing for secession, that the “Coast People’s Party had an out of date, crazy 
and stupid idea about coast autonomy,” which is not supported by any Afri-
can.111 These views were in agreement with those raised by an African Mus-
lim, Msanifu Kombo, organizing secretary, Kenya African National Union 
(KANU), Mombasa branch. In an intimidating letter of June 1961 addressed 
to the Arabs, Kombo said:
We say that this Coast of Kenya is an integral part of Kenya and it 
can never be separated either by force or without force, and anyone 
who will try to do that, then I say that will be the day of “TROUBLE 
AND ANXIETIES HERE AT THE COAST.” Africans are the own-
ers of the country and they will not tolerate either you or what your 
party will do. Africans have evidence that they do not want Mwam-
bao (Coastal Strip) separated and there is no better proof than those 
21,000 voters who boycotted the Mwambao Representative. Here the 
Africans demonstrated by deed their determination of their rejection 
of this matter, and so if you want to introduce it by force, then what 
you will reap, will be what you have sown.112
It is clear that most of the coastal politicians of African descent did not em-
brace the idea of being under the sultan. They regarded the Arabs as an im-
migrant minority group whose special privileges over the years had been an 
obstacle to Africans advancing to majority rule. Also of concern to them was 
the privileged land ownership. The coastal African politicians challenged the 
land rights that enabled the Arabs to acquire huge tracts of land thereby ren-
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dering the Africans (both Muslims and non- Muslim) as squatters in their own 
land. This was the case in Malindi, Kilifi, and Kwale where land from some 
indigenous people was taken by the Arabs.113
The coastal African politicians emphasized that the Arabs had originally 
arrived in Kenya not as rulers but as traders. Therefore, they did not have any 
territorial rights in the country. According to them the coastal strip agreement 
was made between two foreign parties without due consultation with the 
rightful owners of the region.114 So while Arabs referred to upcountry politi-
cians as “outsiders” or “foreigners,” African politicians from the coast regarded 
the Arabs as nonindigenous immigrants. This attitude of the coastal African 
politicians toward Arabs was fueled by the latter’s rejection of their native 
status earlier in the colonial period.
In general, African coastal politicians (both Muslims and non- Muslims) 
felt more comfortable dealing with upcountry Christian politicians than 
with Arab Muslims. Accordingly, African coastal leaders sought assurance 
from the colonial government that it would not enter into any further agree-
ment with the sultan until Kenya had achieved uhuru (independence). In 
other words, they were suggesting that the new government of Kenya should 
be involved in any future discussions on the status of the strip. This view was 
utterly rejected by the proponents of separation who considered the treaty 
solely bilateral and insisted that the discussions should only involve Zanzibar 
and Britain. Lack of understanding between Arab leaders and African poli-
ticians led to the rise of several parties at the coast each claiming to fight for 
the interest of mwambao (the coastal strip). Some of the parties that emerged 
during that period were (i) the Shungwaya Freedom Party, (ii) the Kenya 
Protectorate National Party (KPNP), (iii) the Coast Peoples Party (CPP), and 
(iv) the Coast League.115
The Shungwaya Freedom Party, which emerged under the leadership of 
Ahmed Jeneby, was believed to be a Bajuni party representing the views of 
the community. The main objective of the party was to champion for the 
improvement of the social welfare and the political rights of the Bajuni.116 Its 
creation reflected the Bajuni’s reaction to Mombasa- based leadership. Their 
disillusionment with the Mombasa leadership was evident in the 1960 gen-
eral meeting where they criticized the Arab elected members for neglecting 
issues affecting the Bajuni community. They were bitter that the two mem-
bers of the council had not bothered to visit the Bajuni district and inform the 
people of the political developments in the country. It was out of this resent-
ment that the Bajuni dissociated themselves with the petition to the sultan. 
During the meeting, they resolved that any future decisions concerning the 
community would be dictated by a careful study of the political changes. To 
indicate their commitment to their 1960 resolutions, in May 1961, Bajunis 
decided to support the advocates of a unitary system based on the conviction 
that the Bajuni land formed part of Kenya.117
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Turning to the KPNP, the party emerged as an Arab organization in the 
Malindi district. The party was also dissatisfied with the established leadership 
in Mombasa, which allegedly only remembered the district during election 
periods. Some of the party’s objectives were “to constitutionally fight for in-
dependence of mwambao and later on federate with the rest of East African 
states. To avoid any sort of colour and/or religious discrimination; to strive for 
the abolition of all forms of racialism and oppression, and to uphold demo-
cratic ideals.”118 Though on paper the party intended to eradicate all forms 
of racialism and oppression, in practice it appeared more of a party that was 
championing the cause of the Arabs, particularly those of Malindi. However, 
its main objective was to constitutionally advocate for the independence of 
mwambao, which it considers as part of Zanzibar and not Kenya. This ex-
plains why in March 1963, the KPNP appealed to the district officer (DO) of 
Malindi to permit them to raise the red flag at a public rally as a symbol that 
the decision about the coastal strip was with the sultan. Previously, the red 
flag, representing the Busaid dynasty, “was flown on Fridays and holidays” to 
assert the coastal region was under “a Muslim power.”119 However, the request 
was rejected by the DO on two grounds: (i) according to Section 10 of the 
Public Order Ordinance Cap 56 laws of Kenya it was illegal to fly a flag at a 
public meeting and (ii) the red flag, being the sultan’s flag, could not be per-
mitted to be hoisted where the British were in authority because that would 
be tantamount to suggesting that it was the sultan who was in authority at the 
coast and not the British.120 Though that was the motive behind the demand 
by the KPNP, naturally, the colonialists would not encourage such a notion 
to be nurtured by the coastal Arabs.
Despite the fact that both the Shungwaya party and the KPNP were coastal 
Muslims’ political platforms, they were all sectarian in outlook, promoting 
the welfare of their respective communities. Through the Shungwaya party, 
the Bajuni resented the treatment the community was accorded by the Arab 
elites. This was a clear case of the “politics of reputation” as observed by 
Jonathon Glassman, “in which the weak might vilify the powerful for being 
ungenerous, and the rich ignore their obligations to those they deemed un-
grateful.”121 Upon realizing that the Arabs had been taking them and other 
Swahili communities for granted, the Bajuni envisaged their aspirations being 
accorded in postcolonial Kenya rather than in separation dominated by Arabs. 
On the other hand, the KPNP championed the continued influence of the 
Arab elites in coastal politics, which was only guaranteed through secession.
Among all the other parties that appeared at that time, the Coast Peoples 
Party (CPP) emerged as the most articulate proponent of coastal autonomy 
in the 1960s. One of its pamphlets of September 1961 inviting people to a 
public rally reads: “The Coastal Strip has never and will never be one with 
the colony. You are all invited to a MAMMOTH meeting by the COAST 
PEOPLES PARTY: (CHAMPIONS OF COASTAL AUTONOMY).”122 The 
Historical Evolution of Muslim Politics in Kenya from the 1840s to 1963   43
main objective of CPP was “to strive peacefully and constitutionally for the 
ultimate independence of the Kenyan Protectorate and its eventual federa-
tion with Kenya or other East African territories.”123 Through their campaign 
cries of mwambao hai (coast alive/arise) or umma hai (the nation/community 
alive/arise), they drew huge crowds to their meetings. In its effort to have a 
nonsectarian, nonethnic, and nonracial outlook, the party attempted to gain 
support outside Mombasa district. This is why its leadership had Ali Abdallah 
(an Arab Muslim) as its secretary and Maalim Rashid Bakuli (a Digo Muslim) 
as its vice president. Maalim Bakuli’s position was perceived as strategic with 
the hope that, being a Digo Muslim, his allegiance would sway his tribesmen 
to join CPP.124 Remarkably, at this juncture, the Arab elite begun seeking the 
support of groups of people they had earlier regarded as wajinga or washenzi 
like the Digo, only to find out that these “ignoramuses” had a different idea of 
the shape of coastal politics. The efforts by Bakuli to gain support from fellow 
Digo failed to dislodge the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the 
Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), both of which had already been 
established among the Digo of southern region of the coast.
It was in Kwale district that non- Muslim politicians from upcountry Kenya 
received significant support. Jomo Kenyatta and several Kenya African Union 
(KAU) officials had visited the region in early 1952 and established a branch 
of KAU among Digo Muslims.125 A year later when KAU was proscribed, 
a series of barazas (public meetings) were held in Kwale warning people 
against associating themselves with “subversive activities.” As Muslims, they 
were reminded to be good citizens and to respect those in authority.126 All 
these efforts, including the religious appeals, were ineffective in diluting the 
nationalistic fervor that had spread among the Digo. And when KANU and 
KADU were formed later in the early 1960s, they found enthusiastic sup-
porters among the Digo. By joining these earliest nationalistic political or-
ganizations, Digo Muslims hoped to be able to contribute to policies aimed 
at redressing imbalances in society. This reaction can be explained by the 
injustices they had witnessed in the colonial period. All Africans irrespective 
of their religion condemned oppression, yet the only Muslim group that was 
accorded privileges was the Arab community. It was this injustice that influ-
enced the relationship between African Muslims and Arab Muslims vis- à- vis 
African nationalism.
Yet another party was the Coast League, which was described as the party 
of moderation and compromise in comparison with the CPP. It was alleged 
that this party advocated for the establishment of a British base at the coast 
in return either for autonomy or continued protection of the strip until the 
coastal people were prepared to take over. While the Coast League was also 
seen as being more pro- sultan, the CPP questioned the allegiance given to 
a sultanate that seemed unconcerned with the welfare of its mainland sub-
jects. The CPP was disillusioned by the leadership in Zanzibar that was not 
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coming forth to espouse the cause of the coastal people, especially the Arab 
elites. It was against this background that the CPP advocated for mwambao 
autonomy. The Coast League’s agenda did not resonate with most coastal in-
habitants, which thereby contributed to the failure of this party to make any 
significant impact at the coast.127 The fact that more than one party emerged 
to fight for mwambao was symptomatic of basic divergences in approach 
and multilayered rivalries. Clearly, the sectarian approaches to the issue of 
mwambao politics demonstrate the multivariant fault lines that characterized 
the coastal society. The evident wrangling and lack of coordination among 
the mwambao parties affected the cohesion that would have been crucial to 
advance their cause.
The plan for mwambao autonomy that was supposed to be submitted to the 
British government was undermined by divisions in the Arab camp. Among 
the Arabs there were those who wanted to see the continuation of British pro-
tection and those who sought the complete autonomy of mwambao. The two 
elected Arab members favored a revision of the 1895 agreement and opposed 
the idea of the establishment of a British base at the coast. Their views were 
criticized by other Arabs including Salim Mohammed Balala, a spokesman 
of the Hadhrami traders and shopkeepers, who ascribed Mombasa’s develop-
ment to British enterprise. Due to these divisions the Arabs were in a dilemma 
and could not agree which political agenda to embrace. This dilemma is 
expressed in an article published in the Mombasa Times:
No clear cut (Arab) policy has been issued although the atmosphere 
is challenging and other races have come out in their true colours . . . 
the Africans have put the “Africa for Africans” slogan . . . and it is hard 
to believe that we shall be immune. The Coast is protected for us but 
it is nevertheless part of Africa. Things are moving fast and disinte-
gration looms ahead like a nightmare. With all our long cultural and 
religious association with Zanzibar do we accept it?128
In the midst of this confusion and division, in September 1960, Governor 
Patrick Renison assured Arabs that the status of the protectorate would be 
considered and the 1895 treaty would not be abandoned by the colonial gov-
ernment. He promised them that consideration would be given to proposals 
made by Arabs regarding the future of the protectorate. The speech provoked 
criticism by African nationalists from both the coast and the upcountry.129
Meanwhile, the British government together with the sultan of Zanzibar 
commissioned Sir James W. Robertson to inquire and present appropriate 
suggestions concerning the future of the coastal strip. Discussions between 
Robertson and leading political actors of the early 1960s reveal that represen-
tatives of the indigenous African communities (Mijikenda) favored the coast-
al strip being integrated with the Kenya colony upon independence. The at-
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titude of the coastal African politicians toward Arabs was fueled by the latter’s 
rejection of their native status, where under colonial rule Arabs preferred to 
be considered as alien so as to enjoy the privileges that status entailed. The 
Arab elites uncompromisingly disapproved the notion of being equated with 
the “uncivilized African” (washenzi) as that would deny them special rights. 
This colonial policy demonstrates the British government’s role in reinforcing 
racial segregation between the native African and the Arab elite. As a result of 
this policy of communal representation, politics was extremely polarized both 
racially and ethnically— and to some extent religiously— as evident during 
the mwambao debate. After Robertson concluded his consultations with the 
various segments of the coastal population, he compiled a report that recom-
mended integration of the two political spheres before independence. With 
the commission’s findings that recognized mwambao as part of the Kenya ter-
ritory, the Arab elites and their supporters felt shortchanged, as Governor Ren-
ison had earlier assured them of colonial administration support. The colonial 
government approved the suggestion, and in the London conference of 1963, 
it was agreed that the sultan’s government would surrender its sovereignty 
over the strip to Kenya and that Britain would make the necessary compen-
sation to the sultan.130 The agreement implied that the issue concerning the 
status of the coast had been resolved and that it was legally part of Kenya.
Given that the coastal strip was heterogeneous, it increasingly became dif-
ficult for Arabs to continue advocating separatism on their own. They came to 
the realization that they no longer had any special political status of their own 
since the majority of the people living along the mwambao wanted the region 
to be part of Kenya. This awareness compelled them to unequivocally decide 
to place their destiny in the hands of those who would soon command power 
in the country. As they accepted integration into Kenya, it was important for 
them to attain internal reconciliation. Ali Abdallah of the CPP had earlier ad-
dressed a meeting attended by members of the various political parties at the 
coast advising them that “the time has come when we should be thinking of 
each other not as enemies, because we belonged to different political groups, 
but as friends, willing to settle difference and deeply interested in the welfare, 
progress and prosperity of our communities.”131 At this meeting, they agreed to 
forget their differences and forge a united front as coast politicians irrespective 
of race, ethnicity, and religion. The major factor that influenced the decision 
of a section of coastal Muslims to forgo their earlier political aspirations and 
opt for full integration with Kenya was the adoption of a regional system of 
government (majimbo). This was the idea propagated by Ngala’s KADU.
With regionalism, Arabs were assured of some degree of autonomy, escap-
ing domination by non- Muslim politicians from upcountry. According to this 
system of government as agreed upon in the London conference in 1963, 
there would be six regional governments and a central one responsible for 
major matters such as foreign affairs, defense, trade, and economic develop-
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ment.132 During the conference, an agreement was signed in October 1963 
between Kenyatta and Mohamed Shamte, the Zanzibar prime minister repre-
senting the sultan, which legally bequeathed the mwambao to Kenya.
Before the signing was concluded at the Lancaster conference, the Kenyan 
delegation led by Kenyatta gave an assurance that they would honor and re-
spect Muslims’ way of life in assuming sovereignty. As freedom of conscience 
and of religion was embodied in the constitution, there was no fear of inter-
ference in their religious affairs. In principle it was agreed that the Ten- Mile 
Coastal Strip would become part of Kenya on the condition that the rights of 
Muslims as well as the Kadhi courts would be preserved at all times.133 On 
behalf of the Kenyan government, Kenyatta stated,
1)  The free exercise of any creed or religion will at all times be 
safeguarded and, in particular, His Highness’s present subjects 
who are of the Muslim faith and their descendants will at all 
times be ensured of complete freedom of worship and the pres-
ervation of their own religious buildings and institutions.
2)  The jurisdiction of the Chief Kadhi and of all the other Kadhis 
will at all times be preserved and will extend to the determina-
tion of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status (for 
example, marriage, divorce and inheritance) in proceedings in 
which all parties profess the Muslim religion.134
This agreement was recognized by the United Nations as a pact between two 
sovereign states and embedded under the pacts of international treaty. It is 
this arrangement that Muslims sometimes revisit when they come into con-
flict with either the state or their non- Muslim compatriots in relation to the 
Kadhi courts.
The Pan- Somalia State and Kenyan Somalis’ Secession Program
The Somalis, on the other hand, believed that they were part of the greater 
Somalia before they were scattered into five different territories. The main 
political discourse of Somali Muslims from 1952 to independence centered 
on the issue of secession to Somalia and the formation of an independent 
pan- Somali nation- state. This agenda was based on the argument that Somali- 
speaking people constitute a distinct nation entitled to a separate existence, 
just like other nation- states in the world. Accordingly, the Republic of Somalia 
claimed that the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which is mainly inhab-
ited by Somali speakers, should be part of its territory and not of Kenya. This 
claim was an integral part of the concept of “Greater Somalia,” which poli-
ticians in the Republic of Somali endeavored to achieve.135 The authorities 
in Mogadishu supported the idea of pan- Somalia state, which incorporated 
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the Italian Somalia, the British Somaliland, Djibouti on the French side, the 
NFD in Kenya, and the Ogaden in Ethiopia as extolled by the five- pointed 
star in their new flag.136 Though the idea of secession originally appeared to 
have been nurtured by politicians from the Republic of Somalia, it found 
acceptance among Somalis of the NFD. To realize this goal, various political 
parties were formed by Somalis in the region.
The most effective party was the Northern Province Peoples Party 
(NPPP) led by Wako Happi. As a result of its campaigns, the NPPP succeed-
ed in gaining more support among both Somali- and non- Somali- speaking 
people (especially among the Boran and Rendille) than any earlier politi-
cal movement in the region. The party was able to bring together Kenyan 
Somalis in terms of membership, geographic locations, and status within 
community. With the creation of the new state of the Republic of Somalia, 
the NPPP and its secessionist partners requested that the colonial admin-
istration conduct a referendum in the region to resolve the destiny of the 
NFD. To indicate their determination not to be part of independent Ken-
ya, the Somali resorted to boycotting the 1960 electoral registration and to 
abstaining from any involvement in the movement toward independence 
in Kenya.137 Through such strategies, the Somali hoped that their union 
with Somalia would be accomplished. The reality that upcountry Christian 
politicians were bound to take over the leadership of the country did not 
augur well with the Somali Muslims. They hated the idea of being under 
a government dominated by people they “disliked and despised.”138 As a 
result, the party actively championed the agenda that the NFD should be 
part of the Republic of Somalia, at independence, with whom they shared 
a common culture and religion.
During the Lancaster conference of 1962, the NPPP representative in the 
Legislative Council, Abdi Rashid Khalif, and a delegation from the NFD pre-
sented their case for secession and unification with the Republic of Somalia. 
They argued that the area they represented (the districts of Isiolo, Garissa, 
Mandera, Marsabit, Moyale, and Wajir) should be granted autonomy as ter-
ritory independent of Kenya. This arrangement would enable the region to 
enter into an Act of Union with the Somali republic when Kenya attained 
independence.139 They emphasized that they had more in common with the 
people of Somalia than those of Kenya in terms of culture and religion. This 
explained their desire for an administration that would respect them as a com-
munity, which they saw in the Republic of Somalia. They believed that the 
Republic of Somalia would uplift their colonial status and offer them prosper-
ity because they considered its administration to be consistent with their way 
of life and beliefs.140
This view was utterly rejected by KADU and KANU members present at 
the Lancaster conference. As the future Kenya’s political parties, KANU and 
KADU were strongly opposed to the idea of the secession of the NFD.141 The 
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leaders of these parties argued that the neglect of the NFD was not the fault 
of the African leaders, but that of the British administration. They promised 
to redress the situation upon gaining independence and assured Kenyan So-
malis of a better future under independent Kenya than under the Republic of 
Somalia. The assertion by the Kenyan nationalists has proved to be true. Later 
events in Somalia have shown that one religion shared by the entire popula-
tion and backed up by the same language and ethnicity was not enough to 
prevent a country from plunging into chaos. Since discussions on the future 
of NFD had reached a stalemate, the British position was highlighted in the 
1962 Kenya Constitutional Conference report:
The Secretary of State informed the Conference that Her Majesty’s 
Government had given very careful consideration to the views which 
had been put forward by the [NFD] Delegation and by KADU and 
KANU. They had come to the conclusion that an investigation should 
be undertaken in order to ascertain public opinion in the area regard-
ing its future. Accordingly, the Secretary of State proposed to arrange 
for an independent Commission to be appointed, with appropriate 
terms of reference, to investigate this matter and report to him .  .  . 
Meanwhile, there would be no change in the status of the Northern 
Frontier District or in the arrangements for its administration.142
Arguably, the British government gave the secessionist Somalis a ray of hope 
when the NFD Commission and the Regional Boundaries Commission were 
formed to gather views and opinions— between December 1962 and March 
1963— of the residents in deciding the fate of the NFD. Upon completion of 
gathering views, the commissions recommended the creation of an adminis-
trative unit of the NFD that would have local autonomy similarly to those ac-
corded to the other regions in the country. Supposedly, the commissions’ rec-
ommendations were inconsistent with the colonial administration’s assurance 
to pro- secessionist Somalis to consider their concerns. Disillusioned with the 
outcome, the Republic of Somalia severed diplomatic ties with the British 
government, while the “Kenyan Somalis rioted and engaged in political vi-
olence across the NFD and, to a lesser extent, in Nairobi.”143 Consequently, 
when Somalis declined to participate in the 1963 elections, the stage was 
set for antagonism between the Kenyan government and its defiant Somali 
residents.
By the end of the Lancaster conference, the issue of Somali secession had 
not been resolved. In its final effort to determine the issue of the NFD, the 
British government arranged for a conference in Rome, on August 1963. In-
vited to the conference were the Somalia republic, Kenya, and Britain. The 
Kenyan Somalis of the NFD were not represented as the issue was now viewed 
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as involving states. The British delegation was led by the minister of state for 
foreign affairs, Peter Thomas, the Somali delegation was led by the prime 
minister Sharmarkey, and the Kenya internal government was represented 
by Governor MacDonald and some government ministers. Like the earlier 
conference in Lancaster, the Rome conference also ended in a deadlock. 
This was as a result of the British position that it could not act unilaterally over 
the NFD and also Kenya’s insistence that it was not willing to lose that part of 
its territory. This development was interpreted by the Kenyan delegates as a 
“great victory for Kenya.”144 However, the inability to resolve the issue before 
independence meant that the demand for secession continued in the initial 
years of independent Kenya.
It is important to understand that in both regions, the mwambao and the 
Northern Frontier District, the aspiration to autonomy was strong where 
intentions to unite an otherwise heterogeneous population, divided by lan-
guage, class, religion, and sects were witnessed. But as a result of numerous 
negotiations between the pro- secessionists and pro- unitary Kenyans, an assur-
ance was given to the Arabs and the Somalis about their welfare in postcolo-
nial Kenya. Though the Arabs and the Somalis have reconciled themselves to 
the loss of being governed from Zanzibar and Somalia, respectively, they have 
not abandoned the majimbo (federalism) ideal. There are occasions when the 
issue of separatism reemerges, finding its expression in the sometimes unpop-
ular federalism (majimbo) debate.145
Shortly after the integration of the coast, the unification of the administra-
tion led to the abolition of the offices of Liwali and Mudir. The handful who 
remained became district officers (DOs) and district commissioners (DCs), 
according to their experience and qualifications.146 The change of status 
meant better opportunities for promotion for them as the offices of DO or 
DC are higher in the administrative hierarchy than those of a Mudir or Liwa-
li. All these changes were taken in the spirit of creating a united Kenya devoid 
of racial discrimination that could obstruct the full equality of all Kenyans. 
The promises of the leaders of the independence movement that the coastal 
Arabs would be regarded as Africans were followed by action. As one of the 
smaller composite bodies of the new Kenyan state, Arabs were accorded fairly 
good positions in the independence government. However, the ostracism of 
Kenyan Somalis evident in the colonial period— socially, economically, and 
politically— continued in the earliest years of postcolonial period due to their 
enhanced adherence to an irredentist pan- Somalia cause, “their religious po-
sition within Kenyan society (Islam being a minority),” and their terrestrial 
isolation and distinct pastoral lifestyle, which was attributed to an arid en-
vironment.147 After Kenya’s independence and the Somalis’ resort to armed 
insurgency that soured their relations with the government, Kenyan Somalis 
ceased to play a visible role in national politics.
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Significantly, though Muslims widely believe that the ascendancy of up-
country Christian hegemony in the postcolonial period has contributed to 
their perceived marginalization, this should not be seen as the only factor in 
their predicament. Ethnic and racial considerations that were encouraged by 
the colonial administration have adversely affected Muslims’ efforts to pre-
sent a united political voice for the community, influencing the upcountry 
politicians’ relation with them. Certainly, the upcountry Christian politicians 
continued to divide the Muslim community, or to take advantage of the exist-
ing divisions, in order to prevent the emergence of a united Muslim political 
front, as will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters.
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Postcolonial Kenyan Attitudes  
Toward Religion and the  
Predicament of Muslims
Religio- Political Relations in the Postcolonial Period
Upon attaining independence, efforts were launched to shape the population 
that remained within the boundaries of the state into a new polity. Member-
ship of this polity was acquired by being a citizen of the nation- state, Kenya. 
Citizens were expected to develop a Kenyan national identity so as to en-
hance their attachment to the political community. This required the sul-
tan’s subjects on the coast to adjust and accept the new basis of community 
membership, which previously was religiously based. All citizens were, by 
definition, members of the Kenyan state, having equal rights. Religious affili-
ation was not recognized in the Kenyan laws as a criterion for membership in 
the political community. The rise of the Kenyan state as a form of collectivity 
with which people identify demonstrates that the nationalists’ determinations 
were successful in redefining the nature of the political community. Con-
trary to Islamic political thought that views all believers as belonging to a 
collective unit, thereby a political community founded on a religious base, 
the nationalists’ ideology took the nation as the appropriate unit on which to 
build the political community. This trend has progressively permeated the 
Muslim community in Kenya. Today, Kenyan Muslims, while being aware 
that they share a common religion with many people in the Middle East and 
other parts of the world, do not think that this commonality warrants their 
incorporation under a universal Islamic political system.
With the establishment of colonial structures, it paved the way for the 
transformation of the political system in Kenya. Once the postcolonial Ken-
yan leaders inherited the instruments of power from the colonial adminis-
tration, their primary concern was to build a nation out of the motley ethnic 
groups in the country. After independence, Kenya adopted a constitution that 
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did not elevate any religion in the country to the status of a state religion. An 
examination of Article 78 (1) of the Independence Constitution will reveal 
the nature of the secular state that obtains in Kenya. The article is pertinent 
in this respect:
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this 
section that freedom includes freedom of thought and religion, free-
dom to change his religion or belief, and freedom either alone or in 
community with others, and both in public and private, to manifest 
and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance.
Henceforth, the basis of political legitimacy in Kenya is the secular system, 
even though the foregoing constitutional provision together with Article 1 of 
the Independence Constitution that describes Kenya as “a sovereign Repub-
lic” does not specifically stipulate Kenya as a secular state. However, it is clear 
that Kenya is a secular country given the characteristics it exhibits. It should 
not be presumed that this secularization of the state diminished the relevance 
of religious factors to politics. To the contrary, the form of secularism observed 
in Kenya is not antireligious, as religion is persistently an integral factor in 
Kenyan politics, especially during the leadership of leadership of Daniel arap 
Moi (1978– 2002) and Mwai Kibaki (2003– 13).
As indicated in Article 78, the Independence Constitution provides for 
freedom of religion to all citizens. In terms of this article, the state is not al-
lowed to interfere in or control religious affairs. The policy of the state is to ac-
cord equal treatment to all religious denominations. The objective of Kenya’s 
constitution is not to promote one religion at the expense of other religions, 
but to provide an enabling environment to all religions. This demonstrates 
that religion in Kenya is respected by the state, thereby confirming the secular 
policy of religion propounded by Carl F. Hallencreutz and David Wester-
lund.1 Such a model allows the Kenyan state to separate religion as much as 
possible from the politics of the country, emphasizing that “every religious 
community shall be entitled, at its own expense, to establish and maintain 
places of education and to manage a place of education which it wholly main-
tains.” This constitutional provision implied that religion is considered as an 
exclusively private matter outside the scope of state legislation or policy. It is 
regarded as a violation of the constitution if the state supports the religious 
activities of a particular group.
Nevertheless, in Kenya attempts by the state to separate religion and poli-
tics have not been entirely successful. Secularization of the state did not mar-
ginalize religion to the extent that it ceases to have an impact on the country’s 
politics. References to God are embedded in the national fabric, and some 
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deistic concepts are woven into the mix. For instance, the country’s nation-
al anthem opens with “Oh God of all creation,” which is a prayer to God. 
The opening ceremony of every parliamentary session is always preceded by 
prayers offered by representatives of the religious groups who are invited to 
the chamber. Also when the president, members of parliament, judges, and 
other senior government officials take the oath of office, they customarily 
hold the Bible or the Quran depending on their religious affiliation, and add 
at the end of the oath “so help me God.” The Independence Constitution 
had stipulated in Article 78 (4) that “no person shall be compelled to take an 
oath which is contrary to his religion or belief or take an oath in a manner 
which is contrary to his religion or belief.” Therefore, what Hallencreutz and 
Westerlund observed about the secular policy of religion is manifest within 
the Kenyan context. From the preceding examples, religion in Kenya plays a 
significant role in the country’s politics. John Voll observes that “the old ideas 
of the separation of church and state in many countries clearly do not signify 
the separation of religion from politics.”2 This is true of the Kenyan situation 
because despite the claim that Kenya is a secular state, one would not fail to 
notice the presence of religion in its political life.
Though the relationship between religion and politics in Kenya generally 
varies in the three earlier postcolonial political phases, the religious sector has 
had a privileged and cordial relationship with the state, lending credence to 
Kenya’s reputation as a nation that respects the religious beliefs of its citizens. 
This variance implied that religion’s profound political impact depended on 
how the political authority of the time handled it. If affiliation to a particular 
denomination by the political leadership was publicized, then the influence 
of religion on the political agenda would suggest itself. During the reign of 
the first president, Jomo Kenyatta (1963– 78), religion played a more indif-
ferent role in politics. Kenyatta was focused on initiating development proj-
ects to aid the emerging nation, and as a result the country prospered due to 
increased agricultural production, a flourishing tourist industry, emphasized 
macroeconomic policies, extensive investments in infrastructure, and educa-
tion. “From 1963 to 1978, the economy grew at a rate of 5 to 8 percent in every 
year,” Joel D. Barkan observed.3 Although Kenya became a single- party state 
as early as 1964, Kenyatta’s authoritarian rule was relatively benevolent as 
there was no inflation or economic hardship. When Moi and later Kibaki took 
power after Kenyatta, religious representatives increasingly took a more crit-
ical stance against the state. During their tenure, whenever religious leaders 
considered their actions as wrong, they condemned them and described the 
general “community of politicians” as the “greatest threat to peace and pros-
perity.” Like Kenyatta whose regime was dominated by members of his ethnic 
group, the Kikuyu, “Moi sought to redress this imbalance, pursuing a set of 
redistributive policies that favored his own ethnic group— the Kalenjin— and 
other disadvantaged tribes in the Rift valley.”4
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Although Moi’s policies were initially popular, they triggered a failed coup 
attempt in 1982, after which he became increasingly oppressive. He demand-
ed absolute loyalty to his rule, rewarding submissive members of parliament 
with ministerial positions and expelling from the ruling party, KANU, anyone 
who criticized his policies. Consequently, the press and civil society were sup-
pressed, and political opponents detained, destroying any opposition to his 
rule. Rampant cases of human rights violations, including torture, were re-
ported, whereas corruption became the mechanism for regime maintenance 
leading to the decline of the economy. Basic social services and infrastructure, 
particularly roads, gradually decayed while the civil service, the parliament, 
and the judiciary became powerless, acting as mere rubber stamps for Moi’s 
repressive policies.5 With the absence of a credible opposition, the religious 
sector and some professional bodies became avenues for dissent against the 
state. During the Kibaki presidency, the mutual relationship displayed be-
tween the church and the state continued, but was sometimes marked by 
moments of tension and conflict. The most conspicuous moment was the 
contestation between his government and the “church” led opposition over 
the constitution making. The following sections examine the interplay of reli-
gion and politics in the various postindependence periods.
The Kenyatta Era and the Indifferent Role of Religion in Politics
During Kenyatta’s term, the influence of religion on politics was reduced to 
insignificance. In his interaction with the public, Kenyatta was cautious not 
to show an open predisposition toward a particular religion. This interaction 
is aptly described by Mohamed Bakari:
Kenyatta never adopted sectarian positions as the Head of State. He 
cared very little for religion or display of religious symbolism and 
went out of his way to treat all citizens with equality, in keeping with 
his earlier promise, when he came to power, to maintain political 
harmony by practicing the politics of inclusion.6
Though Kenyatta appeared not concerned himself with religion, this does 
not exclude the possibility that he understood the power of religion and its 
vigor in Kenyan politics. This is exemplified by a statement Kenyatta made in 
1964 where he praised the various religious bodies for their role in developing 
the country and requested that they continue acting as a unifying force for 
the nation.7 This call on religious bodies to unify the Kenyan population and 
by extension reinforce the legitimacy of the regime continued throughout 
the Kenyatta period. Religious leaders were several times invited to major 
state events and national celebration days.8 More so, various religious groups 
responded to Kenyatta’s call to assist in development and nation building. His 
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appeal was consistent with the development projects of some of these reli-
gious bodies. The religious sector continued providing education, health, and 
other services as it had done under the colonial administration.9 At the same 
time, Kenyatta realized that it was not prudent to allow the religious bodies 
to provide services in all spheres of development. He was aware that if their 
influence was not checked, it could impede his efforts to consolidate power. 
Consequently, he began to limit their influence by declaring in his party’s 
(KANU’s) manifesto:
In the great task of educating our people, the continued participation 
of the missions and the voluntary agencies, who have served us so 
well in the past, will be welcomed . . . [But] the government . . . is 
bound to provide education and can not delegate this responsibility 
to any other bodies.10
It is clear that the field of education is a very sensitive one and Kenyatta want-
ed to limit the involvement of religious groups in this field. He believed that 
the government had to assume a larger role in providing education for all 
Kenyans. In order to continue its development with minimum government 
control, the religious sector avoided conflict with the ruling authority. As a 
result, the religious sector in Kenyatta’s era was more of a partner in the social 
development of the new nation than a critical political voice. This could also 
be attributed to the fact that Kenyatta was at the height of his popularity when 
he was perceived not only as a political leader, but also as the father of the 
nation,11 baba wa taifa.
The Evangelical Churches’ Support of Moi’s Leadership
When Moi came to power after the death of Kenyatta, the religious sector was 
already an integral part of the social life in Kenya. Its wide network of educa-
tional, health care, social, and economic facilities was firmly established. This 
enabled the religious sector to continue cooperating with the government in 
the provision of social services. Early in his political career there was nothing 
to suggest that Moi was a religious man. This could be due to the fact that he 
had served under Kenyatta for quite a long period and during that time the 
unwritten code was to keep religion out of the public domain. But as soon as 
he ascended to the presidency, Moi assumed a religious posture. This portray-
al is clarified in the words of Bakari:
Moi cast himself as a Christian president and used public media to 
cultivate the classic Machiavellian image of a pious politician, and 
did this by a public display of religiosity through the use of govern-
ment media to broadcast his Church attendances.12
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Throughout much of his presidency, Moi was shown on national television 
going to church every Sunday, until the opposition began to question whether 
it was right for a president of a secular state and a multireligious society to 
use state television to portray himself in a religious posture. Partly because of 
Moi’s personality, during his leadership religion became more pronounced 
in the political sphere. It was not difficult in Moi’s tenure to realize the pre-
ponderance of religious behavior among the political elite. Moi sought to 
cultivate his personal image as a devout Christian, and this is why in some of 
his speeches he quoted the Bible to emphasize a point. This attitude strength-
ened the bonds between the church and the state, hence integrating religion 
with politics. However, attempts to establish courtship with religion did not 
prevent the Anglican Church, Catholic Church, Presbyterian Church of East 
Africa, and some Muslim groups from criticizing the bad governance of the 
president.
With the establishment of a one- party regime from the mid- 1960s, Ken-
ya’s politics stumbled into crisis with an increasing degree of repression. The 
height of the crisis was reached in late 1980s, when President Moi abolished 
secret ballot voting and replaced it with a queuing system of election. Even 
after the establishment of a one- party state, Moi continued to be suspicious 
of his opponents, and sought for a mechanism that would allow him to detect 
party loyalists and dissidents. He hoped that this could be achieved by adopt-
ing the queuing system as an election method. The queuing system required 
each voter to queue behind a candidate thereby allowing Moi to detect party 
loyalists and expel those perceived as dissidents. The system became unpop-
ular and was widely criticized. Leading the protest against the new structure 
introduced by Moi were the church leaders. However, government loyalists 
condemned the critics as unpatriotic and acting on behalf of foreign nations. 
The pattern of conflict that ensued during this period of political crisis had 
a lasting impact on the relationship between religious and political leaders. 
Nevertheless, opposition to Moi’s government by church leaders was not 
unanimous; although the main church bodies opposed certain governmental 
policies, the evangelical churches supported the state. It was during this mo-
ment of wavering support that Moi found solace with the evangelical church-
es. There is no doubt that clergy in the evangelical churches hoped to gain 
privileges from the state by backing the Moi regime, thereby becoming an 
alternative support base loyal to his regime.
According to Paul Gifford, most of the evangelical churches in Africa have 
resolutely refused to challenge government authorities on their poor record. 
Their principle is not to engage in any social analysis of political structures. 
These churches include the Pentecostal and the U.S.- influenced churches.13 
Though their numbers have grown over time, in Kenya they include the Re-
deemed Gospel Church, African Church of Holy Spirit, Seventh- day Adven-
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tist Church, African Inland Church, and the American- influenced churches 
under the umbrella of the United Evangelical Churches of Kenya (UECK).14 
As other religious groups were condemning the government’s unpopular 
policies, the evangelical churches refused to join the protest, claiming that 
it would lead to political polarization, which would ultimately undermine 
national unity. Their approach to politics managed to divert attention away 
from the government deficiencies, and as a result Moi embraced them in his 
bid to continue to stay in power. At a time when the Moi regime was under 
pressure to become more accountable, the evangelical churches offered their 
political support. For instance, after the allegedly rigged elections of 1988, 
Bonnke’s magazine described Kenya as privileged to be ruled by a born- again 
head of state.15
This courtship between religion and politics in Moi’s reign was also demon-
strated by the visit made by the international president of the SDA Church. 
During his 1991 visit to Kenya, the SDA president had a meeting with Moi, 
and in their discussion Moi applauded the SDA Church’s role in proselytizing 
the gospel and for missionary success in the country. It appears Moi was will-
ing to praise a religious body that did not indulge in politics and, specifically, 
in criticism of his government. In response, the church leader extolled Moi, 
describing him as a defender of religious freedom, and assuring him that the 
SDA Church would continue to be reliable supporter of the government.16
Under Moi, Kenya’s leadership had become characterized by corruption 
and maladministration to a magnitude that external benefactors refused to 
give further aid, awaiting the introduction of a system of accountability. Not 
contented with the government’s response to their economic and political 
remedies, donors deferred aid payments in 1991.17 In the midst of widespread 
agitation for multiparty democracy as part of political reforms that Moi was 
resisting, an official of Potter’s House (an American denominational organiza-
tion) came to his support, as reported in a newspaper: “A Pastor said yesterday 
that Christians should be praying for the government instead of criticizing 
it. [He said,] ‘As an American citizen who has lived in Kenya, I do not be-
lieve that a multiparty political system will work at this time in Kenya.’ ”18 
The pastor added that Kenya was a developing country that was growing fast 
due to the good leadership of Moi. With such praises, Moi became steadfast 
in his opposition to multiparty politics. On several occasions he repeated the 
same sentiments echoed by the pastor that Kenya was not ready for multiparty 
politics, claiming that the one- party system was the ideal for Africa. Aware of 
the role religion played in the country, Moi began manipulating religious 
symbolism in order to present himself as a believing Christian president and 
neutralize religious critics. This courtship of the church and state did not stop 
Kenyans from continuing the demand for a leadership that was accountable. 
At this particular moment when the government was under sustained criti-
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cism from several sources, the African Church of the Holy Spirit held a spe-
cial service in Nairobi to pray for the government. During the service several 
members of the church led by their leader declared themselves to be KANU 
members. This act was an indication that the church had resolved to support 
the ruling party, under Moi leadership.19 Clearly, these actions of the church 
leaders were opportunistic and meant to solicit favor from the ruling regime.
While discussing the influential role of a minority group in a country’s 
politics, Omari H. Kokole shows how the Nubi Muslims became very prom-
inent in Ugandan politics during Idi Amin’s reign (1971– 79).20 According to 
Kokole, Amin sought to widen his political support by identifying himself 
with the wider Muslim community. This strategy allowed Amin to expand the 
base of his political supporters beyond his small Kakwa community, whose 
pro- Islam policy also benefitted the Nubi Muslims. There is a parallel be-
tween this policy by Amin and that of President Moi of Kenya. Having come 
from one of the smallest communities in Kenya, the Tugen, Moi expanded 
his political base by embracing and favoring the Kalenjin group, and by por-
traying himself as a staunch Christian adherent. This strategy assured Moi of 
political supporters outside his Tugen ethnic group, but nevertheless, did not 
stop other church leaders from criticizing his unpopular policies.
Despite support from the evangelical churches, Moi eventually gave in, 
allowing multiparty politics, due to both local and international pressure that 
had made his leadership difficult. In 1991, Moi’s government proclaimed 
that Kenya would now allow new political parties to register. This marked 
the beginning of a new chapter for Kenya, although Moi insisted that the 
system would not work. As the first multiparty election of 1992 approached, 
the United Evangelical Churches of Kenya (UECK) joined the group of 
supporters of Moi’s leadership. The head of the parent body (United Evan-
gelical Churches of America) led a delegation to Kenya for a convention 
that occurred a month before the general elections. Before the convention, 
the delegation met President Moi who advised the church officials to have 
no antipathy to the state, and to stay out of politics. Moi’s patronage was not 
lost on the UECK, as the ensuing convention turned into the elevation of 
Moi, leading to a statement signed by UECK leaders challenging the crit-
ical remarks from other churches.21 It was at this point that the Protestant 
NCCK, the Catholic Church, and a section of Muslims (through IPK) made 
critical statements on his regime. Nevertheless, Moi was able to win the 1992 
presidential election, which was flawed by voting irregularities. As the oppo-
sition and NCCK were consulting about whether they should challenge the 
results, the UECK leaders appeared again censuring the NCCK and urging 
the opposition to accept the results.
In March 1993, Pastor Paul Yonggi Cho of Yoido Full Gospel Church of 
Seoul (Korea) came to Kenya for a “crusade.” He had a publicized reception 
with Moi at the state house, where Moi referred to his preaching as a “bless-
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ing” for Kenya. In his last “crusade,” which Moi attended, Cho called for 
Kenyans to have devotion to God in order to be delivered from the economic 
predicament facing the country, adding that “Kenya was a blessed country 
because it had a God fearing leader.”22 The South Korean preacher further 
urged Kenyans to trust in Jesus in order to prosper. Like other evangelical 
churches, Cho’s preaching had a political message. At a time when the for-
eign and local press were pointing out that the cause of Kenya’s economic 
retardation was state- sanctioned corruption, Cho was preaching that Moi 
was ruling with wisdom bestowed by God. The media had reported that Ken-
ya’s economy had been plundered by Moi together with his acquaintances, 
thereby adversely affecting the country’s development.23 But according to 
Cho, Kenyans were unable to prosper because of a lack of commitment to 
God. The preaching by Cho is what Bruce described as the power of religion 
to create order and stability in society by promising the pious poor rewards 
if they believed in God. This power reconciles the poor followers to their 
fate in this world by discouraging them from rebelling against the political 
authority.24
The Cross and the Crown Duel in Constitution Making in the 
Kibaki Presidency
After the removal of Moi’s political party from power in the 2002 election, the 
role of religion as the conscience of society against the state attracted mixed 
results. The churches that had earlier leaned toward opposition shifted to be 
less politicized during Kibaki’s first term (2003– 7) in office as the president 
of Kenya. The first evidence of a critical voice against the Kibaki presidency 
did not come from the churches but from Muslim groups. Muslims made 
statements against the government in the constitution review debate and also 
in the rejection of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill (see chapter four). For 
the main churches, the election of Kibaki brought a dilemma during his first 
term. These churches had been partners of opposition against the leadership 
of Moi. With the opposition in power, the mainstream churches had to re-
solve the dilemma of how to cooperate with the state without compromising 
their critical role against it. The campaign for the reelection of Kibaki (2007) 
further divided the church with the NCCK supporting his candidacy, which 
a number of protestant denominations opposed.25 After the postelection vio-
lence that overwhelmed the country in the early months of 2008, the church 
was accused of encouraging election violence by preaching ethnic hatred. 
Aware that their credibility as an institution had suffered, a section of church 
leaders embarked on a journey of redemption by declaring a political contest 
with the government over the 2010 Proposed Constitution of Kenya.
For a long time, Kenyan politicians have been blamed for frustrating re-
forms and constitutional review. But amid the politicians’ frustrations were 
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some church leaders who posed an emotive threat. The experience of the 
2010 constitutional referendum showed that the clergy used the pulpit to ad-
vance their political agenda, the same way the politicians used rallies. The 
2010 Proposed Constitution of Kenya emerged as a duel between the church 
and the Kibaki administration. The government found itself in a conflict 
with a section of church leaders in contestation for making a “perfect” con-
stitution. Leading the church opposition to the proposed constitution were 
Cardinal John Njue (Catholic Church), Reverend Peter Karanja (National 
Council of Churches of Kenya, NCCK), Bishop Stephen Kewasis (Anglican 
Church of Kenya, ACK), Reverend Patrice Chumba (African Inland Church, 
AIC, North Rift), and Reverend Geoffrey Songok (Reformed Church of East 
Africa).26 The clerics threatened to mobilize their followers to vote against the 
proposed constitution because they were unhappy with the two provisions: 
one permitting abortion in exceptional circumstances and the other retaining 
the Kadhi courts. Though there was a convergence of views that the 2010 Pro-
posed Constitution of Kenya was better than the Independence Constitution, 
there was still strong opposition by some church leaders.
In April 2010, parliament successfully debated and passed the proposed 
constitution, but the opposing church leaders maintained their disagree-
ment. The clergy vowed to campaign against the draft to ensure that the 
country overwhelmingly voted against it at the referendum. The president 
for his part called on Kenyans to support the proposed constitution of Kenya, 
saying:
I am sure that Kenyans will get a new constitution soon after the 
referendum. I urge you all to support the document  .  .  . You will 
have a chance to pass the new constitution at the referendum. Please 
support the constitutional dispensation.27
At this point, it is clear that this was a contest between the church and the 
state. In its determination not to appear to have ignored the religious sector, 
the government invited the opposing church representatives to talks to re-
solve the impasse. However, the talks failed as both sides were unwilling to 
compromise. Efforts by the state to convince the opposing church leaders to 
support the proposed draft were not successful.28 Although the church was 
an important player that advocated for reforms in Kenya, its position on the 
2010 Proposed Constitution of Kenya was viewed by some Kenyans as a be-
trayal. Some analysts viewed the persistent opposition by the church leaders 
as an attempt to impose their position on Kenyans when the sources of discord 
were issues that could be tolerated. They instead advised the opposing church 
leaders, rather than engaging in confrontation with the state, to be tolerant of 
other peoples’ views.29
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The NCCK insisted that the Committee of Experts and the Parliamentary 
Select Committee did not include its view while writing the proposed con-
stitution and vowed to rally Christians to reject it.30 The same argument was 
reiterated by Reverend Silas Yego of the AIC who said: “The Parliamentary 
Select Committee (PSC) still went on to ratify the draft constitution with the 
sticky issues we had proposed be changed, but later endorsed by parliament. 
We are going to advise our members to vote against it.”31According to this 
section of the clergy, the inclusion of the Kadhi courts in the 2010 Proposed 
Constitution of Kenya amounted to the elevation of Islam over other reli-
gions in Kenya, which is a secular state.32 The church leaders claimed that 
the entire constitutional review process had been skewed to favor Muslims 
and as a result they will “not endorse a draft that marginalizes Christianity.”33 
Probably to instill fear in the Christian majority, propaganda was employed 
to attack the Kadhi courts. It was alleged that if allowed, the Kadhi courts-
would be used to introduce sharia and to expand the Muslim population and 
Islamic influence in the country.34 Such rhetoric brought to fore the nature 
of Christian- Muslim relations in Kenya, how they perceived and related to 
each other.
In religious matters, relations between Muslims and Christians are 
characterized by misunderstanding, prejudice, misinterpretation, stereo-
type, and discrimination. These are manifested in some church- sponsored 
schools, sermons by Christian religious leaders, and statements attributed 
to senior church clergy and political leaders of Christian background— all 
perceived by Muslims as attack against their religion.35 There are also occa-
sions when the Christians are on the receiving end, as is demonstrated by 
numerous onslaughts directed at their places of worship. In late 1997, three 
churches were burned down at Kikoneni in the Kwale area, and the blame 
for the incident was placed on the Digo (read also Muslims) marauders of 
Kaya Bombo forest who were perpetrating terror in Likoni and some parts 
of Kwale in the coast region.36 The timing of the assault was suspect, and 
the main targets of the Kaya Bombo attackers were upcountry Christians, 
who were displaced and prevented from participating in the 1997 election. 
Analysts have argued that the violence was politically instigated and intend-
ed to favor a certain political party. Despite the motive of the marauders 
being political, arguably, religion was unofficially dragged into the violence 
to serve partisan interests. Toward the end of 2000, a Catholic church was 
burned by Muslims in Nairobi, South “B” area, in retaliation for the burn-
ing of a mosque by a group of Christian traders after they quarreled with 
Muslims over ownership of a plot. In July 2012, a church was attacked in 
Garissa and seventeen Christian worshippers killed, which was blamed on 
the al- Shabaab movement in Somalia following the Kenya Defense Forces 
pursuit of the group into their country. Around four churches were burned 
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and destroyed in Mombasa after the assassination of Sheikh Aboud Rogo in 
August 2012 as numerous conspiracy theories emerged explaining his death. 
Such incidents have intensified hatred and mistrust among the members of 
the two main religions in Kenya.
Despite the barrage of attacks on the Kadhi courts, Reverend Timothy 
Njoya held a contradicting view arguing that the opposing church leaders’ 
views on the Kadhi courts were wrong, and it was necessary for them to re-
assess their position if they were serious about building “a united and dem-
ocratic country.”37 This position of a clergyman implied that a constitution 
should be inclusive of the various segments of the population. It is necessary 
for a constitution to protect the rights of every citizen including the minority 
and the vulnerable ones. The extension of the campaign against the Kadhi 
courts into a broader religious contest risked turning the referendum into a 
clash between Muslims and Christians as evident by the enormous amount 
of hate mail that circulated on the Internet. There was a magnitude of intoler-
ance from some Christians that informed their opposition against the Muslim 
courts. Efforts by experts to educate the opposing clergy on the history, nature, 
and importance of the Kadhi courts to Muslims were rejected. Whenever 
such exertions were made, the opposing group of church leaders retaliated 
by insisting that “it was a mistake in the first place to include kadhis’s courts 
in the constitution. The fact that they have been in existence is no reason for 
the mistake to continue.”38 Turning to abortion, the church leaders were op-
posed to Article 26 (4) of the proposed constitution on the right to life, which 
reads: “Abortion is not permitted unless, in the opinion of a trained health 
professional, there is need for emergency treatment, or the life or health of the 
mother is in danger, or if permitted by any other written law.”39
The article empowered doctors to end pregnancy if it endangers the wom-
an’s life or if she needs emergency treatment. Some church leaders wanted 
this clause deleted alleging that it touched on beliefs and teachings of their 
faiths apart from allowing the possibility of legalizing abortion.40 However, 
even if abortion is wrong according to Christian belief, I would like to argue 
that there is no need for the same to be emphasized in the constitution in 
order to convince people that it is immoral and discourage them from it. A 
test of one’s commitment to God’s law would be the individual’s willingness 
to follow it even when a constitutional law does not permit it. Rather than the 
church leaders campaigning for the adherence to biblical teachings through 
the constitution, they should endeavor to instill moral values to their congre-
gants. The clergy should realize that it is not the law of the state that made 
people righteous; it is the moral teachings whose success does not depend on 
legislation, but on the internalization of the teachings.
Analysts have argued that the church’s doctrine recognizes two types of 
abortion: direct and indirect abortion. While the church outlaws direct abor-
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tion outright, it does not show opposition to indirect abortion, which occurs 
when trying to save a mother’s life endangered by pregnancy.41 This view was 
also echoed by Anglican Archbishop David Gitari, who posited:
History has proved the Church wrong in various incidences. Even 
the issue of abortion the Church should not be quick to pronounce 
judgment, especially where the lives of the two are in danger. Instead 
of letting both die we can save one.42
Within Islam, the issue of abortion also has its own controversies and has been 
debated widely given that there is no Quranic injunction that deals openly 
with the subject. Generally, the Quran upholds the sanctity of life, and its 
destruction through either the termination of pregnancy or any other means 
is prohibited.43 However, most Muslim jurists unanimously agree that there 
is justification for ending the pregnancy if it is medically shown that its con-
tinuation would essentially endanger the life of the mother. Under such a 
circumstance, in accordance with the spirit of the Quran, the jurists argue 
that abortion is unavoidable. This position is based on the affirmation that the 
mother is the source of the fetus, and already has duties and responsibilities in 
the society. Therefore, it would not be prudent “to sacrifice her life” for that 
of a fetus that “has not yet acquired a personality” and responsibilities.44 It is 
this indirect abortion, and the saving of the life of the mother, that is found 
in the 2010 Proposed Constitution of Kenya. In fact, experts in constitutional 
law have argued that the abortion clause in the proposed constitution was 
an improvement over Section 240 of the Penal Code in the Independence 
Constitution, which allows a medical specialist to save the life of a mother.45
The controversy over the 2010 Proposed Constitution of Kenya caused 
divisions within the ranks of church leaders. The position by the mainstream 
and evangelical churches to oppose the proposed new constitution provided 
a major “unity test” for them. While it was the first time for the Catholics, 
Protestants, and a number of evangelical churches to unite and take a com-
mon political view, voices of disapproval with the church leadership were 
prominent. There was a group of clergy who did not support the views held 
by their colleagues on the proposed constitution. A section of Catholic, ACK, 
AIC, and Pentecostal bishops differed with their respective church leadership 
and supported the proposed constitution. They included Bishop Titus Kamal 
of the Cornerstone Ministries Church;46 Father Ambrose Kimutai of Kericho 
Catholic Church;47 ACK bishop of Southern Nyanza Diocese, Kenneth 
Ochiel;48 and Bishop John Okinda of Pentecostal Evangelism Fellowship of 
Africa Church, among others.49 The leader of the Church of Christ was more 
categorical in dismissing the view of the opposing church leaders against the 
Kadhi courts, stating:
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It is misleading to insinuate all Church leaders are against the inclu-
sion of Kadhis courts in the Proposed Constitution. I am a Church 
leader and I don’t think the courts warrant the resistance that threat-
ens to derail the quest for new constitution. Kadhis’ courts have been 
in existence since independence and have never affected those who 
do not profess Muslim faith.50
On their part, the Seventh- day Adventist (SDA) Church refused to take a 
definite position on whether to support or not to support the proposed consti-
tution. The SDA Church reasoned it will let its faithful vote with their con-
science. While addressing the press, the president of the East African Union 
of SDA Church, Reverend Paul Muasya, argued: “We will not make any offi-
cial stand as a church on the draft constitution. We know our members hold 
different views and it will be unfair to decide for all of them. As leaders we will 
guide them on the religious and moral issues involved and we expect them to 
also read it and make informed decisions.”51
It was official that the SDA called on its members to read the proposed 
constitution and make an informed choice at the referendum. This position 
of the SDA was similar to the one held by the Kenyan church leadership five 
years earlier when they accorded their followers the freedom to vote during 
the constitutional referendum. During the 2005 constitutional referendum, 
the entire church leadership in Kenya decided not to impose their views on 
their members, instead leaving it to the flock to vote with their conscience. 
To some critics, it appears inconsistent for the church leadership– – with the 
exception of the SDA Church– – to accord their followers liberty to vote in the 
2005 referendum and deny them the same privilege for the 2010 constitution-
al referendum. The foregoing is a testimony that not all the church leaders 
were united in opposition to the proposed constitution of Kenya. With the un-
folding events, it is clear that the clergy— not the church— was in support of 
the proposed constitution. The outcome of the struggle pitted clergy against 
politicians to determine whether the Kenyan Christians will be loyal to their 
religious leaders for political direction.
In this clash between the church and the state, Muslims were urged by 
their leaders to be tolerant and avoid confrontation with their Christian com-
patriots despite attacks on the Kadhi courts by some of the church leaders. 
The tolerance and patience exhibited by Muslims is summed up in the words 
of one commentator: “In this clash of egos [church and state], it is Muslims 
that have carried themselves with a great deal of decorum. Muslims have 
remained composed in the face of provocation by some extremist Church 
leaders. Muslims preachers have remained humble even as some Christian 
clergy rant with the haughtiness of the majority.”52 Rather, a passionate appeal 
was made to Muslims to support the 2010 Proposed Constitution of Kenya 
because it guaranteed a better country for all citizens, in addition to providing 
for the Kadhi courts.
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In August, 2010, Kenyans participated in a referendum to determine the 
fate of the proposed constitution. The final results released by the Interim 
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) showed that the majority of Ken-
yans had endorsed the proposed constitution with 67 percent approval. The 
church thought that it could influence a number of their followers to deliver 
a “No” vote in the referendum poll, but this was not realized. In a statement 
released after the final tally was announced, it appeared the clergy interpreted 
differently the referendum results. The Catholics maintained that the vote 
was “not about numbers but the truth,” which the church will continue to 
uphold.53 This was an indication that the Catholic Church had accepted the 
poll verdict. However, the reaction by the NCCK secretary general was dif-
ferent. He claimed:
We are saddened by the fact that the pre- referendum process was 
marked by malpractices and irregularities which continued right into 
the balloting and tallying phases. This calls into question the validity 
of the process and its outcome.54
What emerged from the debate over constitution making is that the church 
has strongly argued for the separation of religion and the state in its opposition 
to the Kadhi courts in the Kenyan constitution. However, when it came to the 
question of abortion and of when life begins, the same church wanted to have 
its religious views in the constitution. The clergy demanded that the 2010 
Proposed Constitution of Kenya should be categorical that life begins at con-
ception. This belief is contrary to the Muslim jurists’ definition that life does 
not start at conception, but 120 days after the formation has taken place.55 
According to Imam al- Ghazzali, there are several stages of existence before a 
child is born beginning with “the settling of the semen in the womb and its 
mixing with the secretions of the woman.”56 Thereafter, the gestational stage 
comes after 120 days when the fetus receives life.57 Therefore, the church 
leaders’ insistence that life begins at conception failed to show how contrary 
beliefs of non- Christians could be accommodated in the proposed constitu-
tion. This lobbying to include in the 2010 Proposed Constitution of Kenya 
views that emphasize Christian beliefs contradicted the church’s position that 
there must be a separation of religion and politics. The denunciation of the 
two issues was viewed as a campaign against a new constitution. Ironically, 
had the voters rejected the proposed constitution, they would have been left 
with the Independence Constitution that had provisions for the Kadhi courts 
and did not explicitly bar abortion for reasons other than medical emergency.
The Shifting Fortunes of Muslims in Kenya’s Changing Politics
Though it was clear that the Kadhi courts’ opposition was fronted by a section 
of church leaders, it served to reinforce Muslims’ feeling of marginalization 
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and discrimination that they have held over the years. A brief comment by 
a Muslim politician sums up Muslims’ perception of postcolonial Kenya’s 
attitude toward the community:
For 40 years, we (Muslims) have stood by KANU, a party that had 
neither advanced the cause of Muslims in Kenya nor denied the sta-
tus quo. In Kenyatta (first president of Kenya) regime, Muslims were 
largely irrelevant politically. Moi (second president of Kenya) had no 
love for Muslims but used them. . . . To the West Moi was pro- Islam, 
pro- fundamentalism because he entertained Muslims. The Muslims 
now believe that the Kibaki (third president of Kenya) regime has 
accepted to exchange the constitutional rights of Muslims for finan-
cial support from the US government. The Suppression of Terrorism 
Bill is an effort at not only curtailing the freedom and civil rights of 
Muslims but also undermining the future of Islam in the country.58
Many Muslims would agree with the narrative describing the situation of the 
community in the country. Though treatment of Muslims has been varied, 
there is a widely held belief that the various regimes of postcolonial Kenya 
have neglected the welfare of Muslims. If you engage Muslims in a discus-
sion, many would respond with stories of injustice and continued “marginal-
ization” of the community. Although there are local variations in emphasis 
of this perceived marginalization, the most cited grievances would be poor 
education facilities, difficulties in acquiring national documents, exclusion 
from government employment, and the human rights abuses associated with 
the “war on terror.” According to Muslims from the northeastern region, the 
human rights abuses during and after the shifta campaign add to the list of op-
pression committed against the community.59 For some Muslims on the coast, 
the loss of land is regarded as a continuation of injustice against Muslims.60 
These have been some of the repeated complaints of Muslims for many years. 
One will not fail to capture this feeling of “marginalization” in informal dis-
cussions, in mosque lectures, in radio debates, and in letters addressed to 
various newspapers. Nevertheless, oppression and discrimination by the state 
have not been peculiar to Muslims. There are also other Kenyans, regardless 
of their religious affiliation who have suffered injustice at the hands of the 
state. It is likely that by identifying their suffering as a result of their faith, 
Muslims are attempting to place their own experience in the context of the 
global challenges and injustices confronting Muslims worldwide.
When Kenya attained independence, it was expected that a mutual work-
ing relationship between Muslim leaders and government authorities was to 
continue into the postcolonial era.61 For many Muslim leaders, collaboration 
with the new government was necessary for the benefit of the community. 
The expectation of material resources from the state helped to establish close 
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relations between leading Muslim personalities and senior government of-
ficials. In this relation, both the religious and political Muslim figures were 
expected to comply with the government authority of the day. Throughout 
its contemporary history, Kenya has experienced three civilian presidential 
regimes. The period related to these regimes covers the Kenyatta leadership 
from 1963 to 1978, the Moi presidency from 1978 to 2002, and Kibaki’s 
government (2003– 13). All three governments have indirectly encouraged 
Islamic tendencies to some extent; for instance, since independence many 
mosques have been built throughout the country in areas where Muslims 
form a significant part of the population.
The Kenyan constitution provides for the freedom of religion, and the var-
ious administrations in Kenya have strived to protect this right. As a result of 
the provision, Islamic religious rituals are observed without any restrictions. 
At the moment, there are several Muslim radio stations operating in the coun-
try, which include Iqra FM (established 1999), Radio Rahma (established 
2004), Star FM (established 2005), Salaam FM (established 2006), and Fron-
tier FM (established 2006).62 By the nature of FM broadcasting, the reach of 
these stations is localized, but radio Rahma has developed a considerable in-
fluence in those parts of the country where it can be heard.63 When it comes 
to political appointments of Muslims to serve in the three governments, one 
will realize that it has been varied. In some governments, Muslims have been 
given some form of prominence and recognition, while in others no Muslim 
held any significant position at the level of government minister. In 2009, 
while describing the political appointments of Muslims (during the Kibaki 
tenure), a government minister observed that “we have been recognized as a 
potential force to be reckoned with. We now have five ministers, eight assis-
tant ministers and several permanent secretaries.”64 Such are the changing 
political fortunes of Muslims in postcolonial Kenya.
Clearly demonstrated in this chapter is the changing position of Mus-
lims on secession. Regionalism greatly influenced the supporters of seces-
sion to give up their political cause and accept integration, which diluted 
their fears of being dominated by non- Muslim upcountry politicians. Coastal 
Muslims— who in the earliest years of postcolonial Kenya did not support the 
continuation of the Somali cause of secession, even referring to it as a “jihad” 
against the regime of Kenyatta— were the first to be reconciled. Historically, 
development of the northeastern region (formerly the NFD) was neglected 
by the colonial administrations, heightening the demand for secession as the 
country approached independence. When this demand was not granted, the 
pro- secessionists of the NFD resorted to armed resistance, hoping to change 
the political fate of the region by sabotaging the government of Kenyatta.65 
The government of Kenyatta allegedly responded with excessive force against 
the Somalis to ensure that centralization was imposed on the region, since it 
was not willing to lose that part of the country. In 1976, after the Somali sub-
68 chapter two
jugation, another “jihad” was declared by President Amin of Uganda against 
the Kenyatta regime, which also lacked Muslim support. Though Muslims in 
both the coastal and northeastern regions had been in favor of secession, the 
usage of Islamic symbols (jihads) failed to mobilize them in their quest for 
secession, illustrating Muslims’ willingness to be identified as Kenyans.
However, the postcolonial regimes have witnessed varying responses by 
Muslims to events that I will refer to in this chapter as the “Islamic factor.” 
The Islamic factors become a basis of unity when they affect all Muslims, 
irrespective of their ethnic and racial background. But whenever the concern 
raised is seen not to upset all Muslims, even alleged cases of discrimination by 
some Muslims has failed to evoke passion within the entire community. This 
reflects the significant role of ethnicity among Kenyan Muslims. Significant-
ly, the Islamic factor featured differently in all the postcolonial governments 
because they were inspired by specific events of that time. It is these events 
associated with Muslims that have shaped the government’s attitudes toward 
the community. In Kenyatta’s period, the Islamic factor manifested itself in 
the continued campaign of Kenyan Somalis to secede and join Somalia. I 
have shown in the preceding chapter that this campaign was inspired by the 
desire to build the greater Somaliland. There was also the 1972 Succession 
Act— discussed in detail below— which was contested by Muslims until a 
concessional amendment excluding them was added in 1990.
During Moi’s tenure, the Islamic factor was expressed through the rise of 
an Islamic party and demand for equal treatment of Muslims as Kenyan citi-
zens. The democratic wave that was flowing through the country influenced 
these trends. This period also saw the rejection of the Marriage Bill (1985) 
and the Equality Bill (2002) by Muslims. In Kibaki’s presidency, the Islamic 
factor was evident in the issue of the Kadhi courts in the constitutional debate, 
greater demands by Muslims to have a say in the running of the government, 
and in the isolated cases of international terror activities attributed to Mus-
lim groups that have led to the drafting of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 
(2003). The anti- terrorism bill has been viewed by most Muslims as targeting 
the community, arousing their stiff opposition (see the discussion in chapter 
4). There have also been claims of renditions of Muslims to foreign countries 
on accusations of engaging in terrorist activities. All these scenarios inform 
the role of the Islamic factor in the country’s politics. In the following section, 
I will focus on Muslims’ endeavors for parity in Kenya within the context of 
the Kenyatta and Moi regimes.
Muslims Under the Kenyatta Regime
There is a general view among the Kenyan public that Kenyatta was an agnos-
tic, and as a result of this background, he had an indifferent attitude toward 
religion. There is no evidence that Kenyatta had a tendency to favor one 
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religious group to the detriment of the others. In dealing with the various reli-
gious groups, Kenyatta was considered balanced, respecting all the faiths, and 
in recognition of his commitment to them, his state funeral was officiated by 
a Catholic, a Protestant, a Muslim, and a representative of African religion.66 
In his public conduct, he did not exhibit any religious inclinations, indicating 
that religion should be relegated to the private sphere.
Kenyatta’s attitude to religious matters was a blessing to Muslims in the 
sense that he did not appear to be a threat to their existence. In his policies, 
Kenyatta was more interested in ethnic balance than in religious equilibri-
um.67 He was willing to enter into political partnership with any group in-
cluding Muslims, but through their ethnic background. The political culture 
Kenyatta initiated was intended to make the government appear inclusive in 
the public’s view. In this regard, ethnic, racial, and regional criteria became 
important considerations in the formation of his government. The concern 
of Kenyatta’s government was ethno- regional balancing to the exclusion of 
other criteria. The politics of symbolism, where appointment to a national 
office signified political inclusion, became institutionalized during the Ken-
yatta leadership. It was in this context that some of the Muslim members of 
parliament such as Sheikh Salim Balala, Mohammed Jahazi, Mohammed Al-
amoody, Noormohamed Janhohamed, and Kassim Bakari Mwamzandi were 
appointed assistant ministers.
However, Muslims came to view the appointments of their coreligionists 
in religious terms by now regarding themselves as part of the Kenyan society. 
They viewed Kenyatta’s decision as an act of honor to the community, yet 
Bakari has commented that in terms of appointments of Muslims the Ken-
yatta regime was unremarkable. This is because during the Kenyatta era, no 
Muslim occupied a ministerial position nor were a sizeable number of them 
appointed to substantive administrative positions. This situation has been at-
tributed to the lack of higher education of Muslim members of parliament as 
there were none who had a university degree during this period.68 This edu-
cational deficiency was a major drawback for Muslim politicians that pushed 
them to the periphery rather than “the centre of power,” Bakari observed.69 
Despite their loyalty and close proximity to the president, they failed to lobby 
for the benefit of Muslims. Their inferiority in education made them satisfied 
with the small gains the community had made. As a result of their loyalty to 
the state, Kenyatta’s government acceded to the Muslims’ request to declare 
Idd- ul- Fitr a national public holiday in 1971.70
It is important to mention that during Kenyatta’s period a significant Islam-
ic factor manifested itself in the form of a continuation of the campaign by 
Somalis to secede. When this demand was not granted, the Somalis resorted 
to armed resistance to sabotage the Kenyatta leadership.71 As a result, the Ken-
yan government declared a state of emergency in the Northeastern Province 
(previously the NFD). Although the idea of Somali nationalism propelled 
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Kenyan Somalis’ agitation for secession and self- determination, the Islamic 
factor also mobilized the Northern Frontier District (NFD) residents to the 
Somali cause. This is because the campaign for secession also gained consid-
erable support among Muslims of non- Somali background such as the Boran 
and the Rendille living in the NFD. In rallying Muslims behind their cause, 
the Somalis called for jihad against the Kenyatta government.72 These devel-
opments demonstrated the significance of the role of Islam in the Somali pol-
itics of secession. The reference to the Somali cause as jihad was an example 
of the politicization of Islam. The usage of Islamic symbols was intended to 
create sympathy for the Somali campaign by rallying other Muslims behind 
their cause.
The Somali uprising, which came to be known as the shifta insurgency, 
was fought in sporadic ways throughout the region by employing a guerrilla 
tactic of warfare that concentrated on ambushing government convoys and 
personnel.73 Their intention was to make the region ungovernable so that 
Kenyatta would relinquish the region to the Republic of Somalia. The shifta 
rebellion demonstrated the desire for Somalis to resort to violence for attain-
ing political goals. Since intelligence reports confirmed that the Somali shifta 
were obtaining weaponry and logistic support from the Republic of Somalia, 
the Kenyatta government detached diplomatic dealings with Somalia. Ken-
yatta’s new government, with backing from British forces, engaged in a coun-
terinsurgency campaign against the shifta, ensuring that centralization was 
imposed on the region, since it was not willing to lose that part of the country. 
To downplay the Somalis’ struggle for secession, the Kenyatta administration 
branded the Somalis’ armed struggle as shifta skirmishes.74 The term shifta 
was used to portray the struggle as a banditry problem, and to invalidate its po-
litical rationale.75 The armed conflict between the Somalis and the Kenyatta 
administration led to further social, economic, and political marginalization 
of the community. For many years, the Somalis lagged behind the rest of the 
country in terms of development.76 Yet, in spite of the prevailing challenges, 
the Somali community has succeeded in securing a place for themselves in 
Kenya. Two decades later, after centralization of the region was attained, the 
Somalis have reconciled to being Kenyan citizens as conditions in the coun-
try are better than in Somalia. Their reconciliation is illustrated by the unified 
response of the Kenyan Somali political elite to the pronouncement made by 
a Somali warlord, Husayn Mohammed Aidid. In 2002, Aidid was reported 
to have declared that his organization would also ensure that the Somalis 
in Ethiopia and Kenya were brought under the one nation of Somalia. The 
Kenyan Somali political elites criticized Aidid, reiterating that the Northeast-
ern Province is Kenya’s territory and the Somali community in the country 
does not support his idea.77 In contrast to the earliest year after independence, 
there emerged a Kenyan Somali political voice that publicly challenges a 
cause that at one time was embraced by the community.
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Even with their battle cry for jihad, Muslims from other parts of the coun-
try did not support the Somali cause. This is because when the Somali gue-
rilla activities spilled over to the Lamu, Kipini Mpeketoni, and Tana areas, 
they inflicted suffering on the Muslim population in these areas. As a result 
whatever sympathy other Muslims had for the Somali cause was eroded. In 
fact, the non- Somali Muslims in the country assured President Kenyatta that 
they supported the government’s effort to subdue the shifta menace and bring 
peace to the region.78 Consequently, through military action and diplomatic 
efforts, the Kenyatta government managed to keep the Northeastern Province 
in Kenya, bringing to an end the Somalis’ agitation for self- determination. 
With counterinsurgency policies and international mediation, the shifta 
threat ultimately faded in the late 1960s, but sporadic guerrilla activities were 
patent in the 1970s, demonstrating that the desire for secession was still held 
by a section of the Somali community in Kenya.
Another episode that caused concern among Muslims about their relation-
ship with Kenyatta’s government was the establishment of a commission to 
reform the succession laws in Kenya in 1967. The commission was charged 
with the task of reforming the inheritance laws in Kenya and thereby bring-
ing Islamic law and other customary laws in harmony with English common 
law.79 The aim of Kenyatta’s government was to study the laws of inheritance 
practiced by the various ethnic and religious groups in Kenya with a view to 
reconciling them by bringing equality and justice when it came to sharing 
inheritance among members of a deceased’s family. From the moment of 
the commission’s inception, Muslims took great exception to any attempts 
to tamper with what they considered divine law. As a result, Muslims were 
united in opposition against any efforts to introduce new legislation. Apart 
from Muslims, the proposed reforms were also opposed by the followers of 
African customary law.
After the commission had accomplished its work, a bill was drafted in 
1972. The bill attempted to give men and women equal rights of inheritance 
and was, therefore, hailed as a milestone in ensuring equality between sexes.80 
Muslims lobbied against the reforms through various petitions until their po-
sition was acknowledged. Through their efforts and those of the defenders of 
the African customary law, the bill was not presented to parliament during 
Kenyatta’s lifetime. Kenyatta thought it prudent not to offend Muslim sensi-
bilities as well as those of many Africans who, in matters of personal status, 
often observed African customary law. The reforms touched on sensitive Afri-
can issues such as inheritance and polygamy that affected many Kenyans. It 
is believed that Kenyatta and many of the parliamentarians during his time 
were polygamous, which contributed to their reluctance to adopt the bill.81
However, in July 1981, during Moi’s tenure as the president of Kenya, the 
Law of Succession Act was passed despite strong Muslim protest. Muslims 
contended that the law was unconstitutional as it compromised their free-
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dom of religion and worship as embodied in Section 78 of the Independence 
Constitution, arguing that imposing the new law on them was tantamount to 
making them renounce Islam.82 In one united voice, Muslims emphasized 
that the act was in direct conflict with succession laws laid out in the Quran. 
Specifically, Muslims quoted the Quranic injunction expounding, “To the 
male a portion equal to that of two females. If only daughters, two or more, 
their share is two- thirds of inheritance. If only one, her share is half.”83 This 
injunction formed the basis of the Muslims’ rejection of the law.
Muslim protests continued until a concessional amendment was added 
in 1990, still during Moi’s tenure, excluding them from the law. Considering 
the political context and timing of this amendment, there is reason to believe 
that it was not intended to redress the long- standing problem of the law. Moi’s 
gesture to intervene and direct parliament to amend the controversial law of 
succession to accommodate the wishes of Muslims was driven by the desire 
to seek Muslims’ support at the time when Kenyans were advocating for a 
multiparty democracy. The political climate had changed, and there was stiff 
opposition against Moi’s government. At that moment in Kenya’s political 
history, Moi was willing to accede to Muslims’ wishes in the hope of winning 
their political support. And to attain this, Moi wanted to assure Muslims that 
their freedom of worship would always be safeguarded in the constitution.
In 1976, the Palestinian cause and another call for jihad put Kenyan Mus-
lims’ loyality to the state to another test. Kenyan security agents had arrested 
three Palestinians at Embakasi Airport (now Jomo Kenyatta Airport) and ac-
cused them of planning to shoot down an Israeli El Al plane with missiles that 
were found in their possession. Idi Amin, the Muslim president of Uganda, 
who at that time maintained close relations with the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO), demanded the unconditional release of the three Palestin-
ians. The Kenyatta government objected and instead handed over the three 
Palestinians to the Israeli government. This angered Amin, and in his wrath he 
called for a jihad against the regime of Kenyatta.84 In their response, Kenyan 
Muslims, represented by Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), 
came out in support of Kenyatta and strongly condemned Amin’s move. The 
statements by Muslim leaders criticized Amin’s military regime, which had 
massacred large numbers of innocent Kenyan and Ugandan citizens. For that 
matter, they accused Amin of not being a sincere Muslim because, contrary 
to Quranic tenets, he was responsible for the arbitrary killing of innocent 
people. Such a leader, they argued, should not be trusted, and his call for 
jihad against the government of Kenyatta should not be heeded.85 This stance 
taken by Muslim leaders illustrated the community’s loyalty to the Kenyan 
state. Even the Palestinian cause that has radiated strong passion among Mus-
lims all over the world was not enough to rally Kenyan Muslims against the 
government of Kenyatta.
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Muslims Under the Moi Regime
Following the death of the first president, Kenyatta, on August 22, 1978, his 
longest serving (1967– 78) vice president, Moi, ascended to the presidency 
in accordance with a stipulation in the Independence Constitution, which 
states:
Article 6 (1)
If the office of the president becomes vacant by reason of the death or 
resignation of the President, or by reason of his ceasing to hold office 
by virtue of section 10 or section 12, an election of a President shall 
be held within the period of ninety days immediately following the 
occurrence of that vacancy, and shall be held in a manner prescribed 
by section 5(5) of this constitution.86
Therefore, according to the constitution, following Kenyatta’s death, Moi was 
to assume power for a period of ninety days. Moi’s automatic accession to 
power was objected to by a certain section of Kenyan’s powerful politicians. 
The opposition was led by an alliance of Kenyatta’s family and the Gikuyu, 
Embu, Meru Association (GEMA). Constitutionally, Moi was the successor, 
but in 1976, a number of politicians led by the GEMA- Kenyatta’s family al-
liance initiated the Change the Constitution Movement in order to prevent 
Moi’s automatic succession.87 As a result, the issue of succession became a 
major political debate during the last years of Kenyatta’s rule. The first polit-
ical leader to condemn the Change the Constitution Movement was a Mus-
lim politician, Shariff Nassir bin Taib, who gave Moi unconditional support 
in his struggle to assume the presidency in the face of opposition.88
Following Kenyatta’s death and Moi’s accession, Nassir urged KANU del-
egates to elect Moi unopposed as the chairman of the party. This strategy was 
to entrench Moi’s powers in the party making his position uncontested. A few 
days after Nassir’s statement, most politicians and community groups issued 
statements of allegiance to Moi, urging the need for continuity and stabil-
ity.89 Following this cue, in December 1978 a delegation from the Muslim 
community led by SUPKEM met the president and expressed their loyalty.90 
Therefore, as Moi was ascending to leadership he already had loyalists among 
Muslims who distinguished themselves as staunch supporters of his regime. 
For instance, the 1982 coup attempt against his government was put down 
by an army general, Mahmoud Mohamed, a Somali Muslim. As a general 
in the army, Mahmoud played a key role in foiling the coup. This incident 
is presumed to have changed Moi’s attitude toward Somalis and Muslims in 
general. After the failed coup attempt, for the first time in Kenya, a Muslim, 
who happened to be Mahmoud’s brother, was appointed as a cabinet minister 
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in the Moi administration.91 Mahmoud was later to occupy the office of the 
chief of general staff in the Kenya Armed Forces, with analysts interpreting 
Moi’s gesture as a form of payback to the general.92 Again as a strong ally 
of Moi, Nassir is alleged to have spoken out at a KANU Special Delegates 
Congress in December 1991 against permitting the registration of opposition 
political parties.
Based on this background, Moi became sympathetic to individual Mus-
lims who had supported him at various crucial moments in his political ca-
reer. This attitude by Moi toward Muslims should not be perceived as being 
favorable to Islam; but maintaining power was the relevant policy. In cases 
where Muslims have felt discriminated against, this cannot be regarded as 
anti- Islamic policy per se, though he did not see much use in making allianc-
es with Muslims as a community. However, the politics of inclusion that Moi 
exercised was received positively by a section of the Muslim population who 
came to believe that his regime had been more considerate to the community 
in terms of appointments than the previous government.93
However, there are other Muslims who hold the view that Moi’s inter-
action with his Muslim compatriots was pragmatic and for mutual conve-
nience. His critics claim that Moi entertained Muslims only as a strategy 
for political survival, as demonstrated by the concessional amendment that 
was added to the Laws of Succession in the 1990s. The critics wonder why, 
despite supporting the ruling party, KANU, and Moi’s government in par-
ticular, Muslims’ conditions have deteriorated instead of improving.94 This 
explains why during his tenure, Muslims demanded justice and equal treat-
ment, alleging that his regime favored Christianity over Islam. Muslims cite 
the example of his government’s provincial officers’ sanctioning a major 
address by Reverend Bonnke of Germany in the town of Mombasa, while 
preventing Muslim preachers from Tanzania from addressing Muslims of 
the same town. This apparent callousness on the part of the government led 
to Muslim demonstrations in October 1989.95 These demonstrations were 
indications of the community’s frustrations and their determination to be 
treated equally as the country’s citizens.
One area where Muslims alleged discrimination was the issuing of identity 
cards, passports, and citizenship. When it came to acquiring these national 
documents, Muslims, especially those of Somali, Arab, and Asian descent, 
claimed to be the most discriminated group during the presidency of Moi.96 
By the end of Moi’s tenure in 2002, these Muslim groups were required to 
produce extra documentary evidence of citizenship when applying for these 
national documents. The policy was meant to identify genuine Kenyan cit-
izens who deserved these important citizenship documents. Further, Moi’s 
government singled out Somali Muslims as the only group whose members 
were required to carry an additional form of identification to prove that they 
were citizens. They were required to produce upon demand their national 
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identification card and a second identification card verifying screening. Both 
cards were required to be produced by any of them applying for passport, a 
policy that Muslims termed as illegal.97
Moi’s government claimed that the screening policy was necessary during 
the 1990s to curb the influx of illegal immigrants from the neighboring col-
lapsed Somali state, but this reasoning was faulted by some analysts arguing:
The same treatment, however, has never been extended to Christian 
Kenyans on account of refugees from predominantly Christian re-
gions of Africa. For instance, there has long been an influx of Nilot-
ic speaking refugees, carrying Christian names, from neighbouring 
Uganda and Southern Sudan. Yet there has not been any govern-
ment action to subject Nilotic speaking Kenyans of the Christian 
faith to this discriminatory exercise of having to produce additional 
evidence of citizenship.98
The screening procedure of ethnic Somalis in the country was proposed to 
run for three weeks but instead continued, despite temporary suspensions and 
complaints. Protest from Muslims, led to Moi, in August 2002, directing the 
cessation of Somali screening, clarifying that his government would instead 
rely on local leaders to determine the citizenship of the Somalis.99 This put 
into question the timing of the recession of his government policy on the 
Somalis. It was an election year, and five months before the polls Moi wanted 
to assure the Somalis in particular and the Muslim population in general that 
his government was concerned with their welfare. Although the intention of 
Moi’s government in the screening exercise was to safeguard the security of 
the nation, the process was abused and genuine Kenyans were denied their 
rights. Given that corruption is rampant in Kenya, the policy was abused and 
served as an opportunity to extort money from Muslims of Somali and Arab 
descent or to reject their applications if they refused to “cooperate.”
It is because of this discrimination that some Muslims have taken the 
attorney general to court for violating their constitutional rights by denying 
them passports.100 Closely related to this issue is the incident where the Moi 
administration revoked Balala’s passport while he was in Germany, from April 
1995 to July 1997, on the pretext that he was not a Kenyan citizen.101 The 
government revoked Balala’s passport while he was renewing it on the claim 
that he was holding a Yemenite citizenship. However, it appears that the real 
reason was his criticism of the political establishment. Apparently, Moi’s gov-
ernment wanted to prevent Balala from reentering the country for some time, 
as evidenced by the fact that, without issuing any explanation, in July 1997 
Balala was given back his Kenyan passport. This action demonstrates how 
Moi could mobilize government resources to frustrate critical voices in the 
country whether they were Muslims or not.
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It happens that the majority of Muslims in Kenya are poor,102 a fact aggra-
vated by lack of “secular” education. As Muslims were shunning Western ed-
ucation, their non- Muslim compatriots embraced it, placing them in a better 
position than the Muslims. Constantin has asserted that
For a long time modern education was neglected when not com-
pletely rejected by traditional Muslim leaders. Muslims are still gen-
erally less well educated than Christians according to the norms of 
the modern westernized state system. Higher political and govern-
ment positions are strongholds of a westernized ruling class which 
few people can enter with diplomas from Muslim schools or even 
with degrees from an Arab University.103
For many years before the 1980s, many Muslims emphasized acquiring the 
religious education offered in the madrasas (Islamic religious schools) to en-
able them to comprehend and practice their faith in accordance with the 
religion. With teaching varying for doctrinal reasons, generally the madrasas 
emphasize instructing children to read the Quran in Arabic, to understand 
the life history of the Prophet Muhammad, and for more advanced students 
to master the principles of exegesis and jurisprudence. Due to early expo-
sure in religious education and with no other qualifications, some students 
from these madrasas joined universities in other Muslim countries (i.e., Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, and Pakistan) to advance their religious studies. Despite re-
turning home with degrees from these universities, the graduates did not get 
employment in the formal sector, a trend that Muslims have termed to be 
discrimination. This is how the gap between Muslims and secular education, 
or between Muslims and employment, in Kenya partly came into being. For 
the non- Muslims, the situation was different, and they took advantage of the 
education that was initially introduced to them by the church missionaries. 
Having had an earlier start than Muslims, Christians are well educated and 
better placed to take the most rewarding jobs in the country. Because of their 
higher incomes, they are able to build more schools, equip those already in 
existence, and improve their living standard. Thus, a vicious cycle is estab-
lished. But by the early 1980s, just a few years after Moi had come to pow-
er, there emerged a growing demand for Western education among Kenyan 
Muslims. This demand coincided with the realization that Western education 
was the gateway to a good job and higher standard of living. Like the rest of 
Kenyans, Muslims embarked on building their own educational institutions 
through the spirit of harambee (people putting their resources together to real-
ize a specific project) and foreign assistance to cater for the growing demand.
These efforts by Muslims were sometimes allegedly frustrated by the Moi 
government. For instance, in alleviating the shortage of trained teachers, 
the Muslim community felt it was necessary to establish their own teachers’ 
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training institutions. This culminated in the establishment of the Mikindani 
Teachers’ Training College. It is a policy of the Kenyan government that 
private institutions must apply for registration before they begin operating. 
Accordingly, Muslims complied and applied for official recognition of the 
institution by the government. On its part, the Ministry of Education un-
der Moi’s administration refused to offer the institution official registration. 
This decision outraged Muslims, and it took their strong condemnation of 
the government to eventually allow the institution to operate through a pres-
idential order.104 At a time when almost all the private universities in Kenya 
are religiously sponsored, Muslims as a community did not have even a single 
university during Moi’s tenure.105 It is alleged that the Kenyan political admin-
istration under Moi was reluctant to support the creation of a private Islamic 
university on the ground that it would encourage “Islamic fundamentalism” 
in the country.106 This allegation has been criticized as it does not conform 
to the current scholastic practice even in the so- called Western and secular 
nations. If the fear of Islam was to be extended to academic circles, one would 
have expected other secular countries in the world to adopt such a policy. As 
if to suggest that Moi’s government was an obstacle to Muslims’ ownership of 
higher institutions of academic learning, when his leadership came to an end 
in 2002, Kenya’s Commission for University Education granted the Umma 
University interim authority to offer various degree and diploma courses in 
July 2013. Coming after the Islamic University in Uganda that was established 
in 1988, the Umma University is owned and managed by some of the Muslim 
institutions in Kenya.
From the preceding, it is clear there is no uniform policy for the interaction 
of religion and politics in the various postcolonial regimes, which was influ-
enced by the personality of the political leadership and the prevailing condi-
tions. This explains why Muslims’ fortunes in the country shifted depending 
on the political authority of that time. Nevertheless, the primary legacy of the 
postcolonial government was the incorporation of a few Muslims as symbolic 
figureheads to form the impression of political inclusion and participation at 
the highest levels of government, while most influential positions were held 
by upcountry Christian politicians and professionals. This condition of dom-
ination of Muslims in all sectors is what Alamin Mazrui has described as 
“internal colonization.”107 If the colonial paradigm is applied with reference 
to the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, the case of Kenya seems to resem-
ble the French rather than the British model of colonialism.108 During the 
colonial period, the British order combined both paternalism and institution-
alized segregation in its relations toward all its subjects. After independence, 
ushering in the era of Kenyatta and Moi, an unconscious shift from a British 
model of colonialism to a French model can be observed.
French colonial policy permitted their subjects to rise to high positions 
as individuals within the state. The system allowed considerable individual 
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social mobility while retaining collective ethnic subordination. Individual 
natives from the colonies rose high in France, while the group to which they 
belonged still remained subordinate in the total French hierarchy.109 Could 
Kenyan Muslims have entered a neocolonial status based on the French mod-
el in the postcolonial period? From the available evidence, it can be argued 
that Muslims in Kenya are experiencing the French style of colonialism. Indi-
vidual Muslims may have risen to become chief of general staff, commission-
er of police, ministers, directors of government firms, permanent secretaries, 
or education officers, while the general Muslim community is alleged to be 
least educated, most unemployed, and most discriminated against.
However, the general legacy of the Kenyatta regime was the creation of a 
secular society, which recognized the freedom of worship and religious parity 
among different faiths. Kenyatta was very cautious not to favor one particular 
religion, unlike Moi who was out to give the impression that Kenya was a 
Christian country. Moi’s interaction with Muslims in most cases was for mutu-
al convenience. The timing of the president’s accession to Muslims’ demands 
on various occasions has been perceived as a preelection campaign strategy 
to woo Muslim voters. On his part, Kenyatta strived to live in accordance 
with his principles of separating religion and politics, which was welcomed 
by Muslims in Kenya. It is only through the adoption of such a principle, 
which maintains the separation of religion and politics, that the protection 
of minority religious groups like the Muslims of Kenya can be guaranteed.
On the surface, Muslims appear to be united group, but beneath it is a 
community that, like others, experiences conflicts, division, and suspicion 
among themselves. For various reasons Kenyan Muslims are divided, hav-
ing allowed narrow sectarian- mindedness to come between them. Beginning 
from the colonial era and continuing to the postcolonial period, it is possible 
to find Muslims split along lines of black Muslims versus Arab Muslims and 
even coastal Muslims versus Somalis or upcountry Muslims. Such divisions 
ensure that Kenyan Muslim politics are not monolithic, despite efforts to uni-
fy Muslims’ voices. It is this bid to establish a united Muslim front that is 
addressed in the next chapter.
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chapter three
The Development of Muslim  
Civic Associations and  
Political Parties
The Creation of SUPKEM and the Need to Unify Muslims’ Efforts
Many Muslims believe that the ascendancy of upcountry (wabara) Christian 
hegemony is responsible for the perceived marginalization and discrimina-
tion against Muslims in Kenya.1 Although the predicament of Muslims pre-
dated colonialism, postcolonial politics is blamed for not reversing the situa-
tion. Instead, postcolonial governments have made Muslims ask themselves 
questions relating to their position as citizens. Such questions include their 
perceived social, economic, and political alienation vis- à- vis the upcountry 
Christian hegemony. The perception of upcountry Christian domination has 
influenced some Muslims to conclude that religion plays a significant role 
in the power game exhibited by the upcountry politicians.2 As a result, some 
Muslims are of the opinion that it has become imperative to employ Islam 
for achieving their sociopolitical goals. This development of using Islam in 
African politics has also been observed by Louis Brenner:
Today Islam has become a major factor in world politics and in conso-
nance with this trend African Muslims have increasingly been turning 
to Islam for the resolution of their own social and political problems. 
They are injecting themselves into the political arena as Muslims.3
In Kenya, as elsewhere, the place of Islam in the political process has been 
redefined as a means of dealing with new political realities. Since the 1990s, 
things have changed from Muslims protesting against perceived discrimina-
tion by the government to Muslims seeking to shape the direction of Kenya’s 
politics. Several Muslim organizations have been established in Kenya, and 
their impact is felt in the religious as well as the political field.
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The formation of Muslim associations during the colonial period reflected 
ethnic and racial antagonism among Muslims of Arab, Indian, and indige-
nous African backgrounds, which continued to be politically significant af-
ter independence. To divide the Muslim community, the colonial authority 
granted Arabs and Indian Muslims political favors over indigenous African 
Muslims as reflected in the composition of the Legislative Council. In 1920, 
the council had one nominated Arab member. Following agitation for elected 
rather than nominated representation by the Coast Arab Association formed 
in 1921, the British granted the Arabs two elected seats on the council in 
1923. The development increased the factional rivalries among Muslims, 
leading the Afro- Asian Muslims to form their own association in 1927.4 I dis-
cussed the political divisions of Muslims along racial lines during the colonial 
era in chapter 1. There were several ethnically based Muslim associations, 
which acted as a lobby for the interests of a particular community.5 The result 
was the emergence of many Muslim associations, which failed to develop a 
nationalistic and unified Muslim approach on important issues. This frag-
mentation of Muslim interests across a variety of associational activities led 
to a diffusion of any significant Muslim impact in Kenya, which was of great 
value to postcolonial regimes.6
After independence, an important aspect was evident among Muslims. 
Muslims came to the realization that their efforts in uplifting their welfare 
had been weakened by the prevailing fragmentation along ethnic and racial 
lines. Muslims determined it was time to have an umbrella body that could 
articulate the demands of the community rather than having several factional 
ethnic associations. This led to the creation of the Supreme Council of Ken-
yan Muslims (SUPKEM) in 1973. Since the issue of cleavage emanates in 
different forms among Kenyan Muslims, in this chapter I examine to what 
extent the national Muslim organization SUPKEM has succeeded in uniting 
Muslims. Thus, I endeavor to assess its contribution to partisan politics in 
Kenya as the main umbrella body for Muslims. However, more important was 
that the creation of a postcolonial state required Muslims to be unified into 
a centralized body for social control.7 This became clear by the beginning of 
1970s as clarified by Bakari:
The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims was established as part 
of the grand strategy of the Kenyatta government to control various 
sections of the Kenyan society, from trades unions to religious orga-
nizations, in the name of centralization of decision making. It was 
established about the same time that the Central Organization of 
the Trade Unions (COTU) and the National Christian Council of  
Kenya (NCCK) [were formed]. These were umbrella organizations 
that were created to provide direct channels of communication be-
tween the government and important influential sectors of the Kenyan  
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society. All the organizations that served civil society were supposed 
to be affiliated to one or another of these umbrella bodies. And the 
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) was intended to be 
a clearing ground for Muslim organizations that wanted to deal with 
the government.8
Though creating a national Muslim association was part of a general poli-
cy of social control initiated by the postcolonial government, Muslims were 
also involved in this bureaucratization process. The need to have a unifying 
body for all Muslims was the inspiration behind the formation of a national 
organization. Both Muslim politicians and religious leaders were engaged in 
the process that culminated in the creation of SUPKEM in May 1973. The 
council activities are conducted from its secretariat in Nairobi, which has 
staff implementing the decisions of the National Executive Committee. The 
committee is mandated to appoint professionals to assist in the activities of the 
organization. Due to financial constraints, the committee works on a volun-
tary basis, and it is only the small secretariat that is paid.
According to Bakari, the creation of this organization could not have suc-
ceeded without the approval of the government. As a form of political control, 
postcolonial government encouraged the formation of religious organizations 
of national reach among the party loyalists. This explains why some of the 
Muslim senior government officials in the Kenyatta administration were also 
representatives of SUPKEM. This was the case of Assistant Minister Kassim 
Mwamzandi, who was also the chairman of SUPKEM; Assistant Minister Mo-
hammed Salim Balala was SUPKEM’s secretary general; Assistant Minister 
Mohamed Shaikh Aden was SUPKEM’s director of education; and Deputy 
Director of Central Bank of Kenya Ahmad Abdallah was SUPKEM’s director 
general.9 According to Mwamzandi, the reason for incorporating government 
members as officials of SUPKEM was to give the organization influence in 
its endeavor to serve the Muslim community. He is strongly convinced that 
government’s representation helped the organization to earn recognition, es-
pecially in its international dealings.10
Mwamzandi does not agree that it is possible to have a conflict of interest 
in situations where one is a government minister and at the same time rep-
resenting a Muslim body. As a result, the formation of SUPKEM enjoyed 
political blessings. Arguably, the creation of SUPKEM was also meant to 
check potentially disruptive tendencies among Muslims. Prior to the intro-
duction of multiparty politics, the council was anticipated to be in harmo-
ny with the political leadership of the day. The government presumed that 
the council leaders would control Muslims for the benefit of the state where 
open disagreement with the state was to be avoided. In return for their loyalty, 
Muslims found themselves rewarded in different ways. Their religious leaders 
were allowed to participate in state functions, while some Muslim politicians 
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were appointed government ministers, and a few Muslims were promoted to 
substantive administrative positions. The cost that Muslims had to incur to 
have access to these privileges was political conformism.
In essence, however, SUPKEM was set up as an umbrella body to unite all 
Muslim organizations, societies, mosque committees, and groups in Kenya. 
According to its vision statement, SUPKEM’s desire was to provide a single 
channel of communication with the government and the rest of the world 
on all matters concerning Muslims in Kenya.11 Therefore, the organization 
acted as an intermediary because it created new structures through which 
the government could deal with the Muslim population. This recognition 
presents the supreme council as both an institutionalized interest group and 
an adviser to the government on matters concerning Muslims. This official 
close relationship of SUPKEM and the state has sometimes been condemned 
by other Muslims with the allegation that the organization is always hesitant 
to criticize the government.
The “Failure” of SUPKEM in the Political Arena
In principle, all Muslim associations are required to be under SUPKEM. 
However, some Muslim associations have no links with SUPKEM and remain 
independent registered bodies. The Kenya authority has not banned these 
rival bodies except when they are suspected of opposing the government or 
supporting subversive activities deemed dangerous to the security of the state. 
For instance, after the August 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya, 
the government decided to ban five Islamic nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), which included Mercy International, Haramain Foundation, Help 
African People, International Islamic Relief Organization, and Ibrahim bin 
Abdul Aziz al- Ibrahim Foundation. According to the NGO Coordinating 
Board, the organizations were proscribed because they had been found to be 
working against the interests of Kenya’s security.12 Nevertheless, there are oth-
er popular Muslim organizations like the Council of Imams and Preachers of 
Kenya (CIPK) and the National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF), which 
are not affiliated with SUPKEM. Their existences have challenged SUPKEM 
as the sole voice speaking on behalf of Kenyan Muslims.
The supreme council’s authority is further weakened by its sharing of reli-
gious authority with independent sheikhs and imams and government Kadhis. 
Its main domain is limited to secular matters as it has no authority in theo-
logical or intra- Islamic legal disputes. Usually, theological issues are handled 
and interpreted by renowned independent sheikhs and imams of mosques. 
If there is an intra- Islamic legal issue to be resolved, in most instances such 
cases are handled by the Kadhi courts established by the government. This 
demonstrates that the leadership of the supreme council is limited. Further, 
intraparty wrangling has severely damaged the reputation of the organization, 
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where contradicting statements made by officials of the organization have left 
Muslims in confusion. For instance, in 2004, the SUPKEM vice chairman, 
Munir Mazrui (Arab descent), issued a press statement that the organization 
had decided to support a Muslim, Hassan Omar Sarai (mixed ethnic parent-
age), in the Kisauni by- election that year. Juma Ngao (Mijikenda descent), 
SUPKEM chairman Mombasa branch, released a statement refuting the en-
dorsement of the candidate by SUPKEM.13
According to Mazrui, Ngao rejected his endorsement claiming that it was 
meant to favor a Muslim of “Swahili” descent. It happened that Ngao sup-
ported Anania Mwaboza, a non- Muslim of Mijikenda descent. This ethnic 
conflict was evident with the positions the two protagonists had taken. In the 
ensuing war of words meant to show who has supremacy in Muslim politics at 
the coast, Ngao allegedly sent the following short message to Mazrui’s phone. 
It reads (Kiswahili version):
Jumapili ndio siku ninayo kujibu rasmi. Inshallah nitaona mimi na 
wewe ninani msemaji na yupi siye hapa pwani. Nasikuheshimu tena 
kwa tabiya yako yakutohishimu sisi tuliyo kuchangua na badala yake 
unatumiwa ni Dor ambaye yeye na watu wake hutukana SUPKEM 
matusi aina yote tena mibarini. Wallahi I will teach you a lesson. Na 
SUPKEM si yako ni ya Kenya Muslims na mimi ni Kenya Muslim. 
Utaonga na Dor wako.14
Translation:
I will respond to you on Sunday. Inshallah I will know between you 
and me who is the spokesperson for the people of the coast. I don’t 
respect you anymore because you don’t respect us who elected you. 
Instead you have allowed [Sheikh] Dor who together with his clique 
use the mosque to attack and insult the officials of SUPKEM. Walla-
hi “I will teach you a lesson.” Be aware SUPKEM is not your property 
it belongs to Kenyan Muslims and am a “Kenya Muslim.” Dor and 
you are bound to fail.15
This incident illustrates in- fighting within SUPKEM that is sometimes influ-
enced by ethnic antagonism. But more remarkably, the occurrence demon-
strates the underlying tension among the various sections of the Muslim pop-
ulation, which was a product of Arab racial domination in the precolonial 
and colonial era. For Ngao, a candidate of Mijikenda background, previously 
perceived as washenzi, was more important than a Muslim of another ethnic 
group, while for Mazrui both the “Swahili” and Islamic factors were signif-
icant. As I have shown, the Swahili had in a confused way perceived them-
selves as both Africans and Arabs where a person’s racial personality altered 
84 chapter three
according to prevailing circumstances. When they wanted to benefit from 
the aristocratic arrangements of the Arab elites, the Swahili considered them-
selves part of the composite group, the waungwana (civilized), denouncing 
being clustered with the washenzi. It is clear from the Ngao- Mazrui confron-
tation how politics of racial (or ethnic) competition and domination of some 
parts of the coastal region is still a strong factor among Muslims. Therefore, 
this conflict of interest has severely hampered SUPKEM from providing lead-
ership to the general Muslim public.
As a matter of fact, many Muslims view SUPKEM as merely an instru-
ment for individual prestige and power rather than a serious body serving the 
community. The organization is alleged to have failed to deliver substantial 
services to Muslims.16 In its self- defense, SUPKEM claims to have accom-
plished several projects, mostly on education.17 According to the national 
chairman:
Through collaboration and cooperation with its member organiza-
tions, and the assistance from international donors, especially the 
Islamic Development Bank, the Council has initiated developments 
projects on behalf of the community. These include academies, sep-
arate boys’ and girls’ secondary schools, a joint education bursary pro-
gramme, a Teachers’ Training College and a scholarship programme 
that has seen about 140 young Muslim men and women train as 
doctors and engineers in Turkish universities.18
For many ordinary Muslims, enough schools have not been built, scholar-
ships are not offered transparently, and health facilities are ignored. The Mus-
lim national organization, therefore, comes to be seen as another extension of 
a corrupt system. It is as a result of this that most Muslims would prefer to be 
associated with structures that are efficient and transparent. The emergence 
of organizations such as the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), the 
CIPK, and NAMLEF are evidence of the crisis and incompetence within 
SUPKEM. However, this statutory recognition of a national Muslim asso-
ciation is a form of success for a divided group. It was out of this recognized 
national organization that Muslim leaders lobbied for Muslims’ personal af-
fairs (e.g., the issue of the law of succession) to be administered through the 
Kadhi courts, for the development of Muslim educational facilities, and for 
greater access to state electronic media.19 Confronted with numerous Muslim 
associations competing with one another for attention, one national Muslim 
association acting on behalf of the community should enable it to overcome 
the problems of leadership in a pluralist and complex group.
Though SUPKEM is expected to coordinate Muslim activities, the or-
ganization is accused of failing to play an active political role for the com-
munity. There is a perception among Muslims that SUPKEM has been 
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compromised by the government and that is why the state is comfortable 
to work with the organization. This accusation is based on the notion that 
whenever an alternative Muslim voice emerges, the government quickly em-
ploys SUPKEM to diffuse the emerging voice.20 This political weakness of 
SUPKEM lies in the organization’s readiness to denounce Muslim individ-
uals or groups that are perceived to be critical of the state. At one time, 
SUPKEM suspended its secretary general, Ahmed Khalif, because of his crit-
ical stand against the government. As a member of parliament, Khalif advo-
cated for the rights of his constituents and denounced the Wagalla massacre 
by the army in 1984.
In 1989, Khalif again condemned the government’s discriminatory poli-
cy that required Kenyan Somalis to have special identity cards.21 It was also 
clear that during the early 1990s SUPKEM was not keen to support the IPK 
because of its opposition to Moi’s leadership. Arguably, the condemnations by 
Khalif and the emergence of the IPK were interpreted as antiestablishment, 
which angered the political authority. For fear of government retribution, 
SUPKEM distances itself from such individuals or groups. This explains why 
later in the early 1990s, after the formation of the Forum for the Restoration 
of Democracy (FORD) in 1991 as a lobby championing for multiparty de-
mocracy, its founders sought distinguished personalities to represent the party 
in various parts of the country. Accordingly, FORD sought to recruit Khalif 
as its representative for the Northeastern Province, but he declined the offer 
because he did not want to embarrass his colleagues in SUPKEM.22 Since 
SUPKEM has a close mutual relationship with the state, its member join-
ing an opposition party was viewed as a humiliation to both the state and 
SUPKEM during this period.
This perceived political failure of SUPKEM could be traced to one of its 
mission statements, which is “to refrain from being partisan” in political is-
sues. During its inception, political objectives were not among the reasons for 
the formation of SUPKEM, implying that a great deal of caution should be 
exercised when engaging in political matters. Its leadership carefully avoids 
adopting a political approach that will be viewed as antagonizing toward the 
government. It is this cautious engagement of SUPKEM in politics that has 
led to its image as a quasi- government body. However, a national official of 
the organization has a different view regarding SUPKEM’s engagement in 
politics. First, he views politics as “being aware of one’s rights,” and to that 
effect, he is of the opinion that SUPKEM has strived to make Muslims aware 
of their rights, adding:
The council has always mobilized and advised Muslim Members of 
Parliament by arranging seminars to prepare them whenever Bills of 
particular interest to Muslims are being debated in Parliament. De-
spite the fact that the organization is expected to refrain from partisan 
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politics, SUPKEM has always been firm on political issues affecting 
Muslims.23
It is evident that officials of the organization vehemently refute the allegation 
that SUPKEM is a government organ and thereby ineffective. According to 
the body, whenever the rights of Muslims have been infringed, SUPKEM has 
not hesitated to condemn the government. Despite the officials’ defense of 
SUPKEM, it is clear that political objectives are not among its goals and it be-
comes difficult for the organization to engage in partisan politics. It is against 
this background that Muslims formed a political party as an alternative voice, 
which will be examined in the following section.
Muslim Political Opposition from the 1990s Through the 
Formation of an Islamic Party
Before the 1990s, SUPKEM was the main channel through which Muslims 
negotiated with the government. Whenever there were major political deci-
sions to be made that affected the Muslim and state relationship, a delegation 
from SUPKEM met with the president or a minister, depending on the im-
portance of the matter. For a long time, SUPKEM was regarded as the sole 
representative of Kenyan Muslims recognized by the government. Despite 
this acknowledgment, there were other Muslims who were not satisfied with 
the leadership of SUPKEM, especially its alleged uncritical role toward the 
government.
Consequently, in 1992 in an atmosphere of political liberalization, the 
IPK was founded. Despite the prevalence of several Muslim organizations in 
postcolonial Kenya, the only one that had clear political ambitions was the 
IPK. The extension of political space in the early 1990s allowed for criticism 
of the country’s leadership and political competition that had previously been 
unacceptable. The emerging opposition parties to challenge the ruling party, 
KANU, were mostly dominated by upcountry Christian politicians. A section 
of Muslims noticed the void and formed the IPK to articulate community 
grievances that they considered to be neglected. After its formation, the IPK 
found a strong base of supporters among the urban coastal Muslims, especial-
ly those of Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu. Its primary appeal was as a party 
that did not propagate a narrow ethnic agenda, which was displayed by the 
diverse background of its national officials. Within its leadership were Mus-
lim scholars (imams/ulama/sheikhs) who are traditionally trained and profes-
sionals educated in the “secular- formal” institutions.24 Rather than campaign-
ing via ethnic propaganda, IPK focused on Muslim grievances that stemmed 
from perceived marginalization, discrimination, and injustice by the various 
postcolonial regimes.
With the IPK, Kenya for the first time after independence witnessed an 
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Islamic political body. Unlike SUPKEM, IPK wanted to make a more di-
rect political impact in the context of the unfolding new opposition politics 
spurred by demands for multiparty democracy. The party had declared that 
its aim was to bring about a just constitutional government that upholds the 
ideals of democracy, human rights, and removal of all forms of discrimination 
at all levels.25 It wanted to be recognized like any other political party in Ken-
ya so that it could participate in elections, to make the system more open and 
honest rather than demolishing the existing system. This agenda can hardly 
be described as Islamist.26 For this reason, it is appropriate to describe the 
party as a political lobby for the interests of Muslims, rather than as a means 
for Islamist political objectives.
The criticism of the state formed a common ground between IPK and the 
emerging opposition parties. The goal of the opposition parties was to get rid 
of the Moi administration, which they accused of bad governance, corrup-
tion, abuse of power, and disrespect for human and civic rights. In line with 
the programs of other political parties, IPK was primarily seeking reform and 
improvement of public institutions in order to facilitate justice and fair play. 
It is this approach of making the system more open, fair, and honest rather 
than demolishing the existing system that marks the struggle of IPK.27 Howev-
er, it is also possible that the formation of the IPK implied that the party was 
set up for contesting political power. In democratic societies, political parties 
compete in elections for the purpose of attaining power and controlling the 
resources of the state. It is when a political party wins an election that it can 
control the state and resources of the government either individually or in a 
coalition with other political parties. This is the objective that all political 
parties strive to attain. Therefore, a Muslim political party like IPK was not 
different from other political parties, which were set to attain this political 
objective.
The Muslim political movement played a substantial role in the develop-
ment of the politics of opposition in the country. Between 1992 and 1997, 
IPK made common cause with some churches and opposition political par-
ties to Moi’s government, identifying restrictions and discriminatory treat-
ment of Muslims. Vocal preachers such as Khalid Balala in Mombasa used 
mosques to criticize the ruling party, KANU, and to call for change.28 The ap-
pearance of the IPK as an alternative political voice, and its mix of Islam and 
politics, attracted the attention of the country. The political leadership feared 
that the party would dominate Muslim politics. To counter IPK’s popularity, 
the Kenyan government refused to register the party, which increased anxiety 
among its supporters and led to violent antigovernment demonstrations. Al-
though the repeal of Section 2(a) of the constitution permitted the formation 
of opposition parties, political parties still had to be approved by the Registrar 
of Societies. The government, through this office, had the power to vet oppo-
sition parties. Several were refused registration, including the Green African 
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Party, the Kenya Nationalist People’s Democratic Party, and the Islamic Party 
of Kenya. IPK was refused registration on the grounds that it was discrimi-
natory, requiring specific religious beliefs of its members. This practice of 
government veto against political organizations remained a real constraint on 
Kenyan’s freedom to organize politically.
This leads me to an important question: did Kenyan Muslims have a case 
in demanding the registration of IPK? One wonders whether the principles of 
democracy are against the registration of a party that is founded on religious 
lines. It is common in the world that political parties based on religious values 
are allowed to exist provided they are committed to the democratic process. 
As long as their policies and manifestos respect the rights of humanity, deny-
ing them registration has been perceived to be undemocratic. Kenya would 
not have been a peculiar case to have a political party founded on a religious 
basis. There are Christian Democrat parties in both Germany (Christlich 
Demokratische Union) and Italy (Democrazia Christiana),29 Britain has the 
Christian People’s Alliance (CPA),30 and in Russia there is the Islamic Party 
of Russia.31
In fact in Russia, Muslims had earlier applied for the registration of their 
party under the title of the Party of the Muslims of Russia. The Russian Jus-
tice Ministry denied the party registration because they were concerned that 
the name would lend the organization a monoconfessional appearance con-
trary to the law on political parties, which prohibits monoconfessional and 
mononational parties. However, when the name was changed to the Islamic 
Party of Russia, it passed administrative review on the ground that “Islam is 
an ideology, a culture, and lifestyle of many people in the world.”32 On that 
basis, it was officially registered in May 2001. Provided that these parties based 
on religion show respect for the human and civil rights of others, and comply 
with the democratic process, they have the right to compete in democratic 
politics.
It is clear that the main reason for the rejection of IPK by Moi’s govern-
ment was to stifle the political ambitions of the Muslim party and restrict 
their activities to the social and religious spheres. Moi’s party, KANU, foresaw 
the possibility of losing support on the coast and in the northeastern regions, 
which are predominately Muslim, once IPK is permitted to compete in elec-
tions.33 The refusal to register the IPK apparently reflected the political lead-
ership’s fear that the Muslim community could become a coherent political 
force in opposition to KANU. Thereby, the government insisted that no po-
litical organization should employ religious symbols and names. As a result 
of this decree, it was argued that the word Islamic on the party’s name could 
be interpreted as exhibiting Islamic political ambitions and also restricting 
the party to Muslims. This strategy to deny IPK registration was a clear sup-
pression of the Muslims’ political ambitions in Kenya. It severely weakened 
Islamic- oriented politics in Kenya.
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Despite being denied registration, the party did not immediately disappear, 
though the action angered its officials and supporters. By contrast, the coun-
try’s Muslim political leaders continued to maintain good relations with the 
government. The result was a bitter conflict in Mombasa between a section 
of supporters of IPK and KANU, which led to widespread violence, destruc-
tion of property and vehicles, mass arrests, and sporadic street fighting. The 
situation got worse when six days before the elections, Balala was arrested 
and remanded to prison, which led to a violent clash erupting between IPK 
supporters and police.34 As a result of the confrontation, several cases of hu-
man rights violations were reported.35 Violence against IPK was manifested 
through putting some of its activists in custody and harassment of its officials. 
This led to some of its supporters fleeing the country to seek political asylum 
abroad.36
Unable to field its own parliamentary and local government candidates, 
the IPK leadership decided to form an alliance with Forum for the Resto-
ration of Democracy- Kenya (FORD- Kenya), but not without some IPK mem-
bers protesting the action, arguing that it would undermine the party’s core 
goal.37 Though the goal of the alliance with FORD- Kenya was to increase 
IPK’s influence in national politics, a Lamu IPK branch official rejected the 
idea of working with “any secular political party.” In the memorandum of 
understanding, FORD- Kenya agreed to nominate IPK members as its parlia-
mentary candidates in areas where it had a following. This arrangement was 
well illustrated in all the Mombasa constituencies. The IPK believed that 
FORD- Kenya best represented the “original” forum’s ideology for political 
reform.38 However, it later emerged that IPK activists in Lamu preferred to 
work with the Democratic Party (DP), which angered the IPK leadership in 
Mombasa. The fissure within IPK suggests that there was no coordination be-
tween the party’s leadership and activists. It appears that the IPK leaders and 
activists had different visions, which resulted in disorganization and adversely 
affected the party’s unity. Such developments reveal Muslims’ divisions with 
regard to their political articulations.
In Mombasa, where the party was believed to be strong, its most intense 
election campaign took place in the Mvita constituency. This had been the 
seat of Shariff Nassir who had been a staunch Moi loyalist and a strong oppo-
nent of multiparty politics. Facing him for IPK (under the banner of FORD- 
Kenya) was maalim Omar Mwinyi who had a strong following among the 
constituency’s disenchanted Muslim youths. Apart from these two strong con-
tenders, the FORD- Asili (another splinter of the original FORD) standard- 
bearer was its national organizing secretary, Ahmed Salim Bamahriz, who 
was one of FORD’s six initial founders. Bamahriz conducted a strong, highly 
visible campaign, but was marginalized by the IPK- KANU conflict. The DP 
candidate, Ismail Yunis, was also a well- known and powerful local figure. All 
four candidates were Muslims and all had money, though none could match 
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Nassir’s wealth.39 Since 2002, money had become a major factor in assisting 
a contestant to win an election. Those who did not have much money were 
unlikely to win an election.40 The outcome of the election was that KANU 
won Mvita, FORD- Kenya won Likoni and Kisauni, and DP took the Chan-
gamwe seat, while FORD- Asili won nothing. Apart from the fissure in IPK 
that undermined its strength, it is evident that the party’s political appeal was 
limited to Mombasa.
Other challenges confronted by the IPK included the difficulty of unit-
ing Kenyan Muslims into a single political block and overcoming underly-
ing ethnic differences. Some leaders of the Muslim community in the Kilifi 
area condemned the pronouncement of Mombasa as an IPK Muslim voting 
zone and appealed to the community to rally behind the ruling party. Else-
where, especially among the largely Muslim Digo population of Kwale, Ba-
juni in Lamu and the Somalis in the northeastern region, support for KANU 
remained solid. Voters overwhelmingly supported KANU, which was secu-
lar in orientation. It was clear that despite the IPK’s efforts, it was unable 
to mobilize most of the Muslim population on the basis of their religious 
identity. Two interpretations could be sieved from the unfolding scenario. 
One, it demonstrated that the Digos, the Bajunis, and the Somalis identified 
themselves in their ethnic categories first and as Muslims later. And, two, the 
IPK euphoria and support was an urban phenomena and weak in the rural 
areas, a factor aggravated by propaganda and misinformation directed at the 
rural residents. Despite the IPK failing to make significant inroads among the 
Muslim population, there is no doubt that the party marked the beginning 
of politicization of Islam in Kenya. Muslims are a persistent and important 
oppositional force to political leadership in the country. Given the political 
disturbances and violence between the government and IPK sympathizers, 
the influence of Islam in national politics cannot be underestimated. Its asser-
tiveness in presenting a politicized Islamic opposition in Kenya deepens the 
already widespread fractures along ethnic competition.
Toward the Politicization of Islam in Kenya: The Local Factor
With the expansion of political association and freedom of expression, politi-
cization of Islam came to the fore. “Free Balala,” “IPK,” “Kill Moi,” “We are 
fed up. We want change.”— these were some of the graffiti slogans that were 
sprayed on the walls of houses and shops on streets of Old Town, Mombasa, 
in 1992. What could be deduced from these slogans is Muslims’ opposition 
to the government and the emergence of a politicized Islam as symbolized by 
the formation of the IPK. Though the founders of the party had intended to 
capture the entire Muslim vote in the country, the party was only strong and 
popular in the coastal town of Mombasa. A significant number of both the 
young and the old in the area identified with the party’s aspirations. There-
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fore, an important question needs to be asked: what are the underlying factors 
that explain the politicization of Islam in Kenya? In this study, I found that 
local factors played a vital role in the politicization of Islam in the country. 
My analysis does not focus on the international factors because Oded has 
already examined this aspect in his book.41 Oded’s major weakness is that of 
failing to situate Kenyan Muslim politics within the larger historical context. 
Instead, he tends to interpret Muslim politics in Kenya as an extension of 
developments outside the country. While it is certainly correct to point to for-
eign influences as determinants of the politicization of Islam in Kenya, Oded 
occasionally seems to overstate the importance of such influences. Therefore, 
in this book I have paid little attention to outside influences on the politici-
zation of Islam in Kenya, arguing that Kenyan Muslims are more concerned 
with national and local issues.
Abdel Salam Sidahmed has described the internal factors as particularities 
of each society, which are significant in shaping the nature of debate on Islam 
and politics.42 Kenya also has its own internal particularities that have contrib-
uted to the politicization of Islam in the country. The political crisis evident 
in Moi’s tenure increased tension between his regime and Muslims, intensi-
fying the latter’s sense of religious identity. After the IPK was denied official 
recognition by the government, a group of youths in the party steered the 
organization toward its militant direction. This direction radicalized a section 
of the IPK supporters with respect to the state. The behavior of the IPK sym-
pathizers could be explained as a reaction of a group suffering from rejection 
complex that often drives a minority- based movement to adopt violent means, 
as observed by Mohammed M. Hafez. Hafez argues that because accessibility 
to a political system plays a vital role in influencing the tactical response of 
an opposition movement, an exclusionary and repressive political atmosphere 
forces Islamists toward radicalization.43 According to Hafez, a political system 
is accessible to a movement when the state grants it the opportunity to influ-
ence policy making through government institutions; on the other hand, it 
is closed when the movement is prohibited from influencing public policy 
through institutional channels. Under completely accessible systems, opposi-
tion movements encounter few restrictions against forming parties, compet-
ing in elections, lobbying state officials, holding public office, engaging in 
policy formulation, and so on.
Conversely, completely inaccessible systems make illegal any attempt by 
movements to engage in formal policy making and instead opt to repress 
them. I build upon these insights to analyze the sporadic violent activities of 
Kenyan Muslims in the early 1990s as the consequences of earlier policies of 
exclusion and marginalization. During Moi’s reign, the political system was 
exclusionary, characterized by intolerance of criticism. This is exemplified by 
his government’s refusal to register the IPK, denying it an opportunity to par-
ticipate in elections, which was a clear case of a system that is closed. Hafez 
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noted that repression could include proscription on a group’s campaigning 
against the government, mass arrest of their supporters, and secret abduction 
of their members.44 These descriptions accord with what the IPK encoun-
tered, thereby heightening the politicization of Islam. However, it is import-
ant to understand that this strategy was part of how Moi silenced his critics; it 
should not be interpreted as a deliberate policy to undermine Muslims. Even 
leaders of some churches and other nonreligious bodies who had criticized 
Moi’s policy suffered the same consequences.
Significantly, however, the formation of the party indicated Muslims’ ef-
forts to pursue a constitutional path in advocating for their rights. Like other 
political groups in Kenya, some of the IPK supporters resorted to violence 
when legal means were frustrated. In this, they were pursuing the same means 
as other political opposition groups in pressing for their demands. The rise 
of political violence was due to the intransigence of the political elite of the 
KANU regime. At this point, I would like to raise another significant question: 
why did its founders decide to name the party the Islamic Party of Kenya? My 
investigations revealed that there was debate among its founders regarding the 
usage of the word Islam in the party’s name. One of the officials of the party 
confirmed:
Within the IPK leadership there were those who were against the 
name because they felt it would give the impression that the party 
was not inclusive. There were also those who supported the use of 
the name because they wanted Muslims to be associated with a party 
of their own. They hoped that the use of the word Islam would make 
the party appealing to Muslims though its wide intention was to fight 
for the rights of all Kenyans.45
According to the party official, the usage of the word Islam did not imply that 
the IPK was a religious party, but rather it was a secular one. He argued that 
the IPK constitution only bore the name Islam in its title and does not men-
tion Islam anywhere else in its content. I was unable to verify this assertion 
because my efforts to get a copy of the constitution from the IPK officials 
were not successful, leading one to wonder why the document is guarded as 
if it were secret. Nevertheless, the intention of retaining the name Islam was 
to ensure that Muslims also have their own party that caters to their interests. 
The party was not geared toward introducing a new political order based on 
an Islamic political model, but to compete in a democratic election that is 
secularly oriented. Therefore, under the leadership of the IPK, Muslims had 
not attempted to enter the political arena as propagators of Islamic religious 
agenda, that is, implementation of sharia, creation of an Islamic state, forc-
ing women to wear hijab, among other things. Its role in Kenya’s ethnicized 
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politics resembles that of a “tribe” laying claim to its own share of the nation-
al resources.
The ethnicization of Kenyan politics is attributed to having been buttressed 
by the institution of colonialism, which created a system that influenced how 
people related to each other. The colonial administrative boundaries created an 
impression of “a people’s own area,” and enhanced ethnic self- identity, which 
gradually created a sense of exclusiveness that manifested itself in the rejection 
of “outsiders.” Accordingly, the development strategies devised by the colonial 
administration tended to benefit some groups at the expense of others. Areas 
with more missionary stations received relatively better education than certain 
areas, which later proved crucial as a criterion of accessing gainful employ-
ment.46 Pastoral communities and other religious groups like the Muslims did 
not significantly benefit from this arrangement and continued to be neglected 
for most of the colonial period. By the time Kenya was attaining independence, 
there were some ethnic groups who believed that they were not treated favor-
ably by the colonial regime. The leadership of the various postcolonial regimes 
has also been accused of practicing favoritism toward a certain ethnic group. 
During Kenyatta’s leadership, it is alleged that the Kikuyu benefited from state 
patronage in terms of resource allocation and appointments. This trend was re-
versed and tilted to favor the Kalenjin ethnic group when Moi succeeded Ken-
yatta. This is why during the multiparty presidential elections of 1992 and 1997, 
which Moi contested, the Kalenjin voted overwhelmingly in support of Moi. 
Clearly, this expresses that in an ethnically plural society like Kenya, presiden-
tial elections are seen as an opportunity to compete for the control of the state 
because of the discriminatory use to which the state is put by the group that 
controls it. The formation of the IPK was, therefore, intended to bring the Mus-
lims together as a community, who are numerically disadvantaged ethnically, 
and champion their political cause under the banner of Islam rather than tribe.
There is no doubt that the IPK possessed an Islamic face. This was demon-
strated by its method of mobilizing support and spreading its political views to 
its supporters. Conspicuously, the party’s activists used a network of specific 
mosques that had imams who were sympathetic to the IPK in spreading the 
party’s political programs.47 Discussions were facilitated in mosques where de-
bates on political topics were encouraged by imams of these mosques. These 
discussions vocalized issues that affected Muslims such as alleged police in-
justice, wearing of hijab in public schools, and alleged discrimination at the 
immigration office, among others. Most effective in terms of publicity were 
the Friday prayers where IPK supporters attended for both worshipping and 
for raising political consciousness. The sermons in the mosques were overtly 
political and critical of the state and “enemies” of Islam, thereby drawing 
attention from the government. And if there was a demonstration to be ob-
served, the IPK leadership held them on Friday after the main prayers. The 
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timing was crucial because the demonstrations easily mobilized thousands of 
supporters.
Another local experience that influenced the development of politicized 
Islam in Kenya is ethnicity as the defining feature of Kenya’s postcolonial 
politics. In Kenya the politics of ethnicity are regarded as another source of 
power. All the major political parties in Kenya are based on an ethnic constit-
uency. After political parties are formed, there is a tendency for those parties 
to have a strong base in certain parts of the country. Since it is easy to identify 
tribes with regions in Kenya, those parties that are strong in certain areas are 
associated with specific tribes. And once a political constituency is forged as 
a result of communal solidarity and ethnic appeal, then it becomes easy to 
reject other political parties on the basis that they are from different ethnic 
groups. In past elections, the national presidential voting pattern has been 
ethnically influenced, a trend that has been encouraged by politicians who 
insistently appealed for ethnic backing. A list of political parties in the early 
1990s together with their support base will illustrate the point: FORD- Kenya 
under Jaramogi Oginga (a Luo) was viewed as a Luo party; the DP of Mwai 
Kibaki (a Kikuyu) was seen as Kikuyu party together with FORD- Asili of Ken-
neth Matiba (a Kikuyu); while KANU under Moi (a Tugen) was associated 
with the Kalenjin community.48 The rest of the ethnic groups are absorbed in 
any of the dominant parties depending on their influence in the region.
None of these parties promises to create an ethnic state, or even to promote 
the interests of a specific ethnic group despite being associated with a partic-
ular community. However, when political alliances are formed among the 
various parties, the balance always tilts in favor of non- Muslims. This could be 
because the support base for the major political parties could be traced among 
the upcountry tribes that are non- Muslims. There is a belief that this acciden-
tal arrangement has always benefited the non- Muslims and alienated Mus-
lims. Therefore, Muslims political consciousness in Kenya was heightened by 
this ethnic political competition. The founders of the IPK attempted to turn 
this ethnic awareness to religious consciousness for their cause. They hoped to 
draw their supporters among the Muslim population across the various ethnic 
communities. This expectation gave birth to the formation of the IPK.
And when the party officials realized that they would not be able to partic-
ipate in the 1992 elections, the leadership of the IPK sought a political solu-
tion to the crisis. They decided to enter into an alliance with other legal par-
ties (especially FORD- Kenya) in the country as a sign of their commitment to 
opposition politics. This decision by the IPK could also be interpreted as the 
party’s willingness to play an active role in the democratization process. This 
was necessary for the IPK because for it to make an impact in politics, it had 
to have its candidates nominated through a party with which it had an estab-
lished alliance. However, this development was to some extent a handicap to 
the IPK as it was not able to nominate its candidates independently. Despite 
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the number of political parties increasing in the early 1990s, IPK faced greater 
restrictions on its ability to play even a limited role in Kenya’s political arena. 
This scenario indicates that the prevailing local circumstances shaped the 
growth and development of politicized Islam.
Ethnicized Muslims and the Future of Islamic Party Politics  
in Kenya
Having examined the factors that led to the development of politicized Islam 
in Kenya, I wish to explore the second question: why was the Muslim oppo-
sition through the IPK short- lived? In less than a decade, the presence of IPK 
had already been wiped off the political landscape of Kenya. The failure of the 
IPK to sustain a protracted opposition against the state has been attributed to 
Muslims’ lack of a united front. To some extent, the lack of solidarity among 
Muslims has been attributed to the ethnic and racial dialectic within the com-
munity.49 The endemic leadership struggle within the community, which goes 
back to both the precolonial and colonial eras, has been the community’s ma-
jor weakness. Throughout Kenya’s history, different political regimes have ex-
ploited the ethnic and racial difference among Muslims for political survival 
when necessary. It is as a result of the racial fissures that the government spon-
sored a Muslim movement, the United Muslims of Africa (UMA), to counter 
the IPK, when it began getting strong and popular among Muslims.50
Generally, political parties in Kenya embody polarization along ethnic 
lines. Ethnicity is increasingly the relevant reference point for political align-
ment, even if none of the parties have developed an ethnic ideology. The 
numbers within ethnic groupings are politicized as they have the potential 
to assist in determining the political leadership of the country. Muslims’ po-
litical movement in Kenya has experienced both ethnicization and racializa-
tion where the split exists between the IPK and the United Muslims of Africa 
(UMA)— specifically, a growing racial polarization between Arabs (IPK) and 
African (UMA) Muslims. The UMA party, founded in 1993 and suspected 
to be supported by African Muslims, embarked on making announcements 
critical of the so- called Arab Muslims, stressing its African identity before Is-
lamic solidarity. It is alleged that Moi’s government engineered the formation 
of the UMA on the presumption that it would draw its support from Muslims 
of African descent. The aim of forming the UMA was to split the Muslim 
constituency along racial lines in order to diminish its political impact. This 
could be attested by a police statement allegedly made by Emanuel Karisa 
Maitha, a KANU coastal politician. The statement, which on its release, Mai-
tha, a non- Muslim, strongly denied, reads in part:
I have been involved in organizing youth in the past who have or-
ganized operations which the state orders from time to time. The 
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operations were always sanctioned by the DSC [District Security 
Committee] and PSC [Provincial Security Committee] where mon-
ey is spent by the state agencies. I wish to elaborate further that 
sometime in the year in 1991 to 1992 during the IPK resurgences 
and disturbances at the Coast, I was called [to] State House in Nai-
robi where I was engaged to [sic] a talk of how the IPK activities 
would be suppressed within Mombasa and the Coast. Those who 
had been given the authority to tell me and who assured me they 
had the blessing of his Excellency the President was [sic] Mr Joshua 
Kulei who is a personal assistant to the President and a Mr Rashid 
Sajjad who is a nominated MP.51
According to this statement, Maitha then arranged to recruit Omar Masum-
buko to lead the government- backed UMA. Maitha continued:
Mr Masumbuko usually could visit the State House alone or I would 
be called to go to Kulei or Mr Sajjad for payment of any operation 
needed by the State. The DSC and PSC teams normally could be 
ordered to give us any help or even get logistic support from them. De-
spite all this, I recall that Masumbuko managed to silence the IPK by 
various operations which included petrol bombing of targeted areas, 
fighting, invasion of Old Town [a neighborhood in Mombasa] and 
hijacking of Khalid Balala and others. I wish to state further that after 
the silencing of the IPK, UMA was disbanded with the instructions 
from State House, where most of the youths and their leaders were 
paid or some employed for good jobs they had done. I was approached 
again in the year 1993 where I [was] asked now to reassemble the 
UMA youth who were now already trained so that they could be or-
dered to do a further State Operation. When ordered I assembled all 
the youth leaders and changed the name from UMA to Coast Protec-
tive Group (CPG). I was under the paymaster of Kulei and Sajjad.52
From the quotations, it is clear that the formation of the UMA as a rival move-
ment to the IPK was believed to have had the backing of Moi’s government. 
Once it was formed, the UMA directed its criticism against the IPK arguing 
that creation of political parties is un- Islamic and contradicts the Prophet’s 
tradition because Muhammad did not form one to advance the interests of 
the Muslims in Mecca. During its existence, it positioned itself as a KANU 
wing, by asserting that it was interested in political ambition, an indication 
that there were other forces behind its establishment. Though it presented 
the impression that its intention was not to divide “Muslims on racial lines,” 
it claimed (a) IPK was not a true representative of Muslims in Kenya and 
(b) Black Muslims have been discriminated against and sidelined by Arabs 
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and Asian Muslims in Kenya.53 It is this division among Muslims that Moi 
allegedly utilized to divide them politically. He capitalized on the schism 
and manipulated Muslim leaders to derive maximum advantage that would 
guarantee his clinging to power. Unity among Muslims threatened Moi’s po-
litical survival; hence he sought the means to divide them. Racial difference 
has pitted Muslims against each other, as is evident in the IPK- UMA saga. 
Among Kenyan Muslims, it is common for “Africans” to perceive a political 
party formed by “Arabs” as automatically having an “Arab”— and sometimes 
an Islamist– – agenda, while on the other hand when “Africans” establish a 
party, “Arabs” ignore it as insignificant for their aspirations.
The recruitment of Omar Masumbuko, a Muslim of African descent, was 
to rally African Muslims against the IPK, which was viewed as a party of Mus-
lims of Arab origin. While both groups were bonded with the same Islamic 
identity, they did not necessarily share the same political interest. This antag-
onistic relationship between the two is influenced by the pre- independence 
history where Arabs were privileged over the majority African population. 
Ironically, UMA was allegedly financed by a Muslim- nominated member of 
parliament, Rashid Sajjad, who is of Asian descent.54 Sajjad’s contribution 
to the UMA indicates that the role of race or the ethnic factor in politics is 
not always unanimous; it is bound to be contradicted by individual interests. 
The alleged involvement of Sajjad explains the willingness of some Muslim 
politicians to work with the political establishment. Most incumbent Muslim 
politicians had feared that if the IPK euphoria was not checked, there was a 
possibility of them losing the power given to them by the state. Therefore, the 
alleged plan was to split the Muslims’ strength, which succeeded as violent 
campaigns between the two sides emerged.
Another incident to illustrate Moi’s efforts to counter a Muslim alliance 
was the encouragement of ethnicization of Muslim politics. In an unexpected 
move, the government registered the Shirikisho Party of Kenya (SPK) one 
month before the 1997 elections. The party is believed to have its political 
base among the Digo Muslims who viewed the party as a kaya party.55 The 
scheme was intended to channel the community’s political support into eth-
nic solidarity and to weaken Muslim political alliances that were based on 
religion. During its campaign, the party paid greater attention to the suffering 
of the Digo during and after the 1997 Kaya Bombo violence. In 1997, an orgy 
of violence spearheaded by some Digo youths who had taken oaths while in 
the forest of Kaya Bombo was witnessed against the upcountry people in the 
Likoni and Kwale areas. The government responded with brutality in its effort 
to contain the violence, and this is why the SPK platform in 1997 focused on 
the anguish and agony the local people endured at the hands of the security 
agents. Arguably, the timing of its registration has been viewed as a strategy 
by the ruling party, KANU, to “ensure that the Digo did not vote for the op-
position,” on the one hand, and also sealing “the fate of coastal unity on the 
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basis of religion and regionalism,” on the other.56 Therefore, its sudden regis-
tration could be interpreted as government efforts to ethnicize Digo politics 
and to counteract any possibility of religious alliance with the IPK that had 
drastically been weakened by that time. And this is why one can argue that a 
major obstacle that came in the way of the Muslims’ political unity was the 
ethnic- oriented nature of the community.
Related to the lack of a unified front among Muslims was the absence of 
cooperation between the leadership of the IPK and SUPKEM. While the 
IPK chose to oppose the state, SUPKEM cooperated with the state in un-
dermining the IPK’s strategy, as demonstrated by the SUPKEM visit to the 
state house that was publicized by the media. It is likely that the umbrella 
organization could not identify with the IPK on the claim that it is not sup-
posed to practice partisan politics. Arguably, both SUPKEM and the incum-
bent KANU Muslim politicians were intent on acting as the sole guardians of 
Muslim affairs in the country and felt challenged by the IPK, and as a result 
they ceased to show their solidarity with the party. The refusal by some Mus-
lim politicians to support the IPK implied that they viewed the community 
to have performed better under the Moi leadership. This is because it was 
during Moi’s tenure that more Muslims were appointed to cabinet and senior 
positions in government.57 Accordingly, this constituency allegedly scuttled 
the antistate Muslim efforts of the IPK. Since that period, there has never 
been any effort to revive the party. The division of Muslims along ethnic and 
racial fissures makes this difficult.
Today, Muslims are divided concerning the fate of the IPK between those 
who are supporting and those who are opposing its recognition. The voice 
opposed to the registration of IPK as a political party is represented by an offi-
cial of the Kenya Muslim National Advisory Council (KMNAC). According 
to the official, the IPK has no national outlook and proper structures to be a 
strong political party. He argues that for IPK to be accorded official recogni-
tion by the government it has to be reorganized and its name changed from a 
religious one to a neutral one to cater to all communities. These views should 
be seen within the context of competition for supremacy among Muslim bod-
ies. A political party with an Islamic name will undermine the popularity of 
an association like KMNAC as the representative of the community.58 Such a 
challenge is not in the interest of Muslim individuals seeking personal polit-
ical gains from the state. In most cases, the government is eager to work with 
those Muslims who are perceived as accommodative and cooperative.
The views of those advocating for an Islamic political party should only be 
seen as an attempt to have a lobbying platform rather than an Islamist political 
agenda as discussed earlier. Despite the politicization of Islam in the country, 
there is no future for an Islamist agenda whose objective is to establish an 
Islamic political model, sanctioned by the sharia. I have argued in this book 
that the intention of IPK was to participate in Kenya’s politics to make the 
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system more open, rather than demolishing it. This agenda can hardly be 
described as Islamist, and therefore, IPK was not Islamist in outlook.59 The 
realization of the Islamist objective is unattainable due to the peculiar case 
of Kenya because neither its earlier history nor the present composition of its 
society could accommodate this development and state of affairs. The partic-
ularity of the Kenyan situation stems from the following considerations: (a) in 
Kenya the process through which Islam had been associated with its politics 
and ideology greatly differs from those in Egypt, Sudan, and Nigeria, among 
others; and (b) the reality and complexity of today’s Kenya as a multireligious 
country with a Christian majority makes the quest for an Islamist program im-
practical. As a result of these varied processes, the Muslim political approach 
is distinct from the ones witnessed in other parts of the Muslim world. But 
even with the unlikelihood of IPK being revived, Muslims in Kenya have not 
stopped searching for a political platform to raise their visibility.
Nonetheless, the IPK’s goal was to provide a forum for the articulation of a 
national Muslim political awareness. The existence of the party stunned the 
country’s political leadership, increasing a national consciousness of Muslims’ 
political influence. For the first time in the history of the country, Muslims 
had an explicit political identity that articulated their aspirations. However, 
the failure of the party to gain national support among Muslims in other parts 
of the country confirms that there are internal divisions in the community 
apart from Islamic identity. Despite the community appearing united by Is-
lam, a section of Muslims did not view the IPK as a suitable advocate for their 
welfare. In addition to the government’s refusal to register the party, different 
aspirations and competition among party members also weakened the politi-
cal force of the IPK.
In Search of a Political Platform: The Transformation of Ulama
In postcolonial Kenya, there have been numerous competing efforts in the 
creation of institutions that could be viewed as representative of Kenyan 
Muslims and better placed to articulate the concerns of the community. The 
repeated use of words like Kenya or National in the titles of these organiza-
tions illustrates their efforts to be involved in the national political discourse. 
Though SUPKEM presents itself as the Muslim body recognized by the gov-
ernment, it is alleged to have failed to chart the desired political course for the 
community. Its alleged failure to challenge the political authority has resulted 
in skepticism among the people it is supposed to serve. This has inspired the 
formation of other organizations that are vocal and critical of the state policies 
viewed as unfavorable to Muslims. One critic of SUPKEM argued, “basically 
the reality is that a lot of Muslims have lost confidence with SUPKEM. This 
was as a result of them toeing the position of the government, whether they 
were doing justice or injustice to Muslims.”60
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The alleged failure of SUPKEM to guide the political direction of the 
community has led to the creation of other Muslim organizations that have 
taken a strong interest in religio- political activism. This is the case of ulama 
organizations such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) 
and the National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF). Their appearance is 
evidence of a vote of no confidence in SUPKEM’s ability to give the Mus-
lims direction in political affairs. This created a kind of leadership vacuum 
that different players emerged to fill, including the CIPK and NAMLEF, 
who demonstrate the transformation of ulamas/imams in the Muslim public 
sphere as the interlocutors of the community in various issues including poli-
tics. The emerging “ulama mouthpieces” are challenging the view that mod-
ernization would render traditionally educated religious scholars redundant, 
with nothing significant to contribute to contemporary Muslim society. Their 
religio- political activism in articulating Muslim interests gives a clear picture 
of the face of Muslim politics in Kenya. Though initially formed as civic as-
sociations, the CIPK and NAMLEF have become consistent and assertive in 
articulating political matters that affect Muslims in the country. Arguably, the 
CIPK and NAMLEF were willing to strike at Kenya’s political scene. Unlike 
SUPKEM, the CIPK and NAMLEF embodied a devotion to engage in the 
country’s politics and to be part of a political discussion.
The CIPK is a faith- based nonprofit and charitable organization that brings 
together respected imams and Muslim preachers across Kenya, from which it 
seeks its mandate. It was conceptualized and registered in 1997 and has since 
grown into a strong Kenyan Muslim network. Its name was possibly chosen 
to deliberately evoke the memory of the unregistered IPK, which represented 
Muslim activism in the early 1990s. The CIPK network facilitates processes 
and operations aimed at representing the welfare of Muslims and the general 
Kenyan public. However, according to the CIPK officials, the organization 
was formed with the intention of addressing the welfare of imams and preach-
ers in Kenya. Its objective was to find ways to uplift the status and lives of both 
the imams and preachers.61 Over a period of time the organization adopted 
other tasks given the leadership vacuum evident among Muslims.62 Among 
its primary objectives, the organization focuses on the promotion of social jus-
tice, human and basic rights, good governance, and equitable socioeconomic 
growth and development for all Kenyans. To understand more clearly the 
operations of CIPK, its mission statement explains:
CIPK is endeavored to sustain a strong network of Islamic religious 
leaders and professionals who will foster processes that address, 
pursue and safe guard the fundamental rights of Muslims and the 
community at large. The network seeks to alleviate marginalization 
and suffering through initiatives that enhance local capacities and 
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promote community based, people driven solutions to needs and 
problems. It is also geared towards offering hope for all Muslims in 
recognition of their noble role as part of a functioning stable commu-
nity and to enrich their lives with dignity and fulfillment.63
Though the CIPK intends to focus on the Muslim community, the organiza-
tion provides a forum in which Islamic religious scholars make a significant 
contribution in addressing important issues affecting the general Kenyan soci-
ety. It provides an opportunity for positive engagement, dialogue, and interac-
tion with other institutions, religions, and the government. The organization 
has gradually grown and developed into a national organization with its head-
quarters in Mombasa. As a result of its wide network, the organization boasts 
several branches throughout the country. The national secretary attributes this 
wide network to the popularity of the organization among Muslims, claiming:
Since mosques are scattered throughout the country, it is possible to 
find an imam even in the remote parts of the country than a SUP-
KEM official. It is because of this sort of network that the organi-
zation has become popular with Muslims. Whenever Muslims are 
confronted with problems, they present it to their imam, who report 
or present it to the nearest district office and eventually to the nation-
al office in Mombasa.64
It is true that, while CIPK’s leadership insists on its national credentials, it is 
most prominent on the coast, with local officials working hard to make them-
selves visible through lectures at mosques and in some places through im-
plementing projects for donors that guarantee CIPK resources. This is most 
evident in Lamu, where the local CIPK branch is an implementing agent for 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) APHIA II (AIDS, 
Population, and Health Integrated Assistance) project, which supplies an of-
fice, computer equipment, and a full- time employee. The usefulness of these 
donor links allows the CIPK to be involved in a range of activities from AIDS 
awareness to citizenship training. While it had initial reputation for “radical-
ism,” CIPK has been increasingly drawn into the language and organizational 
practices of the NGO world, a trend epitomized in their strategic plan.65
This CIPK transformation could be attributed to scarce resources. Like 
other civic associations in Kenya, and especially Muslim organizations, the 
CIPK faces the problem of funding. Since 2001, funding from donors in 
the Muslim world has become challenging to access because of restrictions 
motivated by the United States since 9/11. This created problems in the 
provision of funding for Muslims’ developmental projects. In these condi-
tions, the alternative for the Muslim organizations to obtain resources for the 
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execution of their programs is through Western donors. Those who accept 
funding from Western donors are aware that it is given with the intention 
of changing their operating method, and they resent such efforts. However, 
the strategy does change their approach, moving them to embrace an NGO 
culture that is focused on Kenyan issues. In their aggrieved criticism of this 
Western donor scheme, the leaders provide an opportunity for others to de-
nounce their organizations (those accepting Western donor funds) and to 
create new ones.
Therefore, the emergence of CIPK has to some extent undermined 
SUPKEM’s claim as the sole mouthpiece of Muslims, thereby limiting its 
authority. CIPK provides an alternative unified voice for Muslims in Kenya, 
and in the recent past the organization has experienced needs that directly 
require interventions. For instance, after the allegedly rigged 2007 general 
elections, CIPK conducted peaceful demonstrations in Mombasa to force 
President Kibaki’s party to accept that the elections were marred with mal-
practices and a political solution has to be sought.66 Following the emer-
gence of the piracy problem along the coast of Somalia, the international 
community signed an agreement with Kenya to have the captured pirates 
prosecuted in the country. This development has been opposed by CIPK, 
which alleges that Kenya is being misused by the international community 
to serve as another “Guantanamo Bay” in Africa.67 More forcefully, the CIPK 
is among the agencies in the forefront confronting the drug problem in some 
of the coastal towns. Their enthusiasm in combating the menace has led 
them to organize workshops with members of the judiciary urging stiff pen-
alties for the drug traffickers, whom they allege are always being protected by 
senior government officials.68
CIPK is vocal in politics because it has in its ranks individuals who had 
been associated with political activism in the past. Among the national offi-
cials of the CIPK is Sheikh Mohammed Khalifa who was formerly an official 
of the unregistered IPK, which provided strong Muslim activism against the 
state. Failure of the government to provide IPK with registration has forced 
some of its members to seek a platform where they could articulate political 
issues among other matters. This platform is provided by the CIPK, which is 
focused on politics, and like other civil organizations, is critical of the mach-
inations of the country’s leadership. With its own structures, the CIPK is 
becoming more popular and assertive in political matters than SUPKEM.69
Another prominent Muslim organization nationally is NAMLEF, which 
was founded in 2003, during the constitution- making debates. NAMLEF 
claims to be an umbrella Kenyan Muslim body with fifty- three organizations 
under its affiliation. Its position is to act as a national platform of leaders 
(imams/sheikhs) of Muslim organizations.70 NAMLEF is another perfect ex-
ample of traditional sheikhs and imams uniting in a single body to “empower 
Muslims in Kenya for the attainment of decent lives and real social, econom-
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ic and spiritual freedom through principled, consultative, representative and 
Islamic leadership.”71 By effectively addressing the various social problems 
that have confronted Kenyan Muslims for a long period, NAMLEF is gradu-
ally carving a niche for itself as a Muslim organization that is more consistent 
in articulating positions on national issues significant to the community.
Though NAMLEF is registered as a Muslim civil society, it has assumed 
a political language in its engagement. The organization is striving to ensure 
that Kenya is governed justly by upholding good governance, constitutional-
ism, and the rule of the law. As a Muslim lobby group, NAMLEF has engaged 
in various activities that have political implications.72 For instance, during 
the constitution- making debate, NAMLEF took political position and made 
its intentions clear. While SUPKEM carefully avoided expressing absolute 
political opinions, NAMLEF advocated consistently for a devolution system 
of government, as well as for the entrenchment of the kadhi courts in the 
constitution. With their political activism, NAMLEF has outshone SUPKEM 
and transformed into an alternative Muslim political voice. The most nota-
ble political engagement NAMLEF undertook was the highly debated 2007 
“MOU” between its leader, Abdullahi Abdi, and Raila Odinga, the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) presidential aspirant. In part the MOU reads:
This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is made between Hon-
orable Raila Amolo Odinga on one hand and the National Muslim 
Leaders Forum (NAMLEF) on the other hand. At the time of execu-
tion of this MOU, on one hand, Hon. Raila Odinga has declared to 
vie for the presidency of Kenya during the 2007 General Elections. 
He has sought the support of NAMLEF in getting the backing of the 
Muslim community in Kenya to back him for presidency. On the 
other hand, NAMLEF a national umbrella platform of all leaders 
of Muslim organizations desires to see our country Kenya as a just, 
harmonious, peaceful and a prosperous nation based on good gov-
ernance, constitutionalism and the rule of law, pro- poor policies, en-
hanced democratic space and where Kenyans effectively participate 
in shaping their destiny and the positive upliftment of the status and 
welfare of Muslims in Kenya and the correction of historical and struc-
tural injustices and marginalization meted on the Muslim through 
deliberate policies and programmes. In entering into this agreement, 
NAMLEF and the Muslim community in Kenya recognize the fact 
that president Mwai Kibaki’s government has meted out calculated, 
deliberate, unprecedented discrimination, intimidation and harass-
ment of sections of Kenyans, including the Muslims. NAMLEF and 
the Muslim community in Kenya desire to see an end to this. After 
due consultations, NAMLEF has arrived at a decision to support the 
candidature of Hon. Raila Odinga for Presidency during 2007.73
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According to this version of the MOU, NAMLEF promised to mobilize the 
Muslim constituency to support Odinga’s candidacy for presidency and de-
clared not to support any other candidate for the presidency during the 2007 
elections. On his part, Odinga promised, if elected president of Kenya, to 
initiate deliberate policies and programs to redress historical, current, and 
structural marginalization and injustices meted against Muslims in Kenya. 
More so, Odinga also agreed to ensure that there is equitable representation 
of Muslims in public appointments in the country.
The MOU generated public debate with a section of church leaders con-
demning the alliance. The church leaders cautioned religious groups against 
forging alliance with presidential candidates during elections claiming that it 
promotes divisive politics. A section of church leaders together with Odinga’s 
political opponents published another copy of the MOU in which Odinga 
had allegedly promised to recognize Islam as the only religion.74 The alleged-
ly fabricated MOU as presented by the evangelicals enumerates various issues 
that resonate with Muslims in Kenya and are of great concern to the commu-
nity. It presented issues that Muslims are passionate about in terms of safe-
guarding their faith, which included establishing sharia courts in all Kenyan 
divisional headquarters and proscribing consumption of products regarded 
as haram (forbidden) in areas where Muslims are the majority. It was also 
alleged that Odinga had agreed to recognize Islam by according it the utmost 
favor that will ensure its expansion. After the publication of the “fabricated” 
MOU for the Kenyan public, the body of ulama (NAMLEF) together with 
Odinga refuted the claims in the “fabricated” version of the MOU, which 
they referred to as mere propaganda.
Obviously, Odinga’s opponents wanted to damage his image before the 
Christian majority and portray him as a person who was pro- Islam thereby 
undermining Christianity. Despite the political intrigues, the MOU showed 
the willingness of Kenyan politicians to enter into political pacts with Mus-
lims to support their candidacy, signifying the recognition of Muslim votes. In 
fact as a result of the MOU, the ODM party nominated the national secretary 
of CIPK (and also National Executive Committee member of NAMLEF), 
Sheikh Mohammed Dor, as a member of parliament.75 His nomination was 
hailed as a milestone by Muslims as it witnessed the first imam (sheikh) in 
the Kenyan parliament. The intensive lobbying by NAMLEF is credited with 
this achievement.
Therefore, the political environment in Kenya appears to presage the con-
tinuation of politicized Islam, and given the experience of political distur-
bances and violence between government’s security agents and some mem-
bers of the IPK, the influence of Muslims in national politics should not be 
underestimated. Although the Muslims will continue to be a minority in Ken-
ya, their impact on national politics cannot be ignored. More so, through a 
politicized Islamic form of opposition, Kenyan Muslims have deepened the 
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already prevalent fissures in the country along ethnic competition. Though 
an Islamic political party in Kenya is not guaranteed, this should not be inter-
preted to imply that the future of Muslims’ civic associations is oblique. There 
would be more attempts by Muslims in the future to establish associations 
they regard to be representative and better placed in advocating the concerns 
of the community. Future Muslim civic organizations will continue using the 
terms Kenya or National in their titles to demonstrate their “commitment to 
engage in Kenyan politics, and to be part of a national political discourse.”76
Despite elusive political unity, there are occasions when Muslims have 
been able to front a united voice overcoming their racial, ethnic, and sectari-
an differences, especially when they are convinced that it is their religion that 
is at stake. It is these instances that succeeded in rallying Kenyan Muslims 




Muslim Politics in the Legislative,  
Judicial, and Constitutional Arenas
The Equality Bill 2002: Women’s Emancipation in Kenya
The phenomenon of the politicization of Islam has become so entrenched 
that Muslim leaders tend to weigh every government decision in terms of 
their faith, thereby calculating possible gains and loses. In this chapter, I focus 
on the constitutional debate and public laws that were politicized by Muslims 
and thereby became the subject of a religio- political conflict. Kenya has a 
significant record of legislation that has been met with strong Muslim oppo-
sition: the Succession Act (1972), the Marriage Bill (1985), the Equality Bill 
(2002), and the Anti- Terrorism Bill (2003) together with the Kadhi courts as 
entrenched in the Independence Constitution and recommended in the Bo-
mas Draft Constitution. These are particularly significant issues for Kenyan 
Muslims, since they determine their development in the country. Reasons for 
their rejection varied, with some of the legislation viewed as a direct affront 
to their religious beliefs or interfering with their individual liberty as Kenyan 
citizens.
More recently (from 2003), the controversy surrounding the relationship 
between Muslims and politics in Kenya has come to focus on the centrality of 
the sharia through the Kadhi courts. The acrimonious debate over the Kadhi 
courts among Muslims, and between Muslims and non- Muslims, has raised 
several important issues bearing on (a) the religious status of Muslim personal 
law, (b) to what extent Muslims can claim zones of legal autonomy in a secu-
lar state, and (c) how Muslim personal law can be made compatible with the 
Kenyan constitution. This tension is the predictable situation of a national 
minority negotiating with a dominant majority in both religion and politics 
(parliamentary representation). These intense dynamics have a crucial role in 
influencing the politicization of Islam in Kenya.
The Equality Bill was drafted in early 2000 as a response to the Beijing 
gender conference. The conference addressed gender equality issues in many 
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areas, followed with a declaration that called for action to promote gender 
equality in human rights, domestic responsibility sharing, participation in 
public life and decision making, access to health services and education, and 
the eradication of poverty and all forms of violence against women.1 The Attor-
ney General’s Office in conjunction with Federation of Kenya Women Law-
yers (FIDA), introduced the bill to parliament, which intended to promote 
“the welfare of all Kenyans and to outlaw discrimination based on gender, 
race, ethnicity, citizenship, creed, marital status, disability, family status, sex, 
age or colour.”2 Despite this broader scope of the bill, its main focus was to 
protect Kenyan women against discrimination. Ever since it was proposed in 
1999, the bill had caused political and religious controversy. In support of the 
bill were the civil and human rights groups, women’s organizations, donors, 
and opposition politicians. While President Moi and some churches were op-
posed to the bill, the strongest reaction to the document came from sections 
of Kenyan Muslims, precipitating a religio- political conflict.3 Though the bill 
was intended to promote gender equality, Muslims rejected it as soon as it was 
published. Their objections centered primarily on the marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance clauses of Part II, Section 4, of the bill that states:
Every person is entitled to equality with respect to the following with-
out discrimination:
a)  acquisition, change or retention of nationality and change of  
domicile;
b)  access to financial credit without requirement for guarantee by  
a spouse;
c)  rights and responsibilities during marriage and its dissolution and 
in all partnerships and unions;
d)  use, distribution and disposal of property acquired during  
marriage;
e)  inheritance.4
Despite stating a diversity of reasons for the rejection of the bill, the main 
grounds for the rejection of the Equality Bill was that it was a gross abuse of 
the fundamental right of Muslims in Kenya to be guided by the Islamic legal 
code on matters of personal law.5 While this was the case, some Muslims 
charged that the bill intends to “make men and women the same,” which 
according to them is contrary to Islamic teachings.6 Even without accurate 
knowledge of the bill, many interviewees readily spoke of it as being “against 
the Islamic faith” because of its portrayal of men and women as the same.
The defense of Islam was presented by the opposing Muslims as the reason 
for their objection to the Equality Bill. According to them, they did not need 
new laws since the sharia was enough as it has stipulated proper guidance for 
Muslims.7 As a result, most Muslims, both male and female, denounced the 
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Equality Bill as irrelevant for the community and, consequently, appealed to 
the government not to include them in the bill. They argued that if includ-
ed, it would violate their fundamental rights to be guided by the sharia on 
matters of personal law. Their position generally strengthened the customs 
of conservative religious society arguing that Muslim women do not need to 
be liberated by the bill because the sharia has clear stipulations to safeguard 
the interests of both sexes. Such a view does not critique the social provisions 
that place women within the Islamic tradition in a subordinate position. It 
emerged that most of the Muslims irrespective of their sex were advocates and 
not opponents of the existing Islamic social system. Clearly, this request by 
Muslims ran counter to the spirit of the bill, which sought to remove exclu-
sion and discrimination. To show their dissatisfaction, protest marches were 
held in both Nairobi (October 2000) and Mombasa (November 2000), where 
Muslim women presented a memorandum of objection to the bill. Their re-
jection of the bill portrayed the concept of gender equality as foreign and a 
blind imitation of other cultures that are not in harmony with the stipulations 
of their faith.
The notion of equality, which was captured in the title of the bill, raised 
suspicion among Muslims as to the intention of the bill. The issue of equality 
was passionately discussed by Muslims, and in that respect a question could 
be asked: does Islam recognize equality between sexes? This question was 
interpreted differently by the respondents. There are those who understood 
“equality” to mean “sameness,” and they responded in the negative because to 
them Islam does make a distinction between men and women.8 This position 
is supported by a Muslim scholar who argues that “from the Islamic point of 
view, the question of the equality of men and women is meaningless” because 
“men and women are not the same”; rather, “Islam envisages their roles in 
society not as competing but as complementary.”9 Amin Wadud has criticized 
this notion of complementary roles that places “a man to be on a vertical line 
vis- à- vis the woman,” which goes against the spirit of reciprocity as envisaged 
in the Quran. She contends that both the man and the woman are “equally 
essential in creation” and consequently “reciprocally responsible for [their] 
relations with others.”10
To avoid such an understanding of the Islamic viewpoint on the issue of 
equality, Muslims need to interpret various Islamic texts in a dynamic and not 
static way. More so, the “equality” intended by the bill is equality in rights and 
duties, and not “sameness.” This is why those who answered in the affirmative 
interpreted the issue of equality to mean justice and fairness in Islam. Accord-
ing to them, Islam does not prefer men over women, but both have equal 
roles, obligations, and rights that are stipulated in the Quran.11 The defense 
for this interpretation is traced to Quran 33:35, which exhorts both men and 
women to do good and promises them the same reward, thereby often cited as 
proof of equality between men and women in Islam.
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At this juncture, it is significant to understand that most Muslim ulama 
supports polygyny, invests the unilateral power of divorce in man, and sanc-
tions the unequal sharing of inherited wealth between the sexes. Therefore, 
Muslim opponents of the bill regard parts of it to be in contravention of the 
widely held views of many Muslims on marriage, divorce, and succession 
as provided in Kenyan law under the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and 
Succession Act. I will now return to these three issues (marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance), which influenced Muslims’ opposition and find out if the 
Equality Bill could be related to the spirit of the Quran.
Polygynous Marriage in Islam
Marriage is an important institution in Islam, and unlike in Christianity 
where it is considered as a sacrament, in most understandings of Muslim 
ulama, it can easily be regarded as a matter of social contract even though it is 
fully invested with all the religious meanings. At one level, marriage sanctions 
relations between human beings, while at another it symbolizes interaction 
between human beings and God. According to the views of many Muslim ula-
ma, it is through marriage that men and women are able to guard themselves 
against indecency, reproduce children for maintaining humanity, and satisfy 
their sexual urges. Under certain circumstances, the Quran allows a man to 
marry up to four wives at the same time. Despite providing conditions under 
which a man can marry additional wives, indulgence in multiple marriages 
is one of the most abused practices by Muslim men worldwide.12 Polygyny is 
observed by some Muslim men with lust rather than family welfare as their 
overriding motive. This is contrary to the Quranic position on the issue that 
is reflected in the verse “marry women of your choice, two, three or four. But 
if you fear that you will not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, 
or that which your right hands possess. That will be more suitable, to prevent 
you from doing injustice.”13 This verse essentially provides a Muslim man 
with the freedom of choice to have more than one wife at the same time, with 
a maximum of four. However, this freedom is circumscribed by a condition 
that has to be fulfilled before a man can indulge in a polygynous marriage. 
The polygynous man is expected by the Quran to deal justly and equitably 
with all his partners in all aspects of their marital life.
The debate over the issue of polygyny among Muslims in various parts of 
the world is whether practices explicitly declared acceptable by the Quran 
can be considered erroneous and subjected to alteration. Several postcolonial 
Muslim states in Africa like Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan embarked on reform-
ing the Islamic family law in their respective countries in the early twentieth 
century. In these countries, some parts of Islamic family law were more easily 
compliant to legal change than other sections. On the issue of polygynous 
relations, Tunisia was the only country that candidly abolished the practice 
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and imposed a penalty on individuals found engaging in it. Apart from being 
confined to feminist discourse, the abolition of polygyny in Sudan has not 
occupied the plan for legal reform in the country. In Egypt, the debate on 
restricting the number of partners in a marriage has been approached with 
prudence, divulging the sensitive nature of the matter. Though the debate on 
whether to abolish, restrict, or retain polygyny appears symbolic, the popular-
ity of this form of marriage is noted to be waning in all these three countries.14
With regard to the Quranic condition on polygyny, it is the position of some 
analysts like Alamin M. Mazrui that maintaining comprehensive equality and 
justice between one’s spouses is an impossible task.15 Given the limitation of 
human beings, it will be difficult for man to treat all his partners with equity 
without showing some hints of favoring a certain side. It is clear that the spirit 
of the Quran has been inclined toward monogamous relationships, and on the 
basis of the Quran 4:3, one can argue that Islam does not require polygyny. 
Its permissibility under strict conditions is an implication that the practice is 
a limited freedom for men and not a duty. Perhaps some Muslims in Kenya 
have come to this realization. A study on a section of the Muslim population, 
the Digo, indicated that monogamous marriage is the widely practiced form 
of marriage among the group despite the permissibility of polygyny in Islam. A 
number of women involved in that study stated their unwillingness to stay in 
a polygamous marriage for various reasons, whereas most of the males “cited 
lack of adequate financial ability (uwezo) as the main reason for not engaging 
in polygamy.”16 Since the Equality Bill was advocating monogamy, it could be 
argued that it was in accord with the spirit of the Quran.
Divorce by Repudiation
Like polygyny, divorce is also one of the most abused practices by Muslim 
men.17 Though permitted in Islam, divorce is an act detested by God. Mere 
pronouncement of the words “I divorce you” in the presence of witnesses is 
enough to dissolve one’s marriage. This power of divorce by repudiation, with-
out compulsion to show cause for the action, is entirely endowed in man.18 
Arguably, it is as a result of this provision of unilateral right to divorce by 
repudiation that the frequency of divorce cases is reported to be high in the 
contemporary Digo society.19 A study conducted among the Digo Muslims 
observed:
The most widespread type of divorce in Digo society is repudiation 
(talaka) pronounced or written by a husband. A Digo man may re-
pudiate his wife by telling her “nkakuricha siwe mchetu wangu” (I 
have released you, you are no longer my wife) or “nkakuricha phiya 
kaya” (I have released you, go back to your home). A man does not 
have to state the reason for the divorce nor is the presence of the 
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wife necessary. Indeed, it is common for a husband to send a written 
divorce deed to his estranged wife when she is already back with her 
relatives.20
On the other hand, a woman who seeks divorce must acquire a judicial pro-
nouncement from the Kadhi (Islamic judge). Muslim women have to appear 
before a Kadhi and request the court to grant a divorce under one of the 
several available categories.21 These classifications can be either taliq talaq, 
where the wife claims that the husband committed an act that according to 
the marriage agreement calls for talaq to be effected, or as faskh, where arising 
conditions merit the dissolution of the marriage. In the process, the woman 
would be required to submit valid reasons for seeking the termination of the 
marriage. Before I make any conclusions, let’s examine the position of the 
Quran on the matter:
When ye have divorced women, and they have reached their term, 
then retain them in kindness or release them in kindness. Retain 
them not to their hurt so that ye transgress (the limits). He who doth 
that hath wronged his soul. Make not the revelations of Allah a laugh-
ing stock (by your behaviour), but remember Allah’s grace upon you 
and that which He hath revealed unto you of the scripture and of 
wisdom, whereby He doth exhort you. Observe your duty to Allah 
and know that Allah is aware of all things.22
It is clear that men are supposed to enter into marriage with women on eq-
uitable terms and similarly dissolve their unions with women on equitable 
terms. According to Alamin Mazrui, this equitability of terms is in reference 
to substance as much as to procedure.23 From the premise of Mazrui’s posi-
tion, only a court of law as an independent party can determine whether the 
terms of divorce are genuinely equitable. Against the backdrop of the Qu-
ran 2:231, one can reason that Islam accepts the establishment of alternative 
structures that will eliminate the abuse of the power of divorce by repudiation. 
The Equality Bill’s intention of restoring justice among partners during the 
dissolution of their marriage accords with the Quranic spirit of promoting 
equitability of terms at the point of divorce.
The Law of Succession
I have shown in chapter 3 that the Islamic law of succession is the most sen-
sitive area when it comes to reforms. Muslims in Kenya were against efforts 
to reform the Islamic laws of succession during the early 1970s. Muslims’ 
reaction is attributed to the formula laid out in the Quran that can be used in 
settling matters of inheritance. In simple terms, the Quran enjoins:
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Allah commands you regarding (the inheritance for) your children: 
To the male, a portion equal to that of two females: If only daughters, 
two or more, their share is two- thirds of the inheritance; If only one, 
her share is half. . . . For parents a sixth of the inheritance to each, 
if the deceased left children; If no children, and the parents are the 
(only) heirs, the mother has a third; If the deceased left brothers (or 
sisters), the mother has a sixth. (The distributions in all cases is) af-
ter the payment of legacies or debts. You know not, which of them, 
whether your parents or your children are nearest to you in benefit. 
These are the portions settled by Allah; And Allah is ever All Know-
ing, All Wise.24
In that which your wives leave, your share is a half, if they leave 
no child; But if they have a child, you get a fourth of what they leave; 
After payment of legacies or debts. In that which you leave, their 
share is a fourth, if you leave no child; If you leave a child, they get an 
eighth; After payment of legacies and debts. If the man or a woman 
whose inheritance is in question, has left a brother or a sister, each 
one of the two gets a sixth; But if more than two, they share in a third; 
After payment of legacies or debts; So that no loss is caused (to any-
one). It is thus ordained by Allah; And Allah is Always All Knowing, 
Most Forbearing.25
Generally, the mathematical formula illustrated in the Quran has been per-
ceived to be “inequitable” where it apportions less to women than to men. 
The two verses explicitly show that when it comes to distribution of inher-
itance between male and female relatives, the men get double the share of 
women. This disproportionate distribution between the sexes has been de-
fended and justified by many Muslim ulama. Its defenders have argued that 
in an ideal Islamic family the responsibility of earning a livelihood is exclu-
sively placed on men, in this case the father. In the absence of the father, the 
brother takes the responsibility for the woman’s maintenance. After marriage, 
it is the husband who is required to provide and meet all the maintenance 
expenses of his wife. Whatever the woman earns and acquires over the years 
is exclusively hers, while what belongs to the man is shared with the woman.26 
It is against this reasoning that the lower proportion of women’s inheritance 
has been justified. Such an interpretation would again be argued to be a static 
and not a dynamic understanding of the Islamic law.
Emerging realities among Kenyan Muslims today call for reevaluation of 
this original justification with regard to disproportionate distribution of in-
herited wealth. Among Muslims in Kenya, there are cases where men have 
neglected to fulfill their material responsibilities in a manner provided by the 
Quran. As a result, there are several cases where women have to play the role 
of the family provider for unemployed siblings and husbands together with 
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aged parents. In addition, new economic demands have forced women to join 
their spouses in the work arena and assist in providing for the family. Present- 
day family needs and other economic expenses have made it impossible for 
men to be the sole family providers.
In his call to Kenyan Muslims to reflect on the emerging situations and 
thereby move toward reforming the Islamic law of inheritance within the spir-
it of the Quran, Mazrui remarks:
Certainly, the spirit of justice and equality in Islam cannot be blind to 
these unfolding new realities. Where the gender imbalance in the Is-
lamic law of inheritance was both equitable and just in a particular con-
text in time, it can no longer uphold these principles adequately today.27
As a result of the developing new economic environment, there is a need 
for Muslims in Kenya to reformulate the law of inheritance so as to uphold 
justice and equality, which is the foundation of the Quran. The Equality Bill 
took these changes into consideration, which necessitated the distribution of 
inheritance to be equitable. Despite the Equality Bill being consistent with 
the Quran, it is clear that most of the Kenyan Muslim religious leaders do 
not subscribe to the modernist and liberal interpretation of the Quran. They 
believe that such an interpretation is contrary to the Islamic doctrine, and this 
is why their opposition was uncompromising. As a result of the Muslims’ op-
position and other sections of the Kenyan population, the bill was not enacted 
into law. The outcome of the debate on the bill favored Muslims because the 
political leadership was also against the bill.28
The Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003: Legislating Against 
Terrorism
The international community recognizes that terrorism constitutes a global 
threat, and it has committed itself to taking firm action to address the prob-
lem. The activities of international terrorism have raised the issue of how 
global security can be guaranteed and maintained.29 In solidarity with the 
international community against terrorism, Kenya acceded to the Internation-
al Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and ratified both the Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and 
the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terror-
ism.30 These international resolutions implied that the global community was 
bound to create strategies to fight terrorism. It was against this background 
that after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent international res-
olution on terrorism, the U.S. government passed antiterror legislation, the 
U.S. Patriot Act, to combat terrorism.31 Thereafter, many countries taking a 
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cue from the U.S. government passed antiterror legislation such as the Anti- 
Terrorism Crime and Security Act (Britain),32 Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2002 (India),33 Anti- Terrorism Act 2002 (Uganda),34 and Prevention of Ter-
rorism Act 2002 (Tanzania).35 According to Ali Mazrui, African countries like 
Uganda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Kenya were under American pressure to 
pass their own antiterrorist legislation, intended to control their Muslim pop-
ulations and potential al- Qaeda infiltrators.36 Due to the purported pressure, 
Uganda and Tanzania were among the earliest countries in Africa to have 
antiterror legislation.
In 2003, Kenya’s attorney general published the Suppression of Terrorism 
Bill, which was part of the effort by the government to combat terrorism. 
Before the bill had the opportunity to be taken to parliament for discussion, 
it raised wide criticism from a cross- section of Kenyans. This included law-
yers, human rights activists, and parliamentary legal committee and Muslim 
leaders who had all described the bill as draconian and oppressive.37 The Ken-
yan public believed that the U.S. government had influenced the drafting of 
the bill because there were many similarities between it and the U.S. Patriot 
Act.38 This explains why some of the antibill marches were also vocal against 
the U.S. government, as witnessed in the July 2003 demonstrations organized 
by human rights lobbies and student organizations, where protesters burned 
American flags.39 Although the Suppression of Terrorism Bill was connected 
to the global event of September 11, 2001, the Kenyan debate focused on the 
local implications of this new legislation.
The opponents of the bill feared that if adopted it would undermine civ-
il liberties and human rights and infringe on citizens’ privacy and freedom. 
This is because the proposed law empowered the government to open and 
read private letters, download e- mails, and confiscate computers. All it would 
take were suspicions by a police officer that a person might be engaging in 
terrorist activities. The powers of investigation under the bill were also im-
mense. The proposed law allowed the police to use “necessary force” instead 
of “reasonable force” on suspects, and while all this happens the police would 
not be liable for any damage they inflict on a suspect in implementing this 
law. This raised the fears that if the proposed legislation was adopted it would 
legitimize excessive police violence against a suspect, a culture of impunity 
and routine torture in the name of “state security.”40
The bill also criminalized any association with any member of an organi-
zation that has been declared “terrorist.” Directors of banks that offer financial 
services to the organization or its members, property managers who lease their 
premises to them, lawyers who arrange for trustee or nominee ownership of 
any property belonging to the organization or its members would be subject 
to long- term imprisonment. The onus of proof of innocence in most of these 
offenses would rest with the accused person. All the prosecution would have 
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to prove is that someone was found in possession of an article that could be 
used for terrorist purposes. It would now be the responsibility of the accused 
person to prove to the court that the article was not meant to cause terror.41 
Apart from the bill infringing on individual freedom and privacy, Kenyan 
Muslims strongly believed that it was also anti- Muslim. Muslims asserted that 
the government was already applying the provisions of the bill against them 
even before it had been enacted into law. One official of a Muslim organi-
zation claimed that “over thirty Muslims have been arrested and others are 
facing trial on allegations of being terrorists. To us this shows that this govern-
ment has targeted the Terrorism Bill on Muslims only.”42
Muslims’ wariness that the bill was targeting them more than any other 
community in Kenya was reinforced by Section 12 (1) of the proposed legis-
lation that said:
A person who in a public place, (a) wears an item of clothing; or 
(b) wears, carries or displays an article in such a way or in such cir-
cumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member 
or supporter of a declared terrorist organization shall be guilty of an 
offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding six months, or to a fine or both.43
If the proposed law was influenced by the U.S. counterterrorism measures 
against al- Qaeda and radical Muslims worldwide, then its repercussion would 
be felt by Kenyan Muslims. The media regularly relays images of al- Qaeda 
and alleged Muslim terrorists in flowing robes and long beards. This typical 
image of a Muslim in robe (kanzu), an Islamic cap (kofia), and long beard 
(ndevu) is also evident among Muslims in Kenya. This particular dress code 
is important to Muslims because it is a way of showing that they belong to a 
certain faith. Muslim protest against the bill was based on the fear that the 
police could arbitrarily use the powers invested in them to arrest Muslims on 
the ground that they were dressing like certain declared terrorists or terrorist 
groups. Already there was concern among Muslims about the war on terror 
because it was seen “as a war on Islam and Muslims.”44 A disproportionate 
number of Muslims have allegedly been harassed by police and some arrest-
ed on suspicion of terrorist activities without evidence.45 Some of the alleged 
questions asked while in custody were related to their dress code. Their inter-
rogators want to know why they wear the kanzu, the kofia, and ndevu.46 When 
the Kenyan government resolved to support the U.S.- led global war on terror, 
it implied “counter- terrorism co- operation, including enhanced military- 
to- military relations and a renewed focus on the neighbouring failed state 
of Somalia” among other issues.47 With historical experiences of prejudice 
and marginalization, the Somali community— and the Muslim community 
in general— became a potential security threat in the country, due to their 
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religious attachment. For Muslims, particularly of Somali and Arab descent, 
their aspirations as Kenyans continue to be hindered by ethno- religious biases.
Therefore, before the bill was tabled in parliament, some of its opponents 
mandated the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) to set up a special team to review 
the proposed law and present a new draft to the government.48 After a thor-
ough review, in April 2003, the LSK came up with a new draft where articles 
that Muslims and human rights groups objected to were revised. The LSK 
claimed to have removed 70 percent of clauses in the bill that were seen as 
targeting Muslims. However, Muslim leaders insisted that the government 
should withdraw the proposed law completely thereby calling Muslims to re-
ject the amended version.49 This response could be attributed to the immense 
mistrust and fear on the part of Muslims. It is evident that the Suppression 
of Terrorism Bill is not acceptable to most Kenyans, particularly Muslims. 
In 2006, the government made another attempt and presented an Anti- 
Terrorism Bill, which like the previous proposed law was strongly opposed 
by Muslim human rights groups and the civil society as undermining civil 
liberties. Nonetheless, in 2012 the state succeeded in passing the Prevention 
of Terrorism Bill into law after convincing particularly Muslim leaders that 
the proposed legislation was not targeting the community, but only terrorists.
Like the earlier two proposed laws that sought to provide measures for de-
tecting and prevention of terrorist activities, the enactment of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2012 faced similar opposition from Muslim leaders and hu-
man rights civil societies in its initial stages of debate. Responses from Muslim 
leaders and bodies were numerous and focused on diverse issues. A section of 
them reasoned that the Constitution of Kenya 2010 had sufficient provisions 
for preventing various crimes including terrorism offenses, but in reality the 
legislation in the constitution did not stipulate terrorism and penalties for 
individuals convicted of involvement in terrorist activities, making it chal-
lenging for security agents to combat terrorism. While others referred to the 
proposed law as a Western agenda imposed on the country, there were those 
who commended it as an improvement over the prior bills but maintained 
that there were still numerous flaws in it that needed to be amended.
Significantly, the Muslim leaders were concerned with Section IV of the 
bill that sought to give police officers immense powers when investigating 
suspects, including allowing them to intercept communications and submit 
them to court as evidence without verification of their admissibility.50 They 
insisted that there is need for the security agents to seek permission from the 
court to determine the necessity of intercepting communications as a way 
of controlling abuse and infringement of one’s rights by the officers while 
performing their duty. To avoid the proposed law being sabotaged and failing 
to be passed into law, the state amended the contentious clauses to accom-
modate the various concerns raised by stakeholders. From varying events that 
I will demonstrate in the next section, there is no doubt that Kenya needed a 
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strong antiterror legislation. Terrorism is no longer just an international prob-
lem, but a reality in the country, and Muslim leaders can no longer ignore 
this fact. Clearly, a good law is required to help in dealing with the problem 
decisively. At this juncture an important question needs to be asked: is Kenya 
under threat of international terrorism? I will now examine the challenges of 
terrorism in Kenya.
The Challenge of International Terrorism in Kenya
International terrorism in Kenya, attributed to extremist Muslim groups such 
as al- Qaeda and more recently the al- Shabaab, poses a daunting political chal-
lenge to Kenyan authorities. The terrorist onslaughts of December 1980 (in 
Nairobi), August 1998 (in Nairobi), and November 2002 (in Mombasa), cou-
pled with the arrests of several alleged indigenous terror accomplices, indicate 
that Kenya has entered the global arena of terrorist operations. The situation 
was exacerbated in August 2003 (in Mombasa) when a suicide bomber deto-
nated a grenade, killing himself and a policeman in a bid to resist arrest. Re-
cently, in September 2013 (in Nairobi), four gunmen affiliated to al- Shabaab 
attacked and took hostage a shopping mall for three days and killing around 
sixty- seven and injuring not less than one hundred people. This incident con-
firmed that an international terrorism network is active in Kenya and willing 
to strike at any given opportunity. These occurrences compel the government 
to take a firm stand against terrorists and their supporters.
The first terror offensive was a bomb explosion in 1980 in the Nairobi 
Norfolk Hotel owned by an Israeli.51 The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), which claimed responsibility for the hotel attack, retorted 
that it was retaliating against Kenya’s supportive role in the Israel rescue of its 
airline hijacked by Palestinians in Uganda in 1979.52 On August 1998, eigh-
teen years later, the U.S. embassy in Nairobi was attacked, claiming twelve 
American and over two hundred Kenyan casualties, while injuring more than 
five thousand people. Statements by Osama bin Laden released subsequently 
led to the conclusion that al- Qaeda was responsible for the strike. After inves-
tigations, it was revealed that all the perpetrators of the bombing were foreign-
ers, including a Palestinian, Mohammed Sadiq Odeh, who was married to a 
Kenyan and had lived in the country for around five years.
On the first anniversary of the devastating strike, August 7, 1999, the 
SUPKEM chairman gave a speech summarizing the painful experiences of 
Kenyan Muslims since the attack. These include having to endure sweeping 
suspicions of Muslims as terrorists; public defamations of Islam by the media, 
politicians, and church representatives; and a ban on not less than five Islam-
ic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) accused of threatening domestic 
security.53 It was reported that while addressing mourners after the bomb blast 
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in Nairobi, President Moi remarked that those behind the bombing “could 
not have been Christians.” This statement attributed to Moi could have in-
sinuated Muslims were complicit in the atrocity. The remarks by the pres-
ident were criticized by Muslim leaders who argued that their religion was 
being wrongly associated with violence. Such statements show that Muslims 
in Kenya are aware of the negative impact of terrorist attacks that are carried 
out in the name of Islam. For many, this is a sufficient reason to condemn and 
reject such violent actions.
Though a section of Muslim leaders have been critical of the banning of 
some Muslim NGOs, intelligence reports confirmed that the al- Qaeda group 
had established a terrorist cell in Kenya in 1993 masquerading as investors 
and charity workers as they plotted attacking the U.S. embassy. As a cover- up, 
the planners in the Kenyan cell, Mohammed Sadiq Odeh and Wadih El- 
Haji, operated fish and precious stone dealings in Mombasa and Nairobi, re-
spectively. The two also facilitated the registration of an NGO— Help Africa 
People— which the al- Qaeda cell used to camouflage its activities in the coun-
try. The charity organization had also links with other NGOs— Mercy Inter-
national Relief Agency and the Haramayn Foundation— which, as officials of 
the charity organizations, allowed the al- Qaeda cell leaders to move between 
Nairobi, Khartoum, and Mogadishu with no difficulties using a miraa/khat 
aircraft haulage arrangement. With this network, they were able to circulate 
funds within the cell on the pretext that the NGOs were delivering emergen-
cy humanitarian support to affected people.54 The revelation prompted the 
government to act swiftly, proscribing their activities in the country.
In an interview, Sheikh Ali Shee was asked what Kenyan Muslims thought 
of Osama bin Laden, and he replied, “He is a hero.”55 However, Shee dis-
closed to me during this study that his position was quoted out of context. He 
clarified his comment by explaining:
Bin Laden is viewed by Muslims to be their hero in terms of advanc-
ing their education, seeking unity among them and promoting the 
general social life of Muslims in the world. But when it comes to 
committing terrorism, bin Laden cannot be regarded as a hero on 
the basis that his actions have gone against the Islamic principles of 
war. According to Islam it is wrong to kill people indiscriminately for 
political gains.56
Such ambiguous positions of Muslim leaders in Kenya and majority Mus-
lims in the country vis- à- vis the terrorists acts of bin Laden are evident. In 
spite of Shee’s clarification, it is clear that he is tacitly sympathetic to the 
al- Qaeda cause, having established himself as one of the vocal critics of the 
West and also a staunch proponent of anti- Americanism.57 This growing 
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anti- Americanism was evident during the demonstrations that were held in 
Mombasa and Nairobi following the fateful events of September 11. These 
demonstrations were a reaction against the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan and 
the Kenyan government’s pledge of support for the American cause. In one 
of the protests, people marched shouting “down, down, USA,” and at the 
same time praising bin Laden. These marches were an expression of their 
sympathy with al- Qaeda because attacks on Muslims whether in Palestine, 
Kashmir, Bosnia, or Afghanistan are viewed as attacks on all Muslims. These 
demonstrations illustrated Kenyan Muslims’ perception of the 9/11 attack on 
the United States, which arguably signified the demystification of the power 
of the West and a proof that America is not invincible.
On November 28, 2002, terrorism struck again, this time at the Israeli- 
owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and against an Israeli jet taking off from 
Mombasa’s international airport. The remnants of the al- Qaeda cell responsi-
ble for the embassy attack were blamed for the onslaught. On the property of 
the Paradise Hotel, which is mostly visited by Israelis, three suicide bombers 
attacked the hotel reception as two hundred guests were checking in. Sixteen 
lives were lost, including the three perpetrators and three Israeli tourists.58 
At almost the same time at the airport in Mombasa, a missile was fired at an 
Israeli Arkia airplane that had just taken off with 261 passengers who had 
checked out from the Paradise Hotel. The shot from the two SAM- 7 missiles 
narrowly missed the targeted plane. While a report came from Beirut saying 
that a group known as the Army of Palestine had claimed responsibility for the 
two attacks, a U.S. government spokesman suggested that the Somali organi-
zation al- Ittihad al- Islami, which is linked to al- Qaeda, might be responsible 
for the attacks.59 However, further investigations showed that the same cell 
established by Odeh was responsible for the two attacks.60 In 1976, similar 
efforts by a Beirut- based PFLP to shoot down an EL- AL airplane in Nairobi 
were thwarted by Israel’s and Kenya’s secret service. The planned attacks of 
Israeli passenger planes in both Nairobi and Mombasa airports might be the 
result of the groups’ inability to infiltrate Western- Europe airports due to strin-
gent security measures.
Again Kenyan Muslim officials spoke up condemning terrorist attacks. An 
official SUPKEM statement read:
Whoever planned and executed the bombing is definitely the num-
ber one enemy of Islam and Muslims in Kenya . . . We would like to 
assure . . . that the Muslims of Kenya will continue to co- exist with 
Kenyans of other faiths as they have always done.61
The SUPKEM official declaration was intended to present an impression that 
though bin Laden may have gained admiration, he had not won sympathy 
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among Muslims. This view is doubtful as shown by the statements of condem-
nation by the Muslim organization during the U.S. embassy bomb blast anni-
versary and the twin attacks in Mombasa, which are not categorically critical 
of the al- Qaeda activities. Despite investigations showing that the al- Qaeda 
was responsible for the terror attacks, Muslim leaders were cautious with their 
statements and did not want to antagonize al- Qaeda.
Another terror incident followed in August 2003 when a suicide bomber, 
Feisal Ali Nassor, detonated a grenade killing himself and a policeman in a 
bid to resist arrest in Mombasa. As he was being driven to the police station, 
Nassor decided to detonate a hand grenade to conceal any further leads fol-
lowing his arrest. The incident confirms that members of the al- Qaeda net-
work were still in Kenya and willing to strike at any given opportunity. There-
after, investigators found at a house used by Nassor a cache of ammunition 
that included five SAM- 7 missiles similar to those used in the failed attempt 
to shoot down the Israeli airline taking off from Mombasa, a hand grenade, 
and six AK- 47 assault rifle magazines. Despite this major breakthrough by the 
Kenya Anti- Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), Nassor’s accomplices managed 
to evade arrest.62 Such occurrences reinforce the perception that terrorists 
are still living amid Kenyan Muslims. This situation has been made worse 
by the Muslims themselves because their leaders have not been consistent in 
condemning terrorist actions. Rather, apart from not unequivocally reproach-
ing terrorist acts, some of the Muslim leaders have embraced a defensive ap-
proach as illustrated by a protest letter from the CIPK officials:
We, the Muslim inhabitants, do not believe that among us is a ter-
rorist . . . In other words, they do not exist here. Unless America and 
Britain and their allies make another fool of the world and plant one 
in our country like how Osama Bin Laden has been planted. He is of 
course, nowhere to be found. What we are going to request from you, 
do come openly to us and point out in order to ascertain.63
Clearly, this demonstrates the ambiguous position of Kenyan Muslim lead-
ers and the majority of Muslims in the country vis- à- vis the terrorist acts 
attributed to Islamist groups. Even with evidence indicating that terrorism 
and particularly al- Qaeda activities are a reality in Kenya, a section of Mus-
lim leaders present this truth as baseless and mere U.S. propaganda. But the 
foregoing examples of incidents reveal that there are terrorists living among 
Kenyan Muslims, who have accepted to play host to the terrorists as they 
plan their activities. There is no doubt that Kenyans have not established al- 
Qaeda cells, but they host al- Qaeda operatives. What is not clear yet is how 
many Kenyans have directly been involved in the terrorist acts perpetrated 
in the country.
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Al- Shabaab’s Challenge to Kenyan Security
In October 2010, the Kenyan government outlawed thirty- three criminal 
groups in the country including the Somalia’s al- Shabaab.64Al- Shabaab— 
along with other Islamist groups— is blamed for instability in Somalia since 
the ousting of Siad Barre from power and condemnation by the Kenyan au-
thority is an indication of the danger it poses to the state. After Siad Barre’s 
twenty- two- year rule ended in 1991, Somalia became lawless, with warlords 
using militias to control different strongholds. Following many years of rest-
lessness, Abdullahi Yusuf was elected, on October 14, 2004, as the president 
of Somalia in Nairobi, Kenya. However, due to the clan factor in Somalia’s 
politics, Abdullahi Yusuf was not able to get the support of the other war-
lords.65 Siad Barre’s government is alleged to have been dominated by peo-
ple from his Darood clan. As a result of Barre’s nepotism, members of the 
Hawiye, Isaaq, and other non- Darood clans were marginalized and plotted 
for his removal. Later when Abdullahi Yusuf, a Darood, was elected presi-
dent in 2004, the Hawiye and other non- Darood opposed him because they 
viewed Abdullahi Yusuf’s administration as the reemergence of the Darood 
hegemony. Consequently, Abdullahi Yusuf’s government lacked the support 
of other Somali clans. This explains why Abdullahi Yusuf’s administration 
could not operate from Mogadishu as it was under the control of the Hawiye 
clan. After the downfall of Abdullahi Yusuf’s (a Darood) government, came 
Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s (a Hawiye) administration in 2009. Analysts argued 
that Sheikh Sharif Ahmed faced the challenge of pacifying the long- standing 
animosity between his Hawiye clan and the former ruling Darood clan. The 
Darood were blaming the Hawiye for sabotaging Abdullahi Yusuf’s govern-
ment. And now that a Hawiye is in power, it is possible that majority of the 
Darood were reluctant to recognize Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s regime. This 
opened up another front of conflict despite efforts by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed 
to incorporate the Darood into the highest governing council.66
This rendered Yusuf’s administration ineffective and contributed to its 
collapse. In 2006, the country came under the control of the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU) who were subsequently removed from power through the ef-
forts of Ethiopian forces and the fragile interim government. The presence 
of the Ethiopians became unpopular, and several Islamist groups emerged 
to oust them, culminating in the Ethiopian army pulling out of Somalia 
in January 2009. Their withdrawal made way for the Somalia Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) led by a former ICU leader, Sheikh Sharif 
Ahmed, in 2009. With the installation of Sharif to the presidency, another 
Islamist group, al- Shabaab, initially an armed wing of the ICU, came into 
prominence to challenge the TFG.67 Led by Sharif’s former ally Sheikh 
Hassan Dahir Aweys, al- Shabaab challenged the legitimacy of the TFG. 
With its leadership in Eritrea, al- Shabaab viewed Sharif as a traitor because 
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of his approach of encouraging reconciliation with the other various fac-
tions in Somalia.68
In an effort to dislodge Sharif from power, fighting erupted between the 
Islamist al- Shabaab and the TFG troops leading to displacement of thousands 
of Somalis, most of them fleeing to Kenya. As they enter Kenya, some of 
these fleeing Somalis would find their way to the various urban centers in 
the country. This has created a security concern in Kenya, as the influx of 
Somali immigrants reveals that some of them carry weapons with them.69 In 
one incident, according to a Kenyan police report, nine youths from Somalia 
were arrested with a rocket launcher, two rocket propelled grenades, seven 
AK- 47 rifles, a Tokerlev pistol, seven ammunition pouches, and 361 rounds 
of ammunition.70 There were also reports of militia suspected to be members 
of al- Shabaab raiding certain border towns in the northern Kenya region and 
causing mayhem. As a result, several international NGOs closed operations 
after the government failed to ensure their security.71 Furthermore, according 
to intelligence investigations, the al- Shabaab and other militia groups fighting 
in Somalia had also been conducting military recruitments in Kenya.72 The 
unsuspecting youths were lured with promises of jobs, offering salaries as high 
as U.S.$ 2,500, according to some of the recruits arrested.73
Apart from al- Shabaab’s recruitment, the Kenyan government has also 
been accused of recruiting youths from among the Somali community, as 
mercenaries for the fragile Somali TFG of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. Over three 
hundred youths were confirmed to be undergoing military training in the 
country with a promise of U.S.$600 as a monthly salary. This raised the con-
cerns of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Muslim reli-
gious leaders, and politicians. Particularly, the officials of NAMLEF were 
concerned that upon accomplishing their mission in Somalia, the youth 
would pose a security threat to the country with their experience in combat. 
The NAMLEF officials feared that the enlisted youths could engage in ac-
tivities of lawlessness considering that most of them would be unemployed 
when they return from their mercenary work.74 While the government denied 
involvement in the scheme, a parliamentary defense committee asserted that 
the report on the Somalia mission was credible.
Before the arrival of the U.S. secretary of state in 2009, the ATPU arrested 
Muhidin Gelle, suspected to be an al- Shabaab member and accused of plan-
ning a terror attack in Nairobi during the secretary’s visit in the country. After 
interrogation, Gelle was released and later arrested in Denmark for attempt-
ing to assassinate the Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard for his portrayal of 
the Prophet Muhammad in a 2005 Danish newspaper.75 An official of the 
antiterrorism unit claimed that Gelle’s stay in the country had been “well 
facilitated by notorious logisticians who continue to operate with impunity, 
taking full advantage of the fact that Kenya has no anti- terrorism legislation” 
at that time.76
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A demonstration called by the Muslim Human Rights Forum in Nai-
robi, on January 15, 2010, in protest of the release of a Jamaican Muslim 
preacher, Sheikh Abdullah al- Faisal, from a Kenyan cell, turned violent. Al- 
Faisal was arrested by Kenyan officials when they realized that he was on 
the international terror watch list. The ATPU claimed that during his brief 
stay in the country the cleric was encouraging Muslim youths to join the 
al- Shabaab militia.77 In the violence that ensued during the demonstration, 
two demonstrators were killed, six police officers were injured, and properties 
worth millions were destroyed. The government alleged that sympathizers 
of the al- Shabaab militia group took part in the protest with the intention 
to cause mayhem, a view utterly rejected by Muslim leaders.78 It is reported 
that during the demonstration some protesters were clad in military fatigue 
and black balaclava to avoid identification. Throughout the procession some 
youths were waving flags similar to those used by the al- Shabaab. Such de-
velopments heightened the state’s concern that intelligence reports had been 
accurate; the protest would be infiltrated by individuals sympathetic to the 
al- Shabaab.79 In its effort to infiltrate the Kenyan Muslim community, there 
is no doubt that the group has sympathizers among the country’s Muslims.
The concern for the al- Shabaab menace continued, as the group’s chain 
of kidnappings and intrusions into Kenya threatened security and the tourism 
industry in the country. As the end of 2011 was approaching, several security 
concerns— like that of abduction of two foreigners and the killing of another 
in a Kenyan coastal resort hotel, the kidnapping of two aid workers from a lo-
cal refugee camp, and the sporadic onslaught against security officers— were 
now on the rise. Consequently, the Kenyan government decided to declare 
war against al- Shabaab, prompting the Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF’s) inva-
sion of Somalia— in October 2011— in a campaign expected to neutralize 
al- Shabaab at their operational base. But even after the KDF incursion, there 
was still a series of terrorist attacks— from October 17, 2011, to September 
21, 2013— targeted against civilians, government officers, security agents, 
and Christian churches that were blamed on al- Shabaab. Clearly, the orga-
nization presents a serious security challenge to the country that needs to be 
addressed with urgency.
Despite earlier objections to the antiterror law from Muslims and human 
rights activists in Kenya, there is no doubt that the country requires an effec-
tive antiterrorism law— but an important question is, will the government be 
able to confront international terrorism without being seen as antagonizing 
its Muslim population?
The War on Terror and Growing Anti- Americanism Among 
Kenyan Muslims
The rejection of terrorist violence among Kenyan Muslims has not stemmed 
the tide of growing anti- Americanism. The anti- Americanism expressed by 
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sections of the Muslim population has been heightened by the American lead 
on the war on terror, which has come up with policies viewed to be discrimi-
natory by Muslims in different parts of the world. This war has not been well 
received by some Muslims who view it as a war against Islam and Muslims 
all over the world. The suffering by Kenyan Muslims as a result of the war on 
terror has been aptly expressed by one commentator:
For the last six years, Kenyan Muslim regrettably, have till to date 
been victims of this American inspired terror campaign. While the 
US champions the values of human rights, democracy and respect 
to the rule of the law, US missions in the country have been active 
participants in promoting illegal acts against Muslims in the country. 
American envoys have publicly lauded the arrests of Muslims de-
tained on allegation of terrorism involvement and the US is known 
to provide substantial support to the Anti- Terrorism Police Unit— the 
main vehicle for perpetuating these abuses.80
Though the above view expressed by Muslims is a bit anecdotal, it demon-
strates the conflicting relation between the U.S. government and the Ken-
yan Muslims. Earlier in the 1990s, there were no outbursts of anti- American 
sentiments because the relation between Kenyan Muslims and U.S. govern-
ment was that of mutual trust. In fact, in 1991, the American envoy had 
forged a special relationship with Muslims in the country. During that time, 
the U.S. diplomat provided physical protection to some of the IPK sympa-
thizers who were being hounded by the police, a gesture that strengthened 
Muslims’ trust toward America.81 Therefore, the recent change of attitude 
of some Kenyan Muslims toward America has raised concerns within ranks 
of the U.S. government, prompting them to search for solutions. In order 
to tackle the problem of mounting anti- Americanism, the U.S. government 
has pursued a two- pronged approach in Kenya since 9/11. On one level, the 
United States has intensified its intelligence operations, with the Kenyan 
authority allowing the U.S. intelligence agents to conduct their operations 
in the country to monitor terrorism activities in the region.82 Some of the 
surveillance intelligence activities are camouflaged under the guise of so-
ciocultural and economic projects in certain Muslim- populated areas in the 
country.
Already identified for these U.S. projects are the Islands of Lamu, Pate, and 
Faza, believed to have hosted some of the most- wanted terrorists like Odeh, 
Saleh Ali Seleh Nabhan, and Fazul Abdallah Mohammed who are respon-
sible for various terrorist activities in the country.83 To gain the support and 
trust of the local communities in these areas, American marines are engaging 
in community projects intended to alleviate poverty among the locals.84 De-
spite initiating significant projects, suspicion remains high about U.S. motives 
with some imams opposed to the presence of the U.S. forces, claiming it is a 
126 chapter four
scheme to counter Islamic influence in these areas. This action of the imams 
reflects an interpretation of the U.S. war on terror as a global fight against 
Islam. However, there are also other local Muslim leaders in the area who 
praise the work of the Americans, signaling their acceptance.
On another level, the United States has sought ways to counter the neg-
ative image that Kenyan Muslims have about its policies. The U.S. govern-
ment embarked on an image- lifting strategy to address anti- Americanism, but 
it is unlikely to succeed given that the activities of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continue to stir 
mistrust among Kenyan Muslims.85 This approach is based on the assumption 
that the tensions had to do with “image problem” that could be resolved with 
good public relations. The U.S. embassy in Nairobi assumed a leading role 
in this strategy, emphasizing that America’s measures are not targeting Islam, 
but terrorist groups that manipulate Islam for their evil actions.86 At the same 
time, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has estab-
lished contacts with Muslim charity organizations, in order to explore the 
possibility of cooperation to provide support for needy Muslims. The USAID 
had approved a new education strategic objective for Kenya, which focus-
es on providing opportunities for children in marginalized areas, including 
Muslim communities in the northern and coastal regions where enrolment is 
low. The program hoped to strengthen school management committees, train 
teachers, and develop curriculum and learning materials. In addition, the or-
ganization developed a proposal to fund Islamic religious schools (madrasas) 
in the country.87 The funding was to be used in the payment of the madrasa 
teachers’ salaries and for developing a unified curriculum.
However, this offer was rejected by some Muslim religious leaders who 
doubted the United States’ “sincerity in supporting Islamic schools,” suspect-
ing the effort to be a ploy to influence the curriculum of the madrasas as 
part of the war on terror.88 Critics of the proposal argue that the U.S. interest 
in the madrasas is based on the suspicion that terrorist organizations have 
infiltrated the religious schools, and that this is why America wants to control 
them. They saw the offer as part of Washington’s global antiterrorism cam-
paign to win over Muslims’ support. There is a widely held public opinion 
among Muslims that the U.S. government is striving toward controlling the 
madrasas’ curriculum, which is considered an “ideological infrastructure of 
[Islamists] terrorism” in the world.89 This allegation was denied by the U.S. 
envoy, arguing that the offer to assist the madrasas was not linked to antiterror-
ism campaigns and pointing out that some Muslim organizations had sought 
the assistance of the USAID, which led to negotiations for providing financial 
support to the madrasas.90 Critics of the proposal argue that the U.S. interest 
in the madrasas is based on the suspicion that terrorist organizations have in-
filtrated the religious schools, and this is why America wants to control them.
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Virtually all Muslims irrespective of their status have had an opportunity to 
go through a madrasa, which have been in existence in Kenya for many years. 
There are probably thousands of these madrasas in Kenya, and this is why the 
greatest challenge to the madrasa system of education is the lack of standard-
ization (uniformity). It is believed that the standardization would improve the 
quality of madrasa education together with regularizing progression for those 
who wish to further their Islamic study. There is at present an initiative by 
the National Muslim Educational Trust to standardize the madrasa system. 
These efforts by Kenyan Muslims to improve the madrasa illustrate the com-
munity’s willingness to develop the madrasa education without the initiative 
and assistance of the United States.
The “Wanjiku Constitution” and the Politics of the Kadhi 
Courts
After around forty years of independence, Kenya began a search for a new 
constitution. The Independence Constitution was alleged to have allowed 
the suspension of human rights in many circumstances and also permitted 
a range of oppressive laws to continue. There was the feeling by most people 
that the laws in the Independence Constitution were similar to those used by 
the colonial government to oppress Kenyans and were no longer relevant in 
postcolonial Kenya. Despite the numerous amendments to the Independence 
Constitution, it attracted increasing calls to completely overhaul it.91 As the 
clamor for constitutional reform reached a climax, the government insisted 
that the drafting of such an important document was a task that would be done 
by foreign experts.92 However, reform advocates disagreed with the govern-
ment, arguing that foreign experts could not offer solutions to local problems, 
thereby demanding that the process be people driven for it to be valid.
This is the constitution whose advocates referred to as the “Wanjiku con-
stitution.” Wanjiku is a common Kikuyu female name, and like elsewhere in 
Africa, the female in Kenya is the most underprivileged person. The name 
Wanjiku was borrowed to symbolize the common person in the country. The 
call for a Wanjiku constitution implied a constitution where the ordinary citi-
zens of the country were consulted about the type of government they desired. 
Consequently, in 1998, the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission was 
established and charged with the responsibility of collecting and collating the 
views of Kenyans on what they would want reflected in the new constitution. 
This was why the commission endeavored to hear as many voices as possible 
to ensure that the recommendations they made were as representative of the 
common person as possible. On September 27, 2002, the CKRC published a 
draft bill that came to be popularly known as the Ghai Draft Constitution. Af-
ter the draft bill of the CKRC was published, a group of churches highlighted 
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a number of issues that were of concern to them, most notably the entrench-
ment of Kadhi courts, abortion, and same- sex marriage in the constitution.93
I would now want to focus on the Kadhi courts, where the debate was cen-
tered on whether to entrench or retrench them.
To Entrench or Retrench the Kadhi Courts?
The row over the Kadhi courts revolves around the question of whether or not 
the courts should be entrenched in the Kenyan constitution. Opponents of 
the Kadhi courts, chiefly a section of church leaders, claim to have embraced 
the ideal of the secular state against the adoption of religious laws. On the 
other hand, supporters of the Kadhi courts— mostly Muslims— are oblivious 
to the implications of religious laws in the national context characterized by 
pluralism and freedom of expression. This tension is the predictable outcome 
of a national minority negotiating with a dominant majority in both religion 
and politics (parliamentary representation). I have already observed in chap-
ter 1 that after the colonialists successfully imposed their regime, they intro-
duced numerous changes that came to have a significant impact on both 
the colony and the protectorate of Kenya. Among these initiatives was the 
enactment of the Native Court Regulation of 1897, which legally allowed the 
British administrators to establish the Kadhi courts. The status of the Kadhi 
courts in the Independence Constitution could be traced to Article 66 (1) to 
(5), which provides for the establishment of these courts. Some of the Kadhi 
court articles in the Independence Constitution read as follows:
Article 66 (1)
There shall be a Chief Kadhi and such number, not being less than 
three, of other Kadhis as may be prescribed by or under an Act of 
Parliament.
Article 66 (5)
The jurisdiction of a Kadhi’s court shall extend to the determination 
of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, di-
vorce or inheritance in proceedings in which all the parties profess 
the Muslim religion.
At independence, the Kadhi courts were three, but in 1967, the Kadhi Courts 
Act allowed the establishment of the courts in other parts of the country, 
and as a result, the number of the courts subsequently increased. Today, 
the Kadhi courts are scattered and can be found in all the major towns in 
the country. According to the Independence Constitution, these courts are 
supposed to be presided over by either a chief Kadhi or a Kadhi appointed 
by the Judicial Services Commission. It also outlined the jurisdiction of the 
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courts in addressing issues related to personal status, which included mar-
riage, divorce, and inheritance in proceedings where the individuals practice 
the Islamic faith.
In the proposed Bomas draft, the Kadhi courts were retained and addi-
tional changes incorporated based on Muslims’ recommendations. This is 




(1) There are established Kadhi’s Courts, the Office of Chief 
Kadhi, Office of Senior Kadhi and the Office of Kadhi.
(2)  There shall be a number, being not less than thirty, of other 
Kadhis as may be prescribed by the Act of Parliament.
(3)  A Kadhi is empowered to hold a Kadhi’s court called a District 
Kadhi’s Court, having jurisdiction within a district or districts as 
may be prescribed by, or under an Act of Parliament.
Jurisdiction of Kadhi courts:
Article 200
(1) The Jurisdiction of a Kadhi’s court extends to (a) the determi-
nation of questions of Muslim Law relating to personal status, 
marriage, divorce, including matters arising after divorce, and 
inheritance and succession in proceedings in which all the par-
ties profess Islam; (b) the determination of civil and commercial 
disputes between parties who are Muslims, in the manner of a 
small claims court as by law established, but without prejudice 
to the rights of parties to go to other courts or tribunals with 
similar jurisdiction; (c) the settlement of disputes over or arising 
out of the administration of wakf properties.
According to the Kadhi courts sections of the Ghai Draft Constitution, Mus-
lims had recommended that the existing Kadhi courts be reformed and made 
efficient. Some of the recommendations that were incorporated into the Bo-
mas draft, as in Article 202, included the Kadhis being trained in both Islamic 
law and common law. In addition to their Islamic credentials, the Kadhis 
were required to be experienced advocates with a common law degree. Also 
recommended was the provision for a Kadhi Court of Appeal to address ap-
peals from the lower Kadhi courts. The draft pointed out that only after these 
appeals have passed through the Kadhi Court of Appeal would cases from the 
lower Kadhi courts be heard in the national High Court of Appeal. And lastly, 
130 chapter four
the Ghai Draft Constitution recommended that the jurisdiction of the Kadhi 
courts be expanded to hear minor commercial disputes among Muslims.
When these recommendations were published in the draft bill of the 
CKRC, they raised concerns among Christians, particularly those from the 
Anglican and Pentecostal Churches. Their opposition in the plenary was un-
compromising. The controversy instigated an intense debate between Mus-
lims and Christians, and by extension over religion and state. Following the 
unresolved discussion in the plenary, the chairman of CKRC called a meet-
ing of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu leaders to find ways of resolving the im-
passe. The meeting agreed to appoint a committee charged with the respon-
sibility of solving the issue amicably. After several meetings the committee 
accepted a number of amendments, which Muslim representatives refused 
to endorse. While Muslims insisted on having the Kadhi courts entrenched 
in the constitution, the church- led opposition wanted the entire institution of 
the Kadhi courts removed from the Bomas draft.94
Leading this opposition was a group of church clergies who identified 
themselves under the banner of “The Federation of Churches in Kenya” or 
“The Kenya Churches.” The demand by the Christian clergy for the abolition 




(1)  State and religion shall be separate.
(2)  There shall be no state religion.
(3)  The state shall treat all religions equally.
According to the opponents of the Kadhi courts, the Ghai draft had provided 
that Islamic personal laws would be a source of laws in Kenya despite the 
provisions in Article 9. They argued that Islamic laws are religious laws and 
thereby contradict the three provisions stated in Article 9. They further point-
ed out that the Ghai draft had created a parallel judicial system for Muslims, 
which was tantamount to favoring one religion and contravening the princi-
ple that the state should treat all religions equally. This line of argument was 
to reappear many times during the debate and became the basis of reference 
for the opponents of the Kadhi courts.
In this regard, the group of clergies requested all provisions on the Kadhi 
courts be removed and replaced by a provision establishing subordinate 
courts with limited jurisdiction on issues of personal laws relating to marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance, between parties of the same religious faith or per-
suasion and who submit to that jurisdiction.95 Consequently, the proposed 
provision by the opposing churches would allow parliament to establish sub-
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ordinate courts for any religious community, including Muslims, to deal with 
their personal laws if so desired. This approach in their view would ensure 
equal treatment of all religions.
After a wide debate at the constitution review conference, three issues that 
are related to the Kadhi courts were removed. These were (i) the provision 
of Islamic laws being a source of laws in Kenya, (ii) the creation of a parallel 
judicial system for Muslims, and (iii) determination of civil and commercial 
disputes according to Islamic law. This implied that the provision entrenching 
the Kadhi courts in the Ghai draft was retained in the Bomas Draft Consti-
tution to the dissatisfaction of the opposing churches. And as a result, in July 
2004, twenty- six applicants representing a group of Kenyan churches went 
to the high court over the entrenchment of the Kadhi courts in the Indepen-
dence Constitution and the Bomas draft proposal.96 The federation argued 
that the historical reasons for which the Kadhi courts were given constitu-
tional protection are no longer tenable. They claimed that after several years 
of independence, the former “subjects” of the sultan of Zanzibar should no 
longer require any constitutional protection as Kenya is now a unified sover-
eign state where all enjoy equality irrespective of race, gender, or religion.97
They contend that the entrenchment of the Kadhi courts in the Bomas 
draft and the Independence Constitution was a step toward the introduction 
of sharia in Kenya, which was unacceptable. They also pointed that any finan-
cial maintenance of the Kadhi courts from the public resources was unjust 
and amounted to support of one religion. They interpreted this practice as 
Islam being declared a state religion, contradicting one of the three provisions 
in Article 9 that there shall be no state religion. Therefore, they wanted Sec-
tion 66 of the Independence Constitution, which introduces and entrenches 
the Kadhi courts, to be declared unconstitutional and expunged from the Bo-
mas draft.98 In responding to some of the arguments raised by the Federation 
of Churches of Kenya, the Muslims insisted that the inclusion of the Kadhi 
courts in the Independence Constitution was not because the beneficiaries 
were merely “subjects” of the sultan of Zanzibar, but because the courts are a 
core institution in the practice of Islam. Muslims’ claim that the laws, rules, 
and regulations applied by the Kadhi courts are not a creation of the sultan of 
Zanzibar, but a product of the teachings of Islam. It is against this background 
that the Muslims feel insulted by the claim that the courts are outdated and 
have no place in a modern constitution.99
Apart from the objection to the Kadhi courts, the Federation of Churches 
of Kenya had other objections to the Bomas draft proposals. Among other 
issues, the federation outlined the following as being of great concern to its 
members: the supremacy of God and the separation of religion and state. 
As for the supremacy of God, the federation argued that Kenyans are an ex-
tremely religious community who recognize God as the supreme authority 
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in their affairs, and therefore this should be reflected in the preamble of the 
constitution. This led to the federation drafting their suggestion that reflected 
its vision of the relationship between religion and state. The federation in-
sisted that the first clause of the constitution should mention God indicating 
that it recognizes the supremacy and sovereignty of the Almighty God of all 
creation. A similar demand for the recognition of God was made in another 
clause, which originally read:
Kenya is founded on the Constitution and the rule of law and shall 
be governed in accordance with the Constitution.100
The federation suggested:
Kenya is founded on the supremacy of God, and shall be governed in 
accordance with the constitution and rule of law.101
These recommendations by the federation indicate that the churches are not 
advocating a clear separation of religion and politics per se because their views 
over the separation of religion and state are contradicted by the demand for 
the inclusion of the supremacy of God in the constitution. Their suggestions 
show that they are willing to allow an aspect of religion to pervade Kenya’s 
constitution. Once people use a constitution to acknowledge that God is the 
supreme authority in all their affairs, it becomes difficult for them to separate 
matters of state from religion. The action of the churches was summarized by 
Abdulkader Tayob that the Kenya churches had accepted the place of religion 
in the broader symbolism of the state, but the symbolism of a specific religion 
like Islam was unacceptable.102 It is clear that these churches are not keen to 
recognize the Islamic religious symbols in relation to the state.
On their part, Muslims accepted the retention of the courts in the status 
exemplified in the Independence Constitution. As the Kadhi courts play an 
important role in the preservation of Muslim identity, they insisted that the 
courts should be entrenched in the Bomas draft, maintaining that this was not 
a new demand, but an issue that had been recognized many years ago. Within 
the pro- Kadhi courts camp, apart from Muslims there were also several non- 
Muslim sympathizers who supported their cause. Among them was Father 
Gabriel Dolan of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Kitale. His 
appeal to fellow Christian leaders was
Kadhi’s Courts, according to the final document, are not a threat to 
other faiths. Nor do they give preferential treatment to the Islamic 
Faith. Rather, the aim is to protect the rights of a minority . . . and 
also confine their jurisdiction to matters of Personal Law. We should 
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admit that Kenyan law is based on British law, which in turn was 
critically influenced by Canon Law and Christian values. The Is-
lamic Faith comes from a different tradition, with its own values in 
matters of family, property and inheritance. By supporting the right 
of Kadhi’s Courts to be protected by the Constitution we are just 
acknowledging that there are different traditions in our young nation 
and that minorities need protection in the constitution.103
On his part, the chairman of the CKRC thought it would have been a good 
faith gesture by the Christian majority to accept the entrenchment of the 
Kadhi courts in the Bomas Draft Constitution. Removing these courts, the 
chairman argued, would appear to Muslims as an act of vindictiveness, which 
was “regrettable to see the Church indulging in.”104 The views expressed by 
the chairman of CKRC and a church leader implied that entrenching the 
Kadhi courts in the Bomas draft was a way of safeguarding the rights of mi-
norities. There is an argument that democracy requires the majority to protect 
the minority and not to bully them. Since the constitution is usually made 
for both the majority and minority, it is important that the voices of all are 
heard so that they can all own the constitution that will bind them together. 
Since Muslims constitute a minority group, the CKRC felt it was significant 
to entrench their rights in the constitution rather than leaving them to the 
mercy of parliament.
Most Muslim leaders perceived opposition to the Kadhi courts as exter-
nally inspired. They suspect that it forms part of the Western agenda to fight 
proxy wars with Muslims all over the world since 9/11. The U.S. government 
and the American evangelical churches were mentioned specifically as the 
main culprits. It has been alleged that the American evangelical churches 
exerted undue influence on the Kenyan Pentecostal Church to oppose the 
rights that Muslims have enjoyed for centuries.105 This could be affirmed in 
an editorial comment from a Muslim bulletin:
Opposition to the courts first emerged during the Bomas constitution 
conference when some evangelical delegates launched a campaign 
to oppose their inclusion in the constitution. Behind this group was 
an American evangelist . . . who orchestrated a campaign against the 
inclusion of the courts. The preacher was at Bomas as an observer 
where he circulated literature opposing the existence of the courts.106
However, according to some senior U.S. officials, they claim that it has not 
been the policy of their government to involve itself in the Kadhi issue, but 
it was possible that there could be some American churches involved in the 
whole saga.
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The High Court’s Verdict on the Legality of the Kadhi Courts
I mentioned in the previous section that in 2004 twenty- six applicants had 
sought several declarations with regard to the entrenchment of the Kadhi 
courts in the Kenyan constitution. The case was presided over by Judges Rose-
lyn P. Wendoh, Joseph J. Nyamu, and Anyara J. Emukule, who in May 2010 
declared the Kadhi courts to be illegal and unconstitutional. In one section of 
their verdict, the judges concluded:
We grant the declarations sought in prayer 1 limited to declaring that 
Section 66 is inconsistent with sections 65 and 82 and in respect of 
Section 82 is discriminatory to the applicants in its effect. As regards 
to paragraph 2 of the prayers, we find and hold that sections 66 and 
82 are inconsistent with each other, and that Section 66 is superflu-
ous but it is not the court’s role to expunge it. It is the role of Parlia-
ment and the citizenry in a referendum. As regards prayer 3, we hold 
and declare that any provision similar to Section 66 in any other draft 
of a constitution in word or effect is not ripe for determination. The 
enactment and the application of the Kadhi courts to areas beyond 
the 10 miles coastal strip of the Protectorate is unconstitutional.107
Following the constitutional court verdict on the Kadhi courts, their judg-
ment was received differently and widely debated by various sections of the 
Kenyan population. On their part, the church leaders welcomed the ruling 
and urged the government to implement it.108 The government through the 
attorney general termed the verdict unconstitutional and appealed to the high 
court challenging the ruling.109 And for the Muslims, a section of the commu-
nity went to court to challenge the ruling declaring the Kadhi courts illegal 
and unconstitutional. The petitioners were aggrieved by the decision of the 
court, claiming their constitutional rights had been violated. They argued 
that the Kadhi courts provided an essential dispute resolution mechanism, 
without which a vacuum would be created in administering justice. Through 
their lawyer the Muslims argued:
If the effect of the judgment would be to disband Kadhi Courts, 
which is a section of the judiciary established by the Constitution 
of Kenya, it would disrupt their proceedings thus creating a sense of 
insecurity and disillusionment with the administration of justice for a 
large sector of the population.110
Muslim leaders rejected the view that the Kadhi courts are discriminatory 
on the basis of Section 62 of the constitution. They claimed that the ruling 
was faulty and that the judges had ignored the provisions of the same section 
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they had quoted, which says that issues of divorce, adoption, marriage, and 
inheritance are excluded from the definition of discrimination.111 According 
to Section 66 of the constitution of Kenya, the Kadhi courts have been giv-
en the jurisdiction to deal with issues of marriage, divorce, and inheritance 
among Muslims.
The main foundation of the judges’ ruling was that Section 66 of the con-
stitution (which allows for the creation of the Kadhi courts) is inconsistent 
with Section 65 (which gives parliament the power to establish courts sub-
ordinate to the high court) and Section 82 (which outlaws discrimination in 
lawmaking) thereby declaring Section 66 to be superfluous. Despite making 
the correct conclusion that the role of the court is to interpret and declare the 
law, and not that of amending it, their verdict was the opposite of this conclu-
sion. They made categorical pronouncements that declared a section of the 
Kenyan constitution illegal. For instance, they granted the request that had 
sought for Section 66 to be declared discriminatory, oppressive, unconstitu-
tional, and null and void.
However, the attorney general argued that the constitutional court had 
no jurisdiction to declare Section 66 of the constitution as being unconsti-
tutional. His position was that Section 66 of the constitution was an existing 
provision and could not be struck out on the basis that there is no provision of 
the constitution that is superior or inferior to the other. For the constitutional 
court to nullify any provision of the constitution would itself be unconstitu-
tional. According to the attorney general, the court’s jurisdiction would be to 
strike out a law (an act of parliament) other than a provision of the constitu-
tion.112 Consequently, it was wrong to declare the Kadhi courts illegal if the 
country’s constitution provides for them. In their pronouncement, the judges 
emphasized in their verdict that they have granted a declaration that any form 
of religious courts should not form part of the judiciary as it offends the doc-
trine of separation of state and religion.
The reading of the judges’ verdict was faulted as to whether it was profes-
sionally acceptable for them to express their opinion on a matter for which 
they admitted they had no constitutional role. For the three judges to argue 
that religious courts should not form part of the judiciary in Kenya because 
it is against the principle of separation of religion and state was outside their 
role. The subject on the interaction of religion and politics is a long one, 
and it has been widely debated by scholars. There is no indication that a 
definite position on the subject has been reached. The judges dealt with the 
issue as if there is a conclusive position in the international law. There is no 
internationally accepted constitutional doctrine that governs cases involving 
the interaction of religion and politics. Countries that allow the interaction 
of religion and politics have embraced different approaches peculiar to their 
unique situations. Due to the realization that it is difficult to have a complete 
separation of religion and politics, these countries have been grappling with 
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the question of the extent that this interaction should be accepted. Therefore, 
the Kadhi courts were provided in the Kenyan constitution under the pecu-
liar historical circumstances of the moment, which its defenders have argued 
should be put into consideration when debating about them.
The three judges also held that the enactment and application of the 
Kadhi courts beyond the Ten- Mile Coastal Strip specified during their estab-
lishment was unconstitutional. This judgment attempted to limit the Kadhi 
courts whose expansion outside the strip was sanctioned by an act of parlia-
ment. Based on this awareness, the constitutional court knew they had the 
jurisdiction to strike down any law made by an act of parliament if it is in 
conflict or inconsistent with the constitutional provision. Nevertheless, ana-
lysts argued that it was necessary for the judges before giving such a verdict 
to examine the history and circumstances under which Kenya accepted the 
courts. Though the courts have mostly been associated with the coastal re-
gion, during the colonial period the British had recognized the importance of 
this institution and extended it outside the Ten- Mile Coastal Strip. This was 
illustrated by the British appointing the first state- funded Kadhi for the Soma-
li Muslims of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in 1927.113
During the early years of the Kenyatta era, among other issues, the expan-
sion of the Kadhi courts to the Somalis of the NFD was used in ending the 
Shifta war. As part of the peace agreement brokered in Arusha by Zambia’s 
President Kenneth Kaunda in 1967, the government of Kenya accepted the 
expansion of the kadhi courts to the residents of the NFD.114 This is an im-
portant background that should have informed the decision of the judges. 
Other analysts argued that at minimum, the expansion of the Kadhi courts 
should have been informed by the justification that “Kenya is not a federal 
state and that it will be wrong to expect a citizen to enjoy a right in Mom-
basa and not have the same right in other parts of the country.”115 This view 
implies that Muslims in Kenya also live outside the Ten- Mile Coastal Strip 
and it is the responsibility of the government to ensure that they continue 
enjoying their rights as Muslims wherever they choose to live. On the issue 
regarding financial maintenance of the Kadhi courts by the government, the 
constitutional court declared that it is discriminatory and sectarian. Such a 
conclusion was informed by perceiving the Kadhi courts as religious courts 
and not part of the judiciary. According to the Kenyan constitution the Kadhi 
courts form an integral part of the official judiciary, and this is why the pub-
lic coffers are used in funding and maintaining them, its proponents hold. 
There is no doubt that the ruling by the three bench judges against the 
Kadhi courts set off a religious tension threatening Muslim- Christian rela-
tions in Kenya.
Nevertheless, the Kadhi courts saga was resolved when, in August 2010, 
Kenyans voted for a new constitution that entrenches the Kadhi courts as part 
of the judicial system. The passing of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya in the 
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referendum illustrated support for the Kadhi courts by most Kenyans. Amid 
opposition from a section of church leaders, the referendum results showed 
that there was acceptance of the Kadhi courts in the country. Section 170 of 
the promulgated constitution reads:
(1)  There shall be a Chief Kadhi and such number, being not fewer 
than three, of other Kadhis as may be prescribed under an Act 
of Parliament.
(2)  A person shall not be qualified to be appointed to hold or act in 
the office of Kadhi unless the person— 
(a)  Profess the Muslim religion; and
(b)  Possesses such knowledge of the Muslim law applicable to 
any sects of Muslims as qualifies the person, in the opinion 
of the Judicial Service Commission, to hold a Kadhi’s court.
(3)  Parliament shall establish Kadhi’s court, each of which shall 
have the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it by legislation, 
subject to clause (5).
(4)  The Chief Kadhi and the other Kadhis, or the Chief Kadhi 
and such of the other Kadhis (not being fewer than three in 
number) as may be prescribed under an Act of Parliament, shall 
each be empowered to hold a Kadhi’s court having jurisdiction 
within Kenya.
(5)  The jurisdiction of a Kadhis’ court shall be limited to the deter-
mination of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, 
marriage, divorce or inheritance in proceedings which all the 
parties profess the Muslim religion and submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the Kadhi’s court.116
Therefore, according to the new constitutional provision, the Kadhi courts 
are recognized as subordinate courts under the legal system. This is signifi-
cant as it would debar any argument that these courts are religious courts and 
thereby favoring Kenyan Muslims. There is need for more public awareness 
about the Kadhi courts to guard against future opposition to them and possi-
ble challenges to the nature of the secular state in Kenya.
It is clear from the discussions expounded in this book that Muslims’ pol-
itics of legislation and constitution are different from their politics of associ-
ations and political parties. The politics of legislation and constitution have 
always brought Kenyan Muslims together with a united voice to demand what 
they regard to be rightfully theirs. Muslims in Kenya have succeeded in mar-
shaling the community’s support in rejecting certain legislation they regard as 
inimical to allowing them to observe their lives in accordance with the prin-
ciples of Islam. When it comes to politics of associations and political parties, 
however, unity on this level has not been forthcoming. Whenever Muslims 
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feel that the impending issue is not directly related to their collective margin-
alization, they retreat back to their ethnic and racial enclaves, jeopardizing 
any form of desired unity. It is against this background that the Kenyan Mus-
lims have not been able to stage a cohesive unity on the political front. Like 
other groups in Kenya, Muslims politics is also strongly ethnically influenced.
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chapter five
The Controversial “MOU”  
and Muslim Topics  
in an Election Period
The sacking of Najib Balala in March 2012 as a government minister and 
the angry reaction from a section of Muslim clerics who cited faith as the 
reason for his firing introduced once again the issue of religion in Muslim 
politics. The religious card has been played often in Muslim politics since 
the early 1990s, culminating in the formation of the unregistered Islamic 
Party of Kenya (IPK) to articulate the interests of the community for alleged 
marginalization. Leading the condemnation, the National Muslim Leaders 
Forum (NAMLEF) referred to Balala’s removal as a “betrayal” of the Muslims 
and thereby nullified the 2007 controversial memorandum of understand-
ing (MOU) that Raila Odinga signed with the Muslim community.1 Conse-
quently, they threatened to mobilize Muslims all over the country not to vote 
for Odinga as the next president of Kenya in the forthcoming 2013 general 
elections, which eventually Odinga lost to Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya’s current 
president).2 According to Abdullahi Abdi, the NAMLEF chairman, the MOU 
reached between his organization and Odinga was undertaken to preserve the 
welfare of Muslims and act as a barricade against injustice toward the com-
munity. Explaining the reasons behind the agreement, the NAMLEF chair-
man argued that the MOU was made after wide consultations among more 
than twenty Muslim organizations within its membership across the country 
with the aim of ending “the years of injustice and discrimination perpetrated 
against the community since independence.”3
Speaking in an interview with Radio Salaam in Mombasa, the NAMLEF 
leader clarified that the pact was arrived at with Odinga in his individual ca-
pacity and not as the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) leader, giving 
his firm commitment that he would abide by the agreement. Their decision 
to support Odinga’s presidential bid in the 2007 elections was based on his 
record of championing the rights of Kenyans, including condemning vehe-
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mently the abuse of Muslims in the so- called war on terror and their rendition 
to foreign countries like Somalia and Ethiopia.4 While Muslims supposedly 
lived up to their side of the negotiation by overwhelmingly voting for Odinga 
in the 2007 elections, some Muslim leaders expressed the concern that Odin-
ga failed to fulfill his promise. Despite his failure to attain the presidency, 
the disputed 2007 presidential election results gave way to the creation of 
a coalition government that established the prime minister’s office to share 
powers with the president. With the appointment of Odinga as the prime 
minister, some Muslim leaders were optimistic that he would use his office 
to influence policies that favored the community. Muslims voted for him 
with the understanding that he would ensure that Muslims were no longer 
discriminated against, but he allegedly failed to realize this expectation as a 
number of injustices continued being perpetrated against the community. In 
fact, Muslims are bitter that the person (read Odinga) they had trusted in cor-
recting injustices against the community was now referring to the “Muslims 
who were renditioned to Uganda as terrorists.”5 Because of this experience 
with Raila, the NAMLEF leader retorted that in the future Muslims would 
not make agreements with any presidential candidates to support their bid 
for the country’s leadership. Instead, the NAMLEF official suggested that the 
community should form their own political party, which they could use in 
negotiating coalition agreements with other parties.6 Such sentiments would 
influence Muslims’ campaign themes as they sought for a new political direc-
tion in the 2013 elections.
The Muslim clerics supporting Balala interpreted the dismissal as back- 
peddling on the controversial MOU in which Odinga supposedly committed 
to ensuring that the Muslims constituted 20 percent of public appointments. 
Confirming this view the organizing secretary of NAMLEF complained that 
“the sacking of Mr Balala from the Cabinet is a breach of the agreement 
signed between the National Muslim Leaders Forum and Mr. Odinga to 
safeguard the interests of the Muslim community.”7 At the beginning of the 
coalition government in early 2008 due to the disputed presidential elec-
tions of December 2007, around eleven ministerial appointments were held 
by Muslims and only Adan Duale, Mohamud Muhammad Ali, and Najib 
Balala had been sacked from their positions.8 The removal of these Muslim 
politicians from their government positions by their ODM leader was inter-
preted by some Muslim leaders as going against the spirit of the agreement. 
But the anger exhibited by NAMLEF and a section of the CIPK leadership 
in view of Balala’s dismissal portrayed the Muslim leadership’s collective 
conscience as something that can be manipulated for narrow and individu-
alistic political gain.
A number of questions were raised during the debate related to Balala’s 
discharge debacle, but the most striking one was, was Balala’s removal from 
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office politically influenced or religiously inspired? Some analysts have ar-
gued that it is normal for members of a political party to differ and fall out. 
And when this happens, political appointees would consider it a matter of 
principle to resign from their government positions alluding to either person-
al reasons or differences over policy matters and ideologies. But in Kenya, 
even when politicians disagree “with their party leaders” they will continue 
to “cling to their government portfolios.”9 In an emotional statement after his 
release from the cabinet, Balala struck out at his party leader, Odinga, as a 
“dictator that Kenyans do not deserve as their next president.”10 He attribut-
ed his fall out with his party leader to exercising his independence of mind 
and standing by his principles, including speaking against lack of democ-
racy in the ODM.11 Despite his dissatisfaction with the ODM leadership, 
Balala did not find it honorable and principled to resign and seek a fresh 
mandate from another party, a paradox exhibited by most politicians in the 
country. It is obvious that the three Muslim MPs’ devotion to ODM was their 
qualification for the ministerial dockets and after showing disloyalty to their 
party, their sacking should not be used to instill religious tensions among 
Kenyans. Party politics demands solidarity, and when a minister unequiv-
ocally disowns his party it is not rational to persist in representing the party 
in the government. Suggesting that the three Muslim MPs’ removal was a 
betrayal of the Muslim community, and by extension portraying Odinga as 
an enemy of Islam, demonstrates how a section of Muslims could use the 
Islamic factor for their own political interests in the country. It is clear that 
there are some Muslim leaders who would manipulate the religion of Islam 
and the Muslim community to pursue their political goals. NAMLEF’s and 
the CIPK leadership’s condemnation demonstrate their attempt to influence 
the Muslim community to vote against Odinga as the president of Kenya 
in the 2013 general elections by presenting him as an enemy of the Mus-
lims. Indeed there were a number of Muslims serving in influential positions 
in the country, including the heads of both the constitutional reforms and 
defense– foreign relations parliamentary committees, the deputy speaker of 
the National Assembly, and the chairman of the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission, among others.
However, Balala’s perceived Muslim support base was divided on the in-
terpretation regarding his sacking. Another group of Muslim clerics together 
with the entire coastal ODM MPs supported his dismissal for openly con-
tradicting his party leader on a variety of issues.12 While commenting on the 
Balala fiasco, a representative of SUPKEM argued that in politics it is typical 
for members to be reprimanded whenever they disrespected their party lead-
ership. And whenever this happens, it would be wrong to allege that an entire 
religious community is being targeted because of the “sins” of an individual. 
In an interview, SUPKEM official Hussein Adan Somo remarked:
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It is unfortunate that some people who were appointed to different 
positions never lived [up] to the expectations of their party and the 
Muslim community at large and therefore should not cry foul when 
their misdeeds come to haunt them.13
Similar views were expressed by a CIPK official, Sheikh Amir Hamisi Ban-
da, who added that the 2007 MOU clearly stipulated nomination of Muslim 
clerics as MPs and councilors by the ODM party, and said nothing about 
ministers’ appointments and their retention in the cabinet.14 In defense of 
Odinga, Banda argued that he was personally involved in the signing of the 
2007 agreement, and he does not concur that the ODM leader had breached 
it. In a statement that contradicted his colleagues in the CIPK Banda posited:
This [MOU] was a political deal and had nothing to do with the 
appointment of Balala to the Cabinet. The deal was about the nom-
ination of Muslims as MPs and councilors, which the PM [prime 
minister] honoured to the letter.15
In fact, Sheikh Mohammed Dor, who also protested and saw a religious angle 
in Balala’s removal from office, was nominated to parliament as a result of the 
MOU. Clearly, the Balala fiasco divided the Muslim community, which went 
against the interests of their common political agenda.
The appointment of non- Muslim politicians to replace Balala and Duale 
in their ministerial duties was received with a lot of dismay by opposing Mus-
lim leaders. Arguably, the issue was not about Duale’s and Balala’s discharge, 
but about Muslim leaders feeling that the community is being taken for grant-
ed and Odinga’s failure as the prime minister to ensure equitable appoint-
ments of Muslims in government positions. The apprehension of the Muslim 
leaders was that the removal of Duale and Balala, and their replacement by 
non- Muslim politicians, had reduced the Muslims’ numbers in the govern-
ment cabinet, which they perceived as an insult to the community. While 
expressing their disillusionment with Balala’s removal, the leaders lamented 
that all the “political leaders representing” the “constituencies in Mombasa 
county are Muslims” capable of discharging ministerial roles.16 Such public 
statements were intended to reinforce the idea that, like other past regimes, 
Odinga too did not take into consideration the well- being of the Muslims in 
the country.
The emerging scenario could be viewed within the context that the coun-
try was preparing for the 2013 elections and various groups in the political 
arena were tactically realigning themselves for the purpose of capturing the 
running of the state machinery. In the shifting political landscape, the Mus-
lims were gradually and strategically attempting to negotiate their political 
destiny ahead of the 2013 elections. This was significant to the Muslims as 
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the changing political alignment would similarly have an effect on all the 
different groups in the country. Like other Kenyans, the community has a 
considerable role to play in shaping the country’s political future, and since 
the introduction of multiparty politics their voices have been heard in the po-
litical domain. Muslims’ remarkable participation in national politics was ev-
ident in both the 2007 elections and 2010 referendum exercise that captured 
the attention of the country. Both Muslim leaders and organizations played 
a historical and momentous role by successfully mobilizing Muslims to take 
a certain political direction dictated by the prevailing events. Therefore, the 
Balala saga demonstrates the Muslims’ efforts to keep and maintain the mo-
mentum of their participation in national politics.
It is common in Kenya for politicians to give in to the demands of various 
groups during election periods in order to win support. Muslims have capi-
talized on this trend and always come up with demands during this period as 
a condition for their support. In chapter 2, I have shown that certain Muslim 
issues acquired electoral saliency during Moi’s tenure as the president of Ken-
ya, in particular the issues of the law of succession and the screening of Soma-
li Muslims to ascertain their citizenship. In both matters, I have shown how 
President Moi ceded to Muslims’ demands to appease them in an election pe-
riod. This behavior by the political leadership to pacify certain sections of the 
population for the purpose of winning elections is common in the country.
In preparation for the 2007 general elections, two issues of particular 
concern to Muslims were the Anti- Terrorism Bill of 2006 (after the failed 
Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003) and the debate over the Kadhi courts. 
As discussed in chapter 4, the proposed antiterrorism legislation was widely 
criticized by Muslim leaders, who vowed to mobilize the community against 
the government (read President Kibaki reelection) in the impending 2007 
elections if the bill was not withdrawn. Also in chapter 4, I have shown how 
the debate on the entrenchment of the Kadhi courts in the Kenyan constitu-
tion emerged to be an emotional issue between Christians and Muslims in 
the country. Following the spiteful termination of deliberations on the Bomas 
Draft Constitution, the government took over the process. In August 2005, At-
torney General Amos Wako produced another draft of the constitution, which 
came to be popularly known as the “Wako Draft.” The government appeared 
determined to appease the Christian opposition through the Wako Draft by 
substituting a religious courts section for the Kadhi court clause in the In-
dependence Constitution. The section on religious courts found in article 
195(1) of the Wako Draft stated that “there are established Christian courts, 
Kadhi Courts and Hindu courts.”17 The removal of any reference to Kadhi 
courts was interpreted by Muslims as an insult; they felt that the provision for 
religious courts had curtailed the prestige of the Kadhi courts held in the In-
dependence Constitution. The Wako Draft’s intention was to indirectly retain 
the Kadhi courts while pacifying– – mostly– – the Christians with the opportu-
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nity to establish religious courts. No consideration was given to the question 
of whether the community wanted the courts, much less whether such a court 
even existed within the Christian tradition in Kenya. When a referendum was 
held in November 2005 on the Wako Draft, the results indicted a rejection of 
the proposed law. Although there could be other reasons that contributed to 
the defeat of the Wako Draft, Muslim leaders’ vigorous campaign against the 
proposed law certainly aided its denunciation by the community. With 2007 
elections approaching, Muslim leaders picked the two issues most critical 
to them to demonstrate government insensitivity to Muslims’ interest. In a 
charged presidential election campaign, the 2007 MOU came into existence, 
in which Muslim leaders set out to mobilize the community against Kiba-
ki’s reelection. The outcome of the 2007 presidential election was controver-
sial and led to the 2008 postelection violence, which culminated in a peace 
agreement that forced Kibaki to share power with his archrival, Odinga.
Among the important topics concerning Muslims that featured in the 
2013 election period was the war on terror. A section of Muslim leaders, espe-
cially the clerics, strongly harbor the notion that Muslims have for a long time 
been mistreated and discriminated against in the fight on terrorism. Numer-
ous calls have been made by these leaders to the government to consciously 
reverse this trend by ensuring that the law is adhered to and human rights 
principles are respected when dealing with suspects of terrorism. Prominently 
featured in the war on terror narrative was the demand for the return of Mus-
lims who are held in Uganda for their alleged role in the July 2010 Kampala 
bombings.18 There is a widely held perception among Muslim human rights 
activists that the government is not committed to the plight of the seven Mus-
lims who were detained in Uganda after their arrest in the country and subse-
quent deportation. This government decision to extradite its own citizens to 
another country has been challenged by some Muslim leaders as illegal and a 
violation of the suspects’ rights.19 Similarly, Muslim human rights activists are 
irked by the detention of another Muslim, Muhammad Abdulmalik, in the 
Guantanamo Bay camp supposedly without judicial process of the law. While 
the Obama administration is purportedly eager to facilitate the prisoners’ re-
turn to their respective home countries as a precursor to ultimately closing 
down the facility, “Kenya remains among the few countries” that “have not 
shown interest in taking back its citizen.”20 Therefore, it is likely that Muslim 
leaders insisted from the various presidential candidates seeking the commu-
nity’s support reassurance that Muslims’ rights would not be violated in pur-
suit of the war on terror.
In October 2011 the Kenya Defence Forces moved into Somalia to en-
gage the al- Shabaab militia accused of continued hostility that risked under-
mining Kenya’s economic and security interests. In the face of deliberate 
infringement of its territorial sovereignty and national economy by the al- 
Shabaab, the government resolved to pursue the terror group inside Somalia. 
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However, the military operation into Somalia has remained a sensitive issue 
that informed Kenyan Muslims’ political campaign themes. Amid the con-
tinuing war in Somalia, the government embarked on a diplomatic assign-
ment to solicit support for the operation. Among the foreign countries that 
endorsed Kenya’s storming into Somalia was the state of Israel. In addition 
to approving the war on al- Shabaab, Israel supposedly pledged to assist in 
eliminating the “danger of fundamentalism in the region.”21 While there is 
appreciation among Muslims for the need to have allies for the success of 
the military mission, they are apprehensive about incorporating Israel’s assis-
tance into the campaign. The Muslim leaders are critical of Israel’s backing, 
claiming that many Muslims in the world regard this state to hold policies 
considered to be anti- Islamic. Therefore, according to them, it would be 
incongruous for the Kenyan government to declare that the “al- Shabaab is a 
threat to regional peace,” but incorporate Israel in its mission, which is “con-
sidered by many Muslims” to be the “biggest threat to peace and stability in 
the Middle East.”22 The leaders suggested that the government should follow 
the example of the United States, which during the Gulf War, despite the 
need for partners to advance its campaign against Iraq, decided to exclude 
Israel, whose presence would have hurt Muslim sensibilities. Arguably, in its 
effort against terrorism in the country, Israel is alleged to play a behind- the- 
scenes role, particularly in its “brutal interrogation procedures and torture of 
individuals detained on terrorism activities.”23 The Muslims’ concern is that 
Israel’s involvement would encourage violation of Muslims’ human rights 
in the country on the pretext of “supporting the war on terrorism and funda-
mentalism.”24 To dispel such mistrust, the Muslim leaders suggested to the 
government the need to have an adviser on Muslim affairs. This is because 
occasionally the Kenyan government has undertaken measures done for the 
interest of the country but which turned out to raise suspicion among Mus-
lims. Such unpopular measures have increased Muslims’ resentment toward 
the state.
The intent of this book is to trace the political history of the Muslim commu-
nity in Kenya and situate it in the present unfolding political scenarios in the 
country. To that effect, several issues related to Muslim politics were exam-
ined, but gender empowerment and security concerns appear problematic 
matters that call for investigation. The presence of religion in public affairs 
cannot be ignored because on a daily basis the media provides statements by 
religious leaders that have a continuing relevance to the political realm. Due 
to perceived proximity of religious leaders to people, they believe that they are 
capable of influencing and determining grassroots political directions. This is 
why during the 2010 referendum on the proposed constitution of Kenya, the 
religious sector held different views, with each religious body entrenching 
their followers in a specific position.
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It is clear that Kenyan Muslims have been a large and an active constitu-
ent of Kenyan politics for a long time, participating in the country’s political 
process, in both its democratic and nondemocratic aspects. Muslims have in 
distinct capacities represented various political parties in Kenya during both 
the colonial and postcolonial periods. Since the rekindling of democratic 
process in the 1990s, the political engagement of Kenyan Muslims has also 
undergone much transformation. With the transition to competitive politics 
in the 1990s, the role of politicized Islam has become more visible, posing 
challenges to Kenya’s political structures. The development has also chal-
lenged the Muslim community, with new identities driven by racial, ethnic, 
and sometimes party loyalty appearing in the Muslim political scene. The 
emerging various Muslim identities have hampered their ability to create a 
united political voice, making it difficult to overcome their perceived mar-
ginalization and discrimination. Therefore, this book has demonstrated how 
the “marginalization” theme and the intra- Muslim divisions have been major 
factors of Muslim politics in Kenya.
The creation of SUPKEM in early 1970s was an attempt by Muslims to 
resolve their internal differences and unify their efforts for the benefit of the 
community. But even the founding of SUPKEM did not provide a significant 
change in the relationship between Muslims and the state, as SUPKEM tend-
ed to side with government authorities whenever Muslims’ political interests 
conflicted with those of the state. So far the most serious attempt to unite 
Kenyan Muslims politically was witnessed after the introduction of multipar-
tism in early 1990s with the formation of the IPK. However, ethnic and racial 
differences of Muslims weakened their efforts to present a united political 
voice. Allegedly, the various postcolonial regimes have exploited these differ-
ences through clandestine support of competing Muslim groups as evident in 
the foundation of the UMA, perceived as the authentic voice of the “African” 
Muslims, as opposed to the “Arab” element purportedly dominating the IPK, 
and also the unexpected official recognition of the Shirikisho Party, held to be 
a Digo Muslim political organization. It is this division among Muslims that 
some of the postcolonial administrations utilized to weaken the community 
politically. This situation would not have arisen if Muslims in Kenya had 
been a united monolithic political voice, but due to ethnic and racial binaries 
it has been difficult to attain this unity. Although Muslim leadership presents 
itself as the custodian of Muslim interests and dedicated to rendering services 
to the entire community, ethnic and racial identities have weakened this as-
piration. Despite energetic efforts to portray the community as united, most 
Muslim leaders in Kenya have more ethnic and racial interests at heart than 
religious concerns.
Nevertheless, there are moments that Muslims are united irrespective of 
their race or ethnicity when they feel that their right to observe their religion 
is threatened. The case studies of selected legislation opposed by Muslims 
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support such a reading of Muslim politics in Kenya. Whenever Muslims feel 
that their interests as a group are under threat, as in the case of the Equality 
Bill, the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, or the issue of the Kadhi courts, they 
display a high degree of unity. Repressive measures by the state such as the 
restrictive policy of issuing national documents to sections of the Muslim 
population increases the sense of marginalization among Muslims, but does 
not have the same effect of enhancing Muslim unity. It is clear that when it 
comes to pursuing objectives that are not related to the entire community, 
Muslims tend to abandon their Islamic identity and appear divided along ra-
cial and ethnic lines. The contours of this dialectics show Muslims’ complex 
engagement in national politics, which is not always a monolithic phenom-
enon. There have been variant Muslim political voices throughout Kenya’s 
history influenced primarily by ethnic and racial considerations, as indicated 
by the different Muslim political parties and associations.
The recurring “marginalization” theme among Kenyan Muslims is linked 
to the important role education plays in society. The introduction of formal 
secular education in Kenya is attributed to the efforts of Christian missionar-
ies who established the earliest mission school at a coastal village of Rabai in 
1846. Their education was closely bound with missionary work that intended 
to spread Christianity to as many Africans as possible. Later, as a result of the 
partnership between the colonial administration and the various missionary 
groups, many Kenyans were exposed to formal education. In spite of the inte-
gration of some Muslims into the British administration of indirect rule, Mus-
lims did not capitalize on their privileged position, particularly on the coast. 
Muslims failed to seize the educational opportunities offered by the colonial 
regime, which in some cases they deliberately ignored. This has placed them 
in a disadvantageous position, heightening the perception of marginalization 
and discrimination. Presently, there is a degree of regretful self- criticism within 
the community, as many Muslims lament the unwillingness of an earlier gen-
eration to send their children to missionary schools where they feared being 
corrupted by secular education. There is now a growing demand for secular 
education among Muslims as indicated by the increasing number of schools in 
virtually every place where there is a significant population of Muslims.
Even with the growing demand for secular education, there is concern 
among Muslims that they have continued to lag behind in their performance 
in the national examinations compared to other groups in Kenya.25 This led 
to the creation of the Muslim Education and Welfare Association (MEWA) 
in the 1980s to find ways of improving the education of Muslims. Since its 
inception, MEWA has done steady work, providing scholarships despite its 
limited budget. Their work is, however, largely restricted to Mombasa, not 
covering other parts of the country. Perhaps because of its limited scope, in 
the 1990s the Malindi Education and Development Association (MEDA), 
though not formally a Muslim body, has come into prominence pursuing 
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a similar model. Through raising funds partly from the Muslim community 
and partly from external donors for specific projects, the organization is in the 
forefront of empowering Muslims educationally by emphasizing the value of 
secular education. The consequence of these efforts has been a steady growth 
in the number of Muslim graduates and professionals in Kenya. But while 
many Muslims now share the general Kenyan belief that secular school edu-
cation is the panacea for almost all problems, the problem of how to combine 
secular study with religious education remains fundamental.26
With accessibility to education, an increasing number of Muslim women 
have capitalized on the opportunity to be educated, enabling them to hold 
important positions in both the corporate and government sector, making 
their contribution to the money economy visible. Equipped with intellectual 
power, a set of Muslim women has been appearing on the Kenyan politi-
cal stage since the 1990s, sometimes taking their campaigns to the mosque. 
Though their appearance is not attributed to their faith, their presence in 
Kenya’s political space illustrates their desire to gain access to participation in 
public life. The actions of this group of educated Muslim women are chal-
lenging both Kenyan society and their respective Muslim communities, both 
of which are patriarchal. Because of educational empowerment, these Mus-
lim women have challenged the male superiority that is dominant in their 
community.
In Kenya, there is a widely held belief that most Muslim women seek legal 
redress on various issues related to their personal affairs in the Kadhi courts, 
leading to these courts being branded as “women’s courts.” It is through the 
Kadhi courts that Muslim women have received rulings in their favor. Though 
Muslims in Kenya successfully lobbied for the entrenchment of the courts in 
the country’s constitution, there is need to reform the courts to make them 
more advantageous to women. Despite being frequently visited by women, 
these courts are male dominated as there is no single Muslim woman judge 
in their ranks. With opportunities of education, soon Kenyan Muslims will 
notice the rise of Muslim women demanding more rights and fundamental 
changes in the sharia, which would influence reforms in the Kadhi courts. It 
is through comprehensive reforms that Muslim women in Kenya will be able 
to occupy the office of the Kadhi courts as judges.
I have also shown in this study that international terrorism attributed to al- 
Qaeda and al- Shabaab movements poses a security challenge to Kenya. Apart 
from al- Shabaab conducting military recruitment in the country, reports indi-
cate that the Kenyan government had also recruited youths among the Ken-
yan Somalis, as mercenaries for the fragile Somalia TFG. The government 
strongly refuted the allegations, denying any involvement in a scheme that 
is preparing Kenyan youths for the Somalia mission. However, according to 
the report, several youths received military training in various camps in the 
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country, raising the concerns of the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights and Muslim leaders that upon accomplishing their mission, the youth 
would return and a pose a security threat given their training and experience 
in the war zone.27 It is likely that the enlisted youths would engage in activities 
of lawlessness considering that most of them would be jobless upon return. 
This is cited as a long- term repercussion such an exercise would have on the 
country.
Due to the porous nature of the Kenyan borders, members of terrorist 
movements have easily moved in and out of the country undetected, find-
ing sanctuaries with the local Muslim communities from which they have 
succeeded in planning their destructive activities. This has led to occasional 
police raids in certain neighborhoods to round up illegal foreigners in the 
country. For instance, in Nairobi such police raids are conducted in mostly 
Somali neighborhoods, leading to arrests of hundreds of illegal immigrants. 
Though the target is to apprehend non- Kenyan Somalis, there are cases of 
Kenyan Somalis also being arrested in the process. This is due to lack of prop-
er scrutiny by law enforcement agents, which has been perceived by some 
Somali leaders as discrimination and further “marginalization” of Muslims.28 
As a result, “Muslims feel they have been vilified as aliens, ‘terrorist sym-
pathizers’ and collectively punished through arrests and intimidation.”29 But 
before condemning the actions of the law enforcers as discriminatory, it is 
important to examine the difficulties they face in distinguishing a genuine 
Somali Kenyan citizen from an illegal Somali immigrant. Through bribery 
and forgery, a number of illegal Somali immigrants have acquired Kenyan 
national documents, a crime abetted by government officials “who give false 
witness claiming that the foreigners are Kenyans,” thereby complicating the 
search efforts.30
Such claims of collective oppression by some local Muslim activists con-
flate valid security issues with religious ones, misinterpreting legitimate law 
enforcement to mean generalized discrimination against Muslims. However, 
there are cases when Muslims have genuine concerns to complain and pro-
test, including instances where police invade the privacy of Muslim homes 
in offensive ways. Rather than regarding the raids as religious discrimination, 
Muslim leaders could identify specific instances where transgressions have 
occurred and endeavor to resolve the mistreatment with the law enforcement 
hierarchy. Certainly, there are other Kenyans who would not accept ignoring 
the security threat of the country because the culprits are associated with a 
particular faith. There is no doubt that the recurrence of terrorist attacks in 
the country raises concern and calls for stiff measures against terrorism. The 
Kenyan government needs to be vigilant and take drastic action against terror-
ists because if left unchecked they will wreak havoc on the already vulnerable 
security and religious relations.
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The book shows that a major contributory factor to the politicization of 
Islam in Kenya has been the failure of the government to recognize the po-
litical role of Muslims in the country. This has created a sense of marginal-
ization among Muslims, which has enhanced their resolve to resort to polit-
icized Islam. Since Kenya is a democratic state, it should allow individuals 
and religious groups to enjoy constitutional guarantees with regard to their 
relation with the state. This includes the right of the various sections of the 
population not only to worship as they wish, but also to promote their val-
ues in civil society by creating organizations within the country. According 
to democratic principles, it is wrong to prohibit any societal group, including 
religious groups, from forming a political party. It is only permissible to im-
pose restrictions on political parties once their activities are observed to be 
inimical to democracy.
Though this book is about Muslim politics in Kenya, the field study did 
not extensively cover all the regions principally inhabited by Muslims in the 
country. The study was restricted to Nairobi (the capital city) and Mombasa 
(the heartland of Islam in Kenya) where selected individuals and officials of 
certain Muslim organizations were interviewed. Although the present study 
may therefore not claim to represent the entire Muslim population of Kenya, 
it can nevertheless reveal the most prominent trends and positions. Further 
research will be able to reflect the views of Muslims in the grass roots. Due to 
this limitation, there are events and statements that I may have overlooked. 
The task of refining and improving this understanding will lie with other 
researchers. It is my hope that scholars with interest in Muslim politics in 
Kenya will be able to expand the analysis presented. The degree to which 
Kenyan Muslims’ political culture is shaped by Islamic values has remained 
unstudied. Islamic tenets emphasize a communal solidarity, and their con-
sequences for politics need to be investigated within the Kenyan context. 
Also, like most women in Kenya, many Muslim women continue to be pas-
sive recipients of social change despite being forced by the changing global 
economy to enter the wage- earning public sector, which is still defined along 
the lines of the privileged male. Therefore, future research could examine 
the political participation of Muslim women in Kenya in the context of a 
minority within the minority Muslim community, so as to provide insight 
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